Connell v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n

• Decision Date: 10 June 1908
• Parties: CONNELL v. IOWA STATE TRAVELING MEN'S ASS'N.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

139 Iowa 444

116 N.W. 820

CONNELL

v.IOWA STATE TRAVELING MEN'S ASS'N.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

June 10, 1908.

Appeal from District Court, Polk County; W. H. McHenry, Judge.

A certificate of life insurance was issued by defendant on the life of Thomas D. Connell, October 7, 1905. He died October 24, 1906, and in this action a beneficiary demands the indemnity stipulated. A verdict was directed for defendant, and judgment entered accordingly. The plaintiff appeals. Reversed.Parrish & Dowell and George R. Sanderson, for appellant.

Sullivan & Sullivan, for appellee.

LADD, C. J.

Three defenses are interposed to recovery on the certificate of insurance issued to deceased: (1) That death resulted from suicide, the by-laws exempting the company from liability in such a case, regardless of the sanity or insanity of the assured; and (2) that written notice of death was not given, as required by the by-laws; and (3) that death resulted from the discharge of firearms in the absence of an eyewitness, the by-laws providing in that event there should be no liability. These propositions may be disposed of in the order mentioned. Near noon on October 24, 1906, the deceased was found about 4 feet from Birdland, a driveway in Des Moines from Sixth avenue north of the Des Moines river through Woodland to Union Park, about a third of the way from the Gun Club to the street railway bridge. He was lying on his back under a tree, with his head to the west, his left arm resting on the body and extending down near the abdomen, and his right arm extending over the stomach to the elbow of the left. There was a bullet wound at the parietal eminence; that is, above and in front of the ear, near the part of the hair on the left side of the head. There was no indication of the direction of the bullet, and no powder marks or other discoloration near were noticed. Deceased had a handful of cartridges in his right trouser pocket. A revolver was lying beneath the left elbow. Two chambers were empty, and the others loaded. Death resulted from the wound. Appellee insists that the evidence proved suicidal death, and no doubt such an inference might be drawn. But we do not regard the evidence as conclusive. The circumstances were not necessarily inconsistent with the conclusion that it might have been homicidal, nor is the inference that it was accidental necessarily excluded. The burden of proof was on the association to establish this defense. The presumption that death was accidental has the force of affirmative evidence, and before it can be said that the defense conclusively is established, the facts and circumstances proven must be such as to exclude any other reasonable hypothesis than that it resulted from suicide. Stephenson v. Bankers' Life Ass'n, 108 Iowa, 637, 79 N. W. 459. In that case the theory that death was self-inflicted had much stronger support in the evidence than in the case at bar, and yet the court held that the issue was for the jury. In Inghram v. National Union, 103 Iowa, 404, 72 N. W. 559, and also in Beverly v. Supreme Tent Maccabees, 115 Iowa, 526, 88 N. W. 1054, the evidence was such as to lead irresistibly to but the one conclusion that death was self-inflicted. No advantage is to be derived from a reviver of the cases, for the facts of no two are alike. The plain recital of the facts is the best answer to the contention that the inference of suicide was necessarily to be drawn therefrom. The issue was for the jury.

2. The by-laws of the association exacted written notice of death of a member within 15 days after its occurrence. None was given until about 20 days thereafter, but appellant contends that the above provision is void. Section 1820 of the Code, found in chapter 8, tit. 9, declares “No stipulation or condition in any policy or contract of insurance or beneficiary certificate issued by any company or association mentioned or referred to in this chapter, limiting the time to a period of less than one year after knowledge by the beneficiary within which notice or proofs of death or the occurrence of other contingency insured against must be given, shall be valid.” Associations referred to in the chapter are defined by section 1784 of the chapter previous: “Every corporation organized upon the stipulated premium plan or assessment plan, for the purpose of insuring the lives of individuals or furnishing benefits to the widows, heirs, orphans or legatees of deceased members, or accident indemnity, shall be styled an ‘association,’ and any corporation doing business under this chapter which provides for the payment of policy claims, accumulation of a reserve or emergency fund, the expense of management and prosecution of the business, by payment of stipulated premiums, assessments or periodical calls, as provided in the contracts, and wherein the liability of the insured to contribute to the payment of policy claims is not limited to a fixed amount, shall be deemed to be engaged in the business of life insurance upon the stipulated premium plan, or assessment plan, and shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter, and chapter eight, of title nine.” The defendant association is included in this definition, so that the exaction in the by-law of notice within 15...