Van Dresser v. Firlings

• Decision Date: 22 January 1940
• Parties: WILLIAM VANDRESSER v. CARL A. FIRLINGS.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

305 Mass. 51

24 N.E.2d 969

WILLIAM VANDRESSER v. CARL A. FIRLINGS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

January 22, 1940

September 25, 1939.

Present: FIELD, C.

J., DONAHUE, QUA COX, & RONAN, JJ.

Motor Vehicle Nonresident, Operation. Way, Public: trespass. Negligence Violation of law, Motor vehicle, Contributory. Words "Period."

Under Section 3 of G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 90 as amended by St. 1933, c. 188, it was unlawful for a nonresident without registering his automobile here and without satisfying the other requirements of the statute, to operate on a public way in this Commonwealth in 1937 on a day after the expiration of a period of thirty days succeeding a first entry in that year although he had not operated here at any time during that period; and, in an action for personal injuries sustained by such operator, such unlawful operation was evidence of contributory negligence.

TORT. Writ in the Central District Court of Worcester dated October 13, 1937.

On removal to the Superior Court the case was heard by Donnelly, J., who found for the plaintiff in the sum of $4,685. The defendant alleged exceptions.

The case was submitted on briefs.

J. Joseph MacCarthy, H.

E. Manning, & J.

W. Ceaty, for the defendant.

H. R. Sher, for the plaintiff.

QUA, J. This action arises out of an automobile accident which occurred on a highway in Auburn on August 14,

1937. The trial judge denied a request by the defendant for a ruling that the plaintiff's automobile was "illegally registered" and was "a trespasser upon the ways of the Commonwealth.

"

The plaintiff, a portrait painter, was a resident of Florida. His automobile was registered there and bore a Florida registration plate. He was not operating under any permit from the registrar of motor vehicles. On July 1, 1937, he drove into this Commonwealth and drew a portrait while here. The next morning he left and drove to Maine. On August 14, the day of the accident, he was again passing through this Commonwealth on his way to New York. The issue depends upon whether the proviso included in the first sentence of G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 90, Section 3, as amended by St. 1933, c. 188, and in force at the time of the accident, limited the privilege of a nonresident to operate his automobile on the ways of this Commonwealth, without registration here and without satisfying the registrar of motor vehicles that he was protected by liability insurance and obtaining a permit, to a single period of thirty consecutive days from the date of entry, or allowed him so to operate for an aggregate of not exceeding thirty days in any one year. The proviso began thus: "provided, that no motor vehicle or trailer shall be so operated beyond a period of thirty days after either the date of entry of the vehicle in any one year or the acquisition by such non-resident of a regular place of abode or business within the commonwealth, except during such time as the owner thereof maintains in full force a policy of liability insurance. . . ." Then followed a description of the liability policy and a requirement that the owner or operator carry a permit from the registrar to operate without registration. The primary purpose of the proviso seems to have been to limit the time within which nonresidents could operate without furnishing the public the insurance protection required of all residents under the compulsory motor vehicle insurance law.

Before the amendment of 1933 the proviso read: "provided, that no motor vehicle or trailer owned by a non-resident shall be so operated beyond the expiration of a period of thirty days except during such time as the owner thereof" maintained the required insurance and carried the required permit. G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 90, Section 3. The section in this form was construed in English v. Blacher, 297 Mass. 76, with reference to an accident which occurred in 1932. In that case it was said on page 78: "The word `period' in the governing statute is limited in meaning to a total of not over thirty days during a calendar year" and, "We are of opinion that the instant statute does not afford protection for the operation of such an automobile for more than thirty days during a calendar year. This construction alone is consistent with our prior decisions." It was also said on page 79, "It seems to be established under our decisions that `period of thirty days' in the statute formerly in force defining nonresidents in conjunction with automobiles is equivalent to an aggregate of thirty days in the calendar year." The court cited Hanson v. Culton, 269 Mass. 471; Jenkins v. North Shore Dye House, Inc. 277 Mass. 440 , 443; S. C. 289 Mass. 561; Bellenger v. Monahan, 282 Mass. 523 , 530, and Avila v. DuPont, 278 Mass. 83 , 87. We think that the statements quoted were intended as a construction of the statute as it stood before the 1933 amendment and not merely as indicative of its minimum requirements. The court further stated in English v. Blacher, at page 79, that it did not intend to construe the act of 1933. It therefore now becomes important to determine whether the changes introduced by the amended statute of 1933 hereinbefore first quoted were such as to require a construction different from that reached in English v. Blacher.

We feel compelled to the conclusion that the change of wording in 1933 does require a construction different from that given to the language used before the amendment. In this case, as in all cases of the interpretation of statutes, we must remind ourselves of the danger of encroachment upon the field of legislation if we allow free play to our own notions of policy. To be sure, reason and common sense are not to be abandoned in the interpretative process, as it is to be supposed that the Legislature intended to act in accordance with them, but...