Connell v. Petri

Decision Date03 June 1947
Citation30 So.2d 922,159 Fla. 67
PartiesCONNELL v. PETRI.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Rehearing Denied June 23, 1947.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Duval County; Bryan Simpson Judge.

Will O Murrell, of Jacksonville, for appellant.

Osborne Copp & Markham, of Jacksonville, for appellee.

HOLT, Associate Justice.

Carolyn Connell thirteen years of age, was killed by defendant in the operation of his automobile, on the 12th day of April, 1942 on U. S. Highway No. 17, just north of the city limits of Jacksonville, Florida, said highway being thirty-three feet in width.

The record discloses that the deceased, in the company of another girl, crossed the Seaboard Railroad tracks, located directly west of said road, on her way to the highway to await the arrival of the school bus, which they were to board, for the purpose of attending school that day. It was after 8:00 o'clock in the morning, and the weather was clear and dry. As the two girls arrived at the highway, deceased ran acroos it and while she was attempting to negotiate it she was struck by the defendant's car.

At the trial of the cause, after all the testimony of the plaintiff was in, the court indicated that he would take the case away from the jury on the ground that the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence. Whereupon counsel for appellant asked for a non-suit and a bill of exceptions, from which he now appeals to this Court. So the question before us is whether the testimony was of such character as would support the ruling of the lower court or whether it was a matter for the jury to decide.

U. S. Highway No. 17 is the main artery of travel to the north from Jacksonville. Visibility was good. The girl did not look to the south (although there is a slight conflict on this), from which direction the appellee was travelling, and his efforts to stop were disclosed by skid marks on the road of eighty-eight feet in length before striking the child and then a continuance of the same for a length of thirty-two feet after the impact. The engineer of a Seaboard passenger train, travelling in the same direction as appellee's car, was the only eyewitness to the accident. His testimony discloses that his train was travelling between forty-five and fifty miles per hour, and appellee's car, when he first noticed it, was to his rear but was gaining on him rapidly and, at the time of the accident, they were approximately even. This indicates that the speed of appellee's car was much greater than that of the train and that at the least he was travelling at a rate of sixty to seventy miles per hour. This is confirmed by the testimony of the bridge tender of the Trout River bridge of the railroad, who said that the car of the appellee just prior to the accident and a short distance south of the location of the same, passed him at a speed of more than sixty to seventy miles per hour. The mathematical table mentioned in tne argument as to the space in which a car should stop, having good brakes, cannot be relied upon too strongly, since there is nothing in the record to indicate whether the car involved did have good brakes and, if so, whether they were operating properly at the time of the accident. One can never say conclusively from skid marks alone the exact speed of the particular vehicle involved, because so many human and mechanical factors enter into the situation to make it fallible, to say the least.

We think the case turns on whether the appellee should have been put on notice that children were on the highway at that time of the morning, preparatory to attending school. The school bus was only a short distance to the north, proceeding south and picking up the children on the way. In this particular instance the children were supposed to be waiting on the west side of the road to board the bus. Appellee strongly contends that the school children were probably on the road north of the accident but there were none to the south of the point of the tragedy. While there is a paucity of evidence in the record on this point, yet we find it uncontradicted in the testimony of the engineer of the train, as well as that of the bridge tender, that children were 'all up and down the highway.' That children were on the highway to the south of the accident would be in accordance with the logic of the situation, since the bus, as...

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9 cases
  • Bessett v. Hackett
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • July 24, 1953
    ...direct and proximate causal relation, or contribute in some appreciable degree, to the injury that recovery is precluded. Connell v. Petri, 159 Fla. 67, 30 So.2d 922; Shayne v. Saunders, 129 Fla. 355, 176 So. 495; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Weir, 63 Fla. 69, 58 So. 641, 41 L.R.A., N.S., ......
  • Livingston v. State ex rel. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, Lodge No. 1529
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • June 3, 1947
  • City of Jacksonville v. Stokes
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • July 6, 1954
    ...confused with Good Samaritan impulses. * * *' See also Teddleton v. Florida Power & Light Co., 145 Fla. 671, 200 So. 546; Connell v. Petri, 159 Fla. 67, 30 So.2d 922. In this case, there was no contention that age excused the claimant from her own negligence until it appeared in her brief. ......
  • Bilams v. Metropolitan Transit Authority
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • June 5, 1979
    ...of reasonable care. Among the many cases which support this conclusion, two are especially similar to this one. In Connell v. Petri, 159 Fla. 67, 30 So.2d 922, 923 (1947), the supreme court held: ". . . children were 'all up and down the highway.' " "This factor alone should have been of su......
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