Conningford v. Cote

• Decision Date: 15 March 1941
• Citation: 32 N.E.2d 692,308 Mass. 472
• Parties: CONNINGFORD v. COTE (two cases).
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

308 Mass. 472

32 N.E.2d 692

CONNINGFORD

v.COTE (two cases).

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Bristol.

March 15, 1941.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Bristol County; Baker, Judge.

Two actions of tort by Philip W. Conningford, p. p. a. and by Philip E. Conningford against Arthur Cote, to recover for injuries and consequential damages sustained in an automobile collision, wherein verdicts were rendered for plaintiffs respectively in the sums of $4,000 and $375, and the defendant took exceptions.

Exceptions sustained.

Argued before FIELD, C. J., and DONAHUE, DOLAN, COX, and RONAN, JJ.

William A. Torphy and James P. McGuire, Jr., both of Fall River, for plaintiffs.

F. E. Smith, of Taunton, for defendant.

DOLAN, Justice.

These are two actions of tort, the first of which is brought by a minor through his father and next friend, to recover compensation for personal injuries sustained as a result of a collision of motor vehicles, alleged to have been caused by negligence of the defendant. In the second action the father of the minor seeks to recover consequential damages. The defendant's answer contains a general denial, and allegations of ‘contributory negligence of the plaintiff himself or the negligence of some third person over whom the defendant had no control.’ The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in both cases, and they now come before us on the defendant's exceptions to the exclusion of certain evidence, to the denial of his motions for directed verdicts, and to a portion of the judge's charge in which he interpreted the provisions of G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 89, § 8, the so called right of way statute. The minor plaintiff will be referred to hereinafter as the plaintiff.

The only argument addressed to us by the defendant in connection with his exception to the denial of his motion for a directed verdict is based on his contention that, since the plaintiff's truck was being operated at the time of the accident more than thirty days after the date of its entry into this Commonwealth contrary to the provisions of G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 90, § 3, as amended by St.1933, c. 188, the vehicle was a trespasser on the highway and therefore the plaintiff cannot recover.

The accident occurred at the intersection of Fall River and Warren avenues in Seekonk, in this Commonwealth, at about 5:30 p. m. on September 23, 1935. The plaintiff was then sixteen years old, a resident of Greenwood, Rhode Island, and was operating a motor truck owned by his father. The plaintiff used the truck in soliciting business for himself as a radio technician and also on the business of his employer, who conducted an electrical shop in Warren, Rhode Island. He had driven the truck mostly during the period from January, 1935, to the date of the accident. He had driven it to Fall River ‘about June,’ to Swansea in July, and also to Boston for materials to be used in his business. It was registered in Rhode Island and ‘its only registration plates were Rhode Island plates.’ It ‘was not registered in Massachusetts * * * and it carried no Massachusetts compulsory insurance.’ These facts having been elicited from the plaintiff on cross examination, he was then asked ‘if he had any license, permit or authority from the registry of motor vehicles in Massachusetts to operate the truck in Massachusetts and upon objection of the plaintiff the defendant made an offer of proof that he did not have such authority, and particularly with reference to the truck involved in this accident. The question was excluded on the ground that the total number of days that the plaintiff operated a car in Massachusetts did not in the aggregate total thirty days in 1935, and the defendant saved his exception.’

So far as pertinent G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 90, § 3, as amended by St.1933, c. 188, in force at the time of the accident (see now St.1939, c. 325), limited the privilege of a nonresident to operate his motor vehicle on the ways of this Commonwealth without registration here to a period of not exceeding thirty days commencing from the date of entry, ‘provided, that no motor vehicle * * * shall be so operated beyond a period of thirty days after * * * the date of entry of the vehicle * * * except during such time as the owner thereof maintains in full force a policy of liability insurance * * * nor unless the owner or operator of such motor vehicle * * * while operating the same during such additional time, has on his person or in the vehicle in some easily accessible place a permit issued by the registrar which then authorizes the operation of such vehicle without registration under this chapter.’ See also section 9.

In Van Dresser v. Firlings, 305 Mass. 51, 24 N.E.2d 969, decided after the...