Connell v. Hamon

Citation361 Ga.App. 830,863 S.E.2d 744
Decision Date18 October 2021
Docket NumberA21A0925
Parties CONNELL et al. v. HAMON, as Surviving Child of James Isaac Dickens, Jr., Deceased.
CourtUnited States Court of Appeals (Georgia)

Alphonso Avery Howell IV, Gregory Tyson Talley, for Appellant.

Robert D. Howell, Moultrie, for Appellee.

Gobeil, Judge.

Winston Clark Connell, M. D., and South Georgia Emergency Medicine Associates, P.C., (collectively, the "Defendants") appeal from the trial court's order denying their motion for judgment on the pleadings in this wrongful death action. The Defendants argue that the trial court erred by concluding that Diane Dickens Hamon ("Plaintiff") has standing to bring a wrongful death action on behalf of her late father, James Isaac Dickens, Jr. (the "Decedent"). They contend that the court's ruling expands the equitable exception to Georgia's Wrongful Death Act, OCGA § 51-4-1 et seq. "in an unprecedented manner[,] which renders the statute's standing rules meaningless, and allows the adult children of a deceased to usurp the statutory rights of the decedent's surviving spouse." As explained below, we conclude that the trial court erred by finding that Plaintiff has standing, pursuant to an overly expanded interpretation of an equitable exception to OCGA § 51-4-2, to file a claim on behalf of the Decedent. We therefore reverse the trial court's denial of the Defendantsmotion for judgment on the pleadings.1

It is well settled that, on motion for judgment on the pleadings, we treat all well-pled material allegations by the nonmovant as true and all denials by the movant as false. Although such motion is, by definition, limited to the pleadings, a trial court may also consider exhibits that have been incorporated into the pleadings. If, in reviewing these documents, there is a complete failure by the plaintiff to state a cause of action, then the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

NKN Enterprises, LLC v. Branch Banking & Trust Co. , 335 Ga. App. 70, 71, 780 S.E.2d 777 (2015) (citations and punctuation omitted). So viewed, the record shows that Plaintiff, the sole surviving adult child of the Decedent, filed a medical malpractice action against the Defendants for the wrongful death of her father. In her complaint, Plaintiff alleged in pertinent part that at the time of the Decedent's death, he was married to, but had long been separated from, Lisa Dickens ("Dickens"); that Dickens refused to bring a wrongful death claim in her capacity as surviving spouse because she had been separated from the Decedent for several years; and that Plaintiff filed the action in her individual capacity as the Decedent's sole surviving child and in the representative capacity for Dickens. Plaintiff highlighted that Dickens's failure to bring a wrongful death action within the applicable statute of limitation left Plaintiff with no other adequate remedy.

The Defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that, although Plaintiff might be entitled to share in the proceeds from any recovery in a suit, the Wrongful Death Act, and specifically OCGA § 51-4-2, barred the lawsuit due to Plaintiff's lack of standing. The Defendants maintained that Dickens, as the Decedent's surviving spouse, retained exclusive standing to pursue a wrongful death claim.2

Following a hearing, the trial court denied the Defendants’ motion. Specifically, the court explained: "in consideration of the particular facts and circumstance of this case, the [c]ourt finds that [Plaintiff], as surviving child of the [D]ecedent, fits under an equitable exception to the ‘spousal standing’ rule [and] is a proper party to bring the above-captioned wrongful death action." The trial court certified its order for immediate review, and we granted the Defendants’ application for interlocutory review. See Case No. A21I0073 (granted Nov. 5, 2020). This appeal followed.

There is no common law right to file a claim for wrongful death; the claim is entirely a statutory creation. In Georgia, wrongful death claims are only permitted under the auspices of the Wrongful Death Act, OCGA § 51-4-1 et seq. Being in derogation of common law, the scope of the Wrongful Death Act must be limited in strict accordance with the statutory language used therein, and such language can never be extended beyond its plain and ordinary meaning. The express language of the Act will be followed literally and no exceptions to the requirements of the Act will be read into the statute by the courts. In construing any statute, we must, of course, give meaning to and harmonize all parts of the statute to give them sensible and intelligent effect, while avoiding constructions that make any part of the statute mere surplusage.

Tolbert v. Maner , 271 Ga. 207, 208 (1), 518 S.E.2d 423 (1999) (citation and punctuation omitted). OCGA § 51-4-2 provides, in relevant part:

(a) The surviving spouse or, if there is no surviving spouse, a child or children, either minor or sui juris, may recover for the homicide of the spouse or parent the full value of the life of the decedent, as shown by the evidence.
(b) (1) If an action for wrongful death is brought by a surviving spouse under subsection (a) of this Code section and the surviving spouse dies pending the action, the action shall survive to the child or children of the decedent.
(2) If an action for wrongful death is brought by a child or children under subsection (a) of this Code section and one of the children dies pending the action, the action shall survive to the surviving child or children.

There is no dispute that Decedent's surviving spouse, Dickens, was alive when Plaintiff filed the wrongful death action, creating an issue as to standing. See OCGA § 51-4-2 (a) ; King v. Goodwin , 277 Ga. App. 188, 189-190, 626 S.E.2d 165 (2006) (affirming grant of summary judgment to defendant on wrongful death claim where the estate (the only party plaintiff) lacked standing to sue). The issue here is whether the trial court was authorized to exercise its equity jurisdiction to grant standing to Plaintiff under the circumstances in this case.

Before addressing the application of the equitable exception to this case, it is helpful to consider the origin and history of equitable powers in this State. "[Georgia's] Constitution vests general equitable powers in the superior court." Brown v. Liberty Oil & Refining Corp. , 261 Ga. 214, 215-216 (2) (b), 403 S.E.2d 806 (1991) (footnote omitted). Specifically, our Constitution provides:

The superior courts shall have jurisdiction in all cases, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution. They shall have exclusive jurisdiction over trials in felony cases, except in the case of juvenile offenders as provided by law; in cases respecting title to land; and in divorce cases. They shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the state-wide business court in equity cases.

Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Par. I. See also Allen v. Allen , 260 Ga. 777, 779 (3) n. 2, 400 S.E.2d 15 (1991) (when the legislature conferred equity powers upon superior courts in 1799, it adopted the whole system of English jurisprudence, common law, and chancery).

However, equity jurisdiction is only available in certain circumstances. Under OCGA § 23-1-3, "[e]quity jurisdiction is established and allowed for the protection and relief of parties where, from any peculiar circumstances, the operation of the general rules of law would be deficient in protecting from anticipated wrong or relieving for injuries done." Significantly, to invoke the equity jurisdiction of a court, "a party ... must first identify some legally cognizable ‘wrong’ or ‘injury’ that needs to be remedied." Williford v. Brown , 299 Ga. 15, 18 (3), 785 S.E.2d 864 (2016) (punctuation omitted). As this Court has held, a trial court has "broad discretion to fashion an equitable remedy based upon the exigencies of the case, and an appellate court sustains the trial court's action where such discretion has not been abused." Tafel v. Lion Antique Cars & Investments, Inc. , 297 Ga. 334, 339 (4), 773 S.E.2d 743 (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted). But, as our Supreme Court has clarified:

[T]he first maxim of equity is that equity follows the law. Thus, a court of equity has no more right than a court of law to act on its own notion of what is right in a particular case.
Where rights are defined and established by existing legal principles, they may not be changed or unsettled in equity. Although equity does seek to do complete justice, it must do so within the parameters of the law.

Dolinger v. Driver , 269 Ga. 141, 143 (4), 498 S.E.2d 252 (1998) (citations and punctuation omitted).

Georgia courts first applied the equitable exception to exclusive spousal standing to bring wrongful death actions in Brown , 261 Ga. at 214-216, 403 S.E.2d 806. In that case, minor children filed a wrongful death action to recover damages for the death of their mother after the surviving spouse abandoned the children and could not be located; and the trial court dismissed the action for lack of standing. Id. at 214, 403 S.E.2d 806. The minor children appealed, arguing that it was "within the equity powers of the superior court to permit the prosecution of their claim in order to protect their interests when the surviving spouse refuses to do so." Id. at 215 (2) (a), 403 S.E.2d 806. In support of their argument, the minor children cited OCGA § 23-1-3 (as outlined above), and OCGA § 23-4-20, which provides that "[a]ny person who may not bring an action at law may complain in equity and every person who is remediless elsewhere may claim the protection and assistance of equity to enforce any right recognized by the law." In reversing the trial court's dismissal of the action, our Supreme Court wrote:

[o]ur Constitution vests general equitable powers in the superior court. We hold that the factual circumstances of this case demand the exercise of those powers to preserve the rights
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