Connelly v. Waterbury Nat. Bank
| Decision Date | 07 March 1950 |
| Citation | 136 Conn. 503,72 A.2d 645 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | CONNELLY, Tax Commissioner, v. WATERBURY NAT. BANK. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut |
Louis Weinstein, Inheritance Tax Attorney, New Haven, with whom, on the brief, were William L. Hadden, Attorney General, and Frederic W. Dauch First Assistant Tax Commissioner, Waterbury, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Walter F. Torrance, Waterbury, for the appellee (defendant).
Before MALTBIE, C. J., and BROWN, JENNINGS, DICKENSON and BALDWIN, JJ.
The tax commissioner appealed from a decree of the Probate Court for the district of Waterbury determining that certain inter vivos transfers of securities were not subject to the Connecticut succession tax; the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the appeal and the plaintiff has appealed to this court. The appeal raises the question whether these transfers were taxable as a gift intended to take effect in enjoyment at or after the death of the transferor, under General Statutes, Cum.Sup. 1939, § 395e, Rev. 1949, § 2021.
The pertinent part of the statute provides that the transfer by a resident of this state of intangible personal property shall be taxable if made As is conceded by the plaintiff, whether the transfers were made in contemplation of death within subsection (c) was a question of fact, and the conclusion of the trial court that they were not cannot be disturbed. The decisive question, therefore, as whether it was warranted in further concluding that the decedent did not retain for her life the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the property transferred, within the provisions of subsection (d). This question involves the interpretation of that subsection and its application to the facts found.
We summarize the material facts. The decedent died a resident of Waterbury, Connecticut on January 30, 1946, at the age of 91. On or about December 25, 1939, January 6, 1940, and November 29, 1941, either directly or through intermediaries, she transferred to each of her two daughters 1500 shares of Scovill Manufacturing Company stock and 735 shares of General Electric Company stock. The total value of the transfers when made was $135,618. They were gifts for which the decedent received no considerations. Shortly after the daughters received these gifts, they directed each of the two companies to pay all dividends on the stock to the decedent, who accepted them, and neither of the daughters received any dividends on the stock during the lifetime of the decedent. She continued to receive them uninterruptedly from the dates of transfer to the date of her death. The orders to pay dividends were not revoked by the daughters until after the decedent died. At no time did she direct either company to pay dividends to her on the shares of stock. After the transfers, the stock certificates were at all times registered in the names of the daughters and not in that of the decedent and they had physical custody of the certificates and complete dominion over the stock. Either daughter could at any time have rescinded her order for the payment of dividends to the decedent. The latter never discussed her financial affairs with her daughters, and prior to the transfers neither of them had any understanding or any conversation with her concerning the gift of stock to them or the enjoyment of the dividends by her thereafter. The decedent at no time prior to the transfers did anything or said anything that indicated to either of them that she intended to give them the stock or that she desired to retain or enjoy the income from the shares or any part of it after the transfers. It was not until after the transfers were consummated that the daughters first discussed having their mother continue to enjoy the income and decided that they wished to have her do so until such time as they had need to use it for their own purposes. This was without the knowledge of the decedent. They initiated the idea and she had no part in their plans or discussions.
The crux of the question for determination upon these facts is whether the word 'retained' as used in subsection (d) is satisfied by the retention in fact without more, by the transferor of the enjoyment of the property transferred, and so applies to the present transaction, or whether it requires that the retention of such enjoyment shall be contemplated and intended by the transferor in making the transfer. The transitive verb 'retain' is derived from the Latin 're' and 'tenere' and means 'to continue to hold, * * * to keep; not to lose, part with, dismiss, or permit to escape.' Webster's New International Dictionary (1st Ed.). Accordingly, 'to retain' has been held to mean Featherston v. Merrimon, 148 N.C. 199, 205, 61 S.E. 675, 678; 37 Words and Phrases, Perm. Ed., page 510. The concept of continuity of ownership or possession is therefore an essential element in the meaning of the word. No right or title to the dividends remained in the decedent after she had made the transfers. The dividends were in the nature of choses in action and were not choses in possession. The continued payment of the dividends by the...
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Hartford Elec. Light Co. v. Town of Wethersfield
...154,285 A.2d 325, Consolidated Diesel Electric Corporation v. Stamford, supra, 156 Conn. 36, 238 A.2d 410, Connelly v. Waterbury National Bank, 136 Conn. 503, 510, 72 A.2d 645; lead to no other conclusion than that the defendant's interpretation is untenable. II A related point to be drawn ......
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Consolidated Diesel Elec. Corp. v. City of Stamford
...Conn. 550, 556. When a taxing statute is being considered, ambiguities are resolved in favor of the taxpayer. Connelly v. Waterbury National Bank, 136 Conn. 503, 510, 72 A.2d 645; Curtis v. Corbin, 93 Conn. 648, 656, 107 A. 506.' Security Mills, Inc. v. Town of Norwich, 145 Conn. 375, 377, ......
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Dolak v. Sullivan
...on by the court is a correct statement of the rule normally applicable, for the reasons given at length in Connelly v. Waterbury National Bank, 136 Conn. 503, 506, 72 A.2d 645. But it does not mean that an indirect transfer of the type which took place here is not taxable. It is not necessa......
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Heffernan v. New Britain Bank and Trust Co.
...act of the transferor." (Emphasis added.) Archibald v. Sullivan, 152 Conn. 663, 668, 211 A.2d 692, 694; Connelly v. Waterbury National Bank, 136 Conn. 503, 508, 72 A.2d 645. The transferor must intend for his or her death to be "the necessary factor to effectuate the transfer" of possession......