Conner v. Huff

• Decision Date: 01 January 1877
• Citation: 48 Tex. 364
• Parties: W. M. CONNER v. FRANCES D. A. HUFF ET AL.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

48 Tex. 364

W. M. CONNER

v.FRANCES D. A. HUFF ET AL.

Supreme Court of Texas.

1877.

APPEAL from Titus. Tried below before the Hon. B. F. Estis.

The facts are given in the opinion.

Turner & Turner, for appellant.

I. Appellant refers the court to Burleson v. Burleson, 28 Tex., 383;Walker v. Howard, 34 Tex., 478;Collins v. Box, 40 Tex., 190; and draws distinctions between each and the one at bar.

II. The court should have instructed the jury, as requested, to ascertain the value of the interest of the plaintiffs, as heirs of their mother, in the land sued for, and to find for defendants, if the plaintiffs received an amount equal to their said interest as heirs from their father's estate. (Maxwell v. Guyton, 20 Tex., 202;Monroe v. Leigh, 15 Tex., 519.)

III. Heirs are responsible, on ancestor's warranty, to amount of assets descended. (State v. Lewellyn, 25 Tex., 797;Maxwell v. Guyton, 20 Tex., 202; 4 Kent's Comm., 420; 3 Wash., 408.)

IV. Appellees could not take the estate of C. Huff in discharge of supposed demands against his estate. (Sparks v. Spence, 40 Tex., 693; 2 Wms. Ex., 1114; Plunket v. Lewis, 3 Hare's Chan., 323.)

ROBERTS, CHIEF JUSTICE.

The plaintiffs claim three-fifths of the 691 acres of land, in right of their mother's community interest, the land having been sold by their father in 1867, after their mother's death in 1860, and they being three out of five children who were her and his heirs.

The defendant Conner claimed the land through a deed of warranty from the father; and alleged facts showing that the amount received by them from their deceased father's estate was equal to their community interest in their mother's estate, without resort to the land.

The verdict and judgment were in favor of the plaintiffs, for three-fifths of one-half of the land, and for costs of suit.

It is contended that the verdict is contrary to the evidence.

As plaintiffs were suing to recover the land to which they were entitled, it would not be proper to include it in the estimate of the value of their interest in the estate of their mother at the time of her death in 1860, upon the issue thus made.

There was shown to have been a growing crop in August, 1860, when she died, which made 48 or 50 bales of cotton, the value of which is not proved, as shown by the evidence in the record. The balance of the community property was estimated at from $2,500 to $3,100. If we take the larger amount, ($3,100,) three-fifths of the one??half of that sum is $930.

It was shown, in proof, that their father's estate, received by them, and equally divided between his five children, was $3,000; and three-fifths of that amount would be $1,800, which is $870 more than their interest in the community property as proved, not including the land, which, at the trial, was proved, and found by the jury, to be worth three dollars per acre, making their interest in it worth $621. In this way, it was shown that they had received from their father's estate $259 more than their interest in the community property of their mother, including the land as thus valued.

It is probable that the value of the 48 or 50 bales of cotton was proved on the trial, though there is no evidence of it in the record here; and if it was shown that it was worth as much as $870, then the amount received from their father's estate would have only been sufficient to pay them for their interest, not including the land. In that event, the verdict of the jury, finding in their favor three-fifths of one-half of the land, might have been sustained.

We cannot assume that the cotton was proved to have been of that or any other particular value, in the absence of proof; and, therefore, we must hold that the verdict is not sustained by the evidence.

This is not because the plaintiffs did not have a legal right to the three-fifths of one-half of the land, but upon the equitable doctrine, that they have been paid for their entire interest in the community property of their mother, including the land, by the amount which they received from the estate of their father, from whom defendant claims title to the ??and under and through his deed of warranty. (Maxwell v. Guyton, 20 Tex., 202.)

In the case just cited, it is said, that it was shown by defendant that the father “owned at his death lands of equal value with that sued for; that he possessed other property of considerable value, and had the character of making and saving money.” It was held, that “though the evidence was not very precise or satisfactory, yet that it was sufficient to justify the jury in finding for the defendant.” There was in that case a prima-facie case made of sufficient assets coming to their hands, and plaintiffs did not rebut it, although the means of doing so were reasonably within their power, if it could have been done.

We do not understand, from this decision, that, as contended for by appellant's counsel, if the plaintiffs had received from their father's estate an amount equal to the value of their interest in the land alone, they would have been debarred from a recovery of their interest in the land, although their community interest in other property, retained and appropriated by their father, might be equal to the amount which they received from their father's estate. If their father, in his lifetime, had advanced them an amount equal to the value of their interest in the community, except the land, without making a special appropriation of the money so advanced to be in discharge of the land, such advancement would not bar their right to recover their interest in the land from him. He, certainly, could confer no greater right to his vendee, by his warranty, than he had if living and was still the part owner of the land.

This view of the law, as applicable to the defense set up in this case, is presented here, to prevent any misconception, upon another trial,...