Connolley v. Collier

• Citation: 39 Md.App. 421,385 A.2d 826
• Decision Date: 15 May 1978
• Docket Number: No. 1111,1111
• Parties: Philip Gordon CONNOLLEY v. Herbert M. COLLIER, Personal Representative of the Estate of Beulah R. Anthony, et al.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 421

39 Md.App. 421

385 A.2d 826

Philip Gordon CONNOLLEY v. Herbert M. COLLIER, Personal Representative of the Estate of Beulah R. Anthony, et al.

No. 1111.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

May 15, 1978.

Susanne H. Schmoldt, with whom were David M. Williams and White & Williams, Chestertown, on brief, for appellant.

Ernest M. Thompson, Easton, for appellees.

LISS, Judge.

Philip Gordon Connolley, appellant, as plaintiff below, filed a negligence action in the Circuit Court for Kent County against Herbert M. Collier, personal representative of the estate of Beulah Anthony, deceased, and Dudley Crossley, defendants. The trial judge granted appellees' motions for summary judgment grounded on the contention that the appellant's claim was barred by limitations; appellant appeals from that judgment.

Two questions are presented for decision by this appeal:

1) Whether the Circuit Court for Kent County erred in holding that in cases where insurance exists, Maryland Code (1974) Estates and Trusts Article, Subsection 8-104(e) in effect at the time the action arose required an action against an estate to be instituted within a six month period; and

2) Whether the running of the period of limitations contained in Section 8-103 of the Estates and Trusts Article will bar a suit based upon the doctrine of respondeat superior against the alleged master of a deceased servant.

On November 18, 1974, an automobile owned by Dudley Crossley and operated by Beulah Anthony, with the owner's permission, crossed the center line of Maryland Route 291 and struck an on-coming vehicle operated by the appellant. As a result of the collision, Mrs. Anthony was killed and the appellant sustained serious injuries. At the time of the accident, the vehicle driven by Mrs. Anthony was covered by liability insurance.

Letters of administration were granted on the estate of Mrs. Anthony on December 9, 1974, and notice to creditors was first published on December 11, 1974. On June 16, 1977, the appellant sued the personal representative of Mrs. Anthony's estate and joined Crossley as a co-defendant under the legal theory of respondeat superior. All defendants filed special pleas of limitations and moved for summary judgment based on the contentions 1) that the appellant had failed to bring his suit against the estate within the period of time prescribed by Code (1974) Estates and Trust Article, §§ 8-103 and 8-104 and 2) that the bar of limitations also prevented a suit against the alleged master of the deceased servant.

In granting the motion for summary judgment by each of the defendants, the trial judge found:

"(T)hat this suit was not brought within six months after the first appointment of the personal representative as required by § 8-103 and § 8-104 and, therefore, the Motion for Summary Judgment must be granted.

"Since the decedent was the operator of the motor vehicle which allegedly caused the injuries to the Plaintiff, and the responsibility of Dudley Crossley is based upon the doctrine of respondeat superior, the Defendant, Dudley Crossley, is not liable to the Plaintiff because the estate of Beulah R. Anthony is not liable. Therefore, the Motion for Summary Judgment on behalf of Dudley Crossley must be granted."

Subsection 8-103(a) of the 1974 Code, in effect at the time the action arose, provided as follows:

"(a.) General. Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute with respect to claims of the United States and the state, all claims against an estate of a decedent, whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis, are forever barred against the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and legatees, unless presented within six months after the first appointment of a personal representative."

Subsection 8-104(d) and (e) stated in pertinent part:

"(d.) Commencement of suit. When a cause survives death, the claimant is not required to file a claim under subsections (b) or (c). He may commence an action against the estate or against a person to whom property has been distributed, but the commencement of the action must occur within the time limited for the filing of claims.

"(e.) Where insurance exists. Notwithstanding the other provisions of this section, an action against the estate may be instituted after the expiration of the time designated in this section but within the period of limitations generally applicable to actions against the estate in the event the decedent was covered by an existing liability insurance policy at the time of the occurrence." (Emphasis supplied).

1.

Appellant contends that subsection 8-104(e) of Code (1974) Estates and Trusts Article permitted the filing of this negligence action within the three year period generally applicable to such actions ¹ due to the fact that Mrs. Anthony was covered by an existing liability insurance policy at the time the accident occurred. The trial court rejected this argument, concluding that the language of former subsection 8-104(e), which stated that claims against the estate of an insured decedent must be filed "within the period of limitations generally applicable to actions against the estate," clearly and unambiguously referred to the six month period stated in subsection 8-103(a), to the exclusion of any longer time period, thus obviating the need for the court to construe the meaning of the statute.

The Court of Appeals has stated on many occasions that in the absence of ambiguity, a court should confine itself to construction of the statute as written and not attempt to remedy possible defects. Scoville Serv., Inc. v. Comptroller, 269 Md. 390, 306 A.2d 534; Md. Nat'l. Bk. v. Comptroller, 264 Md. 536, 287 A.2d 291; Amalgamated Ins. Co. v. Helms, 239 Md. 529, 212 A.2d 311. We, however, cannot agree with the trial court's conclusion that the relevant portion of the controlling statute was so clear and unambiguous as not to require the court to determine the intent of the legislature in enacting the statute.

Subsection 8-104(e) of the 1974 Code was prefaced with the statement, "Notwithstanding the other provisions of the section . . .", indicating an exception to the other provisions regarding limitations in § 8-104. Cf. Dixon v. Checchia, 249 Md. 20, 238 A.2d 247; Cromwell v. Ripley, 11 Md.App. 173, 273 A.2d 218. Subsection 8-104(e) then referred to two time periods in which suit could be brought: First, "an action against the estate may be instituted after the expiration of the time designated in this section" which refers to subsection 8-104(d), which in turn refers to the six month period stated in subsection 8-103(a). Second, where insurance exists, the action must be brought "within the period of limitations generally applicable to actions against the estate." This language the trial court concluded was also a clear reference to the six month period designated in subsection 8-103(a). Were we to accept this conclusion, subsection 8-104(e) would in pertinent part read as follows:

"Notwithstanding the other provisions of this section, an action against the estate may be instituted after the expiration of the time designated in this section (, or the subsection 8-103(a) six month period to which subsection 8-104(d) refers,) but within the period of limitations generally applicable to actions against the estate (, or the subsection 8-103(a) six month period,) in the event the decedent was covered by an existing insurance policy at the time of the occurrence."

We consider it absurd to believe that the legislature intended to include a separate subsection to § 8-104 distinguishing the claim against the estate of an insured decedent from all other types of claims and in the same paragraph provide for a limitations period identical to that applicable to all other claims. In Coerper v. Comptroller, 265 Md. 3, 288 A.2d 187, the Court stated:

"The cases hold that we should shun a construction of a statute which leads to absurd consequences. Pan Am. Sulphur v. State Dep't., 251 Md. 620, 627, 248 A.2d 354 (1968), and cases there cited. It is a hornbook rule of statutory construction that in ascertaining the intention of the General Assembly all parts of a statute are to be read together to find the intention as to any one part, and that all parts are to be reconciled and harmonized if possible. Thomas v. Police Commissioner, 211 Md. 357, 361, 127 A.2d 625 (1956)."

We conclude that subsection 8-104(e) of the 1974 Estates and Trusts Article, which is controlling in this case, is sufficiently unclear and ambiguous to require that we apply the principles of statutory construction.

Prior to July 1, 1974, the provisions regarding the time for filing suit against the estate of a decedent covered by liability insurance at the time of the accident were contained in Code (1957, 1969 Repl.Vol.) Art. 93, § 8-104. By Chapter 11, § 1 of the Laws of 1974, Article 93 was repealed in its entirety; and by § 2 of that Chapter, the Estates and Trusts Article was enacted to take effect as of July 1, 1974. ² Subsection 8-104(e) of the newly enacted Article contained substantially the same limitations provisions regarding the time for filing suit against the estate of an insured decedent. However, where Article 93, subsection 8-104(c) stated that such actions could be instituted "within the period of limitations generally applicable to such actions . . .", subsection 8-104(e) of the 1974 Estates and Trusts Article permitted such actions to be filed "within the period of limitations generally applicable to actions against the estate . . . ." (Emphasis supplied).

The Legislature, apparently recognizing the inconsistency in subsection 8-104(e) of the 1974 Code, enacted Chapter 464 of the Laws of 1977 (H.B. 676) as an amendment to the subsection, for the stated purpose "of correcting certain errors in the revision of the law relating to . . . presentation of claims against...