Connell v. Crosby

• Decision Date: 23 June 1904
• Citation: 71 N.E. 350,210 Ill. 380
• Parties: CONNELL et al. v. CROSBY.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

210 Ill. 380

71 N.E. 350

CONNELL et al.

v.CROSBY.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 23, 1904.

Appeal from Mercer County Court; W. T. Church, Judge.

Proceeding by the county treasurer of Mercer county against James H. Connell and another to recover an inheritance tax on the estate of William Drury, deceased. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendants appeal. Reversed.L. D. Thomason, for appellants.

Howland J. Hamlin, Atty. Gen., and William J. Graham, State's Atty. (Henry E. Burgess, of counsel), for appellee.

BOGGS, J.

This was a proceeding instituted in the county court of Mercer county by the appellee, county treasurer of the county, under the provisions of sections 13, 14, and 15 of the act entitled ‘An act to tax gifts, legacies and inheritances,’ etc., approved June 15, 1895 (Hurd's Rev. St. 1899, c. 120, pars. 378-380), and to fix and recover the amount of the inheritance tax alleged to be payable by James H. Connell, executor, and Vashti Drury, executrix, of the last will of William Drury, deceased. The proceeding resulted in the entry of an order in the said county court finding that said executor and executrix should in that capacity pay to the county treasurer of Mercer county the sum of $3,310.23, with interest thereon at 6 per cent. per annum from the 13th day of March, 1897, as inheritance tax on the trust funds in the hands of said executrix and executor. This is an appeal perfected to reverse that order.

It is first insisted the county court erred in overruling the contention of the appellants that the county court was wanting in power and jurisdiction to entertain and determine the proceeding, and that the circuit court of Mercer county was vested with such jurisdiction. William Drury was a resident of Mercer county, and died therein. Section 13 of said act of 1895 (paragraph 378 of said chapter 120 of the statute) expressly clothes the county court of the county in which the decedent was a resident at the time of his death with jurisdiction to entertain, hear, and determine such proceedings. But at the time of the death of said William Drury said appellant James H. Connell, who was one of the executors of the will of the deceased, was the judge of the county court of Mercer county, and the matter of the settlement of the estate was for that reason certified to the circuit court of Mercer county, in obedience to the requirements of section 114 of chapter 37 of Hurd's Revised Statutes of 1899 (paragraph 204), and the circuit court thereupon proceeded to adjust and settle the matters pertaining to the estate.

Section 4 of the act of June 15, 1895 (Hurd's Rev. St. 1899, c. 120, par. 369), after requiring administrators and executors to deduct from any trust or legacy or money for distribution any tax that may be payable therefrom, and, if such legacy or property be not in money, to collect the tax, on the appraised value thereof from the legatee or person entitled, provides, if the legacy or property be not in money, such administrator or executor shall ‘make application to the court having jurisdiction of his accounts, to make an apportionment if the case requires it of the sum to be paid into his hands by such legatees, and for such further order relative thereof as the case may acquire.’ When the application at bar was filed, the term of office of the said executor as judge of the county court of Mercer county had expired, and his successor had been elected and inducted into office, but the circuit court of Mercer county still had and held jurisdiction of the accounts of the executors of said estate, and for that reason it is argued that, under the provisions of said section 4 (paragraph 369) before referred to, the application should have been made to the circuit court.

Section 13 of the inheritance tax act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1899, c. 120, par. 378) expressly confers jurisdiction on the county court of the county wherein the deceased resided at the time of his death ‘to hear and determine all questions in relations to the tax arising under the provisions of this act.’ Section 14 (paragraph 379) authorizes the issuance of summons out of that court, and provides the pleading and practice, and for the hearing and determination of the proceedings, and for the fees and costs accruing therein; and section 15 (paragraph 380) makes it the duty of the state's attorney of the county, if he has cause to believe a tax is due and unpaid, to ‘prosecute the proceeding in the county court of the proper county, as provided in section 14 of this act for the enforcement and collection of such tax.’

Said sections 13, 14, and 15 of the act of 1895 clothe the county court with jurisdiction of proceedings to collect the tax, and provide a complete code of procedure in such cases, and we do not think the provisions of section 4 of the act, hereinbefore quoted, have any effect to oust the county court of jurisdiction of such proceeding, and to lodge such jurisdiction in the circuit court, in the cases of estates which have been certified to the latter court for settlement. The provisions of said section 4 do not relate to proceedings on the part of the state's attorney, acting as the representative of the public, to enforce the collection of the tax, but only to the course to be pursued by an executor or administrator in the event questions arise as to the apportionment of taxes in the course of the settlement of the affairs of the estate. There was no intent, in framing that provision, to deprive the county court in any event of jurisdiction of proceedings on the part of the state to collect the tax.

The will of the decedent directed that 91/100 of the residue of his estate should be devoted by his executors to the founding of an institution in Mercer county, to be called the ‘William and Vashti College,’ for the purpose of diffusing knowledge ‘along polytechnic lines, where the education would be practical and of a mechanical and industrial character as well as scientific and classical, and free from denominational or sectarian bias or influence.’ Said William Drury died on March 13, 1897. Under the statute then in force, bequests for educational purposes were subject to the payment of the inheritance or succession tax. Subsequently, on July 1, 1901, the statute was so amended as to exempt bequests for educational purposes. Hurd's Rev. St. 1901, c. 120, par. 367a. The petition of the state's attorney, in the case at bar, for the collection of the tax on this bequest, was not filed until after the amendatory act of 1901 had been adopted and become effective. The appellants contend the right to collect the tax on this bequest for educational purposes, which arose at the time of the death of the said William Drury, was not a complete and valid right, but was a mere inchoate right, and so remained executory until the proceeding provided by the statute for the collection of the tax should be at least begun, if not completed, and that the exemption of bequests of this character from liability to pay the tax, which was effected by the act of 1901, operated to destroy the mere executory right to demand and collect a tax on the bequest for educational purposes.

The amendatory act of 1901 does not in terms repeal the former act. It contains no saving clause, nor does it in terms purport to affect in any way any right, whether vested or inchoate, which might then exist. Section 4 of chapter 131 (Hurd's Rev. St. 1899, p. 1650) furnishes the guide for determining the effect to be given the amendatory enactment. That section provides: ‘No new law shall be construed to repeal a former law, whether such former law is expressly repealed or not, as to any * * * right accrued or claim arising under the former law, or in any way whatever to affect * * * any right accrued or claim arising before the new law takes effect, save only that the proceedings thereafter shall conform, so far as practicable, to the laws in force at the time of such proceedings.’ It is to be assumed the amendatory act was framed in view of the provisions of said section 4 of chapter 131, and that it was the legislative intent the amendatory act should have prospective operation only. Statutes declaring the effect of or the construction to be given subsequently enacted repealing acts will be deemed operative and effective by the courts, unless a contrary intent is plainly manifested in the later enactment. Farmer v. People, 77 Ill. 322; 26 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d Ed.) 681. The right which accrued or the claim which arose to the tax, under the statute in force at the time of the death of the testator, was therefore unaffected, and remained enforceable, notwithstanding the subsequent enactment exempting bequests for educational purposes from the tax. Farmer v. People, supra; Provident Hospital v. People, 198 Ill. 495, 64 N. E. 1031.

The decedent died seised of the title to real estate which was situate in states other than Illinois. The testator, by his will, directed that his just debts should be paid and Ed. L. Drury acquitted of all his liabilities to the deceased, and bequeathed the sum of $10,000 to Vashti, his wife, as her sole and absolute property, and devised and bequeathed the cesidue of his property, both real and personal, to his wife for and during her natural life, and bequeathed the property remaining after the death of his wife to the appellant James H. Connell, in trust, and directed said Connell to convert the property, both real and personal, into money, and to divide the fund so produced into 100 parts, of equal amounts, and to pay 9 of such shares to specified legatees, and to devote the remaining 91/100 of the residue to founding the said William and Vashti College. The testator left neither child, children, nor descendants thereof. The widow, Vashti, renounced the provisions of the will, and elected to take, in lieu of such provisions made for her in the will, and in lieu of dower, one-half of all the real and...