Collier v. Connolley

• Citation: 285 Md. 123,400 A.2d 1107
• Decision Date: 07 May 1979
• Docket Number: No. 53,53
• Parties: Herbert M. COLLIER, Pers. Rep. of the Estate of Beulah R. Anthony et al. v. Philip Gordon CONNOLLEY.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 123

285 Md. 123

400 A.2d 1107

Herbert M. COLLIER, Pers. Rep. of the Estate of Beulah R Anthony et al. v. Philip Gordon CONNOLLEY.

No. 53.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

May 7, 1979.

Michael A. Pretl and Jeffrey B. Smith, Smith, Somerville & Case, Baltimore, and Ernest M. Thompson and Miller, Wheeler, Thompson & Thompson, Easton, on the brief, for appellants.

Susanne Hayman Schmoldt, Chestertown (David M. Williams, Chestertown, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and SMITH, DIGGES, ELDRIDGE and COLE, JJ.

ELDRIDGE, Judge.

We granted certiorari in this case to resolve a dispute over the interpretation of Maryland Code (1974), § 8-104(e) of the Estates & Trusts Article. That section prescribes the statute of limitations for actions against an estate where the decedent was covered by insurance.

While driving an automobile in Kent County, Maryland, on November 18, 1974, Philip G. Connolley sustained serious injuries as the result of an accident. The driver and lone occupant of the other vehicle, Beulah R. Anthony, was killed in the collision. The automobile driven by Mrs. Anthony, at the time of the accident, was covered by a liability insurance policy. The following month, on December 9 and 11 respectively, the estate's personal representative was appointed and notice to creditors was published.

Approximately two and one-half years after the opening of the estate, Mr. Connolley filed an action in the Circuit Court for Kent County against Herbert M. Collier, personal representative of the estate of Mrs. Anthony, and Dudley Crossley, the owner of the automobile in which the decedent was driving. In it he alleged that he sustained personal injuries and property damage as a result of the decedent negligently driving over the center line of Maryland Route 291 and head-on into the plaintiff's vehicle. With regard to Mr. Crossley, it was asserted that the decedent was operating the car as Mr. Crossley's servant and that, therefore, he was liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

In response to these allegations, the defendants each interposed a special plea of limitations. They asserted that since suit was not brought within six months after appointment of the personal representative, as they contend is required by §§ 8-103 and 8-104(e) of the Estates & Trusts Article, the action was barred by limitations. Subsequently the defendants moved for summary judgment. In opposition, the plaintiff contended that § 8-104 provides for a three-year statute of limitations in actions against an estate which is covered by insurance. Rejecting the plaintiff's contention, the circuit court held that the clear language of § 8-104(e) directs that even where insurance coverage applies, the limitations period ends six months after the appointment of the personal representative, as long as notice to creditors is timely published. Accordingly, the court granted the estate's motion for summary judgment. The court also decided that no liability could attach to Mr. Crossley under the doctrine of respondeat superior, on the ground that an action against a principal is barred by the running of limitations against his employee. Consequently, his motion for summary judgment was also granted, and the suit was ordered dismissed.

Upon the plaintiff's appeal, the Court of Special Appeals reversed and remanded the case for trial, Connolley v. Collier, 39 Md.App. 421, 385 A.2d 826 (1978). Disagreeing with the circuit court, the Court of Special Appeals believed that the language of § 8-104(e) was sufficiently ambiguous to require recourse to principles of statutory construction. It went on to hold that the Legislature intended the three-year limitations period to apply to actions against an estate when insurance is in effect. A principal ground for the Court of Special Appeals' holding was the rule of statutory construction, recognized by some courts according to Sutherland, that where a statute of doubtful meaning is rendered certain by subsequent legislation, the subsequent statute is "strong evidence of what the legislature intended by the first statute." 2A Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction, § 49.11 (Sands ed. 1973). The Court of Special Appeals, applying this rule, relied on the intent expressed by a 1977 statute which was enacted, according to its title, for "the purpose of correcting certain errors" in the law relating, Inter alia, to the presentation of claims against an estate, Ch. 464 of the Acts of 1977. See 39 Md.App. at 426-427, 385 A.2d 826. Because of its conclusion that limitations had not run, it was unnecessary for the court to decide if the running of limitations against the employee barred an action against the employer based on respondeat superior.

We shall affirm, finding ourselves in agreement with the Court of Special Appeals that under § 8-104(e), the period of limitations in this case was three years. We believe that this result is warranted by the language of the statute and settled principles of statutory construction. However, unlike the Court of Special Appeals, we do not place much weight upon what the Legislature, in 1977, said was intended in a 1974 statute. Cf. Director v. Myers, 232 Md. 213, 218, 192 A.2d 278 (1963); A. G. Crunkleton v. Barkdoll, 227 Md. 364, 369, 177 A.2d 252 (1962); Annapolis v. Arundeland, Inc., 205 Md. 170, 177, 106 A.2d 493 (1954); Theatrical Corp. v. Trust Co., 157 Md. 602, 609, 146 A. 805 (1929); Marburg v. Mercantile Bldg. Co., 154 Md. 438, 443, 140 A. 836 (1928).

The critical language from the Estates & Trusts Article, prior to the 1977 amendment, is as follows:

Section 8-103:

"(a) General. Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute with respect to claims of the United States and the state, All claims against an estate of a decedent, whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis, Are forever barred against the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and legatees, Unless presented within six months after the first appointment of a personal representative." (Emphasis supplied.)

Section 8-104:

"(d) Commencement of suit. When a cause survives death, the claimant is not required to file a claim under subsections (b) or (c). He may commence an action against the estate or against a person to whom property has been distributed, but The commencement of the action must occur within the time limited for the filing of claims.

"(e) Where insurance exists. Notwithstanding the other provisions of this section, an action against the estate may be instituted After the expiration of the time designated in this section but within the period of limitations Generally applicable to actions against the estate In the event the decedent was covered by an existing liability insurance policy at the time of the occurrence. The existence of insurance coverage is not admissible at the trial of the case and the judgment is limited to the extent of existing insurance if a verdict is rendered against the estate. These provisions permit claims against the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund of the state, if otherwise proper." (Emphasis supplied.)

The defendants maintain that the above provisions unambiguously provide for a six-month limitations period for all claims against an estate, including those where insurance coverage exists. The basis for their position is the language of § 8-104(e), declaring that where insurance exists, actions against an estate must be instituted "within the period of limitations generally applicable to actions against the estate." The six-month time period for filing actions against an estate is set forth in § 8-103(a) and § 8-104(d), which govern "all claims against an estate of a decedent." Thus, according to the defendants' argument, when § 8-104(e) refers to the limitations period "generally applicable to actions against the estate," it is referring to the six-month time period, since it is the only statute of limitations bearing upon actions against an estate. Although conceding that the "General Assembly did not mean" to establish a six-month limitation period for claims against an estate covered by insurance, nonetheless the defendants, citing Slate v. Zitomer, 275 Md. 534, 341 A.2d 789 (1975), Cert. denied sub nom. Gasperich v. Church, 423 U.S. 1076, 96 S.Ct. 862, 47 L.Ed.2d 87 (1976), insist that a court should not look beyond the clear wording of the statute to ascertain the intention of the Legislature.

If we agreed with the defendants that the language of § 8-104(e) clearly and unambiguously supported their position, which was the case with the statutory language involved in Slate v. Zitomer, supra, we would also agree that a court should not look further and attempt to ascertain a legislative intent contrary to the plain language. This Court has repeatedly pointed out that where the language of a statute is entirely free of ambiguity, there is no need to look elsewhere in order to ascertain the Legislature's intent; instead, the statutory language should be given effect in accordance with the clear meaning of the words. Gietka v. County Executive, 283 Md. 24, 27, 387 A.2d 291 (1978); Criminal Inj. Comp. Bd. v. Remson, 282 Md. 168, 193, 384 A.2d 58 (1978); Wheeler v. State, 281 Md. 593, 596, 380 A.2d 1052 (1977), Cert. denied, 435 U.S. 997, 98 S.Ct. 1650, 56 L.Ed.2d 86 (1978); Guy v. Director, 279 Md. 69, 72, 367 A.2d 946 (1977); Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund v. Stith, 277 Md. 595, 597, 356 A.2d 272 (1976). It is not the proper function of courts, under the guise of statutory construction, to supply omissions or remedy alleged defects in statutes or inserts provisions not made by the Legislature. Wheeler v. State, supra, 281 Md. at 596-597, 380 A.2d 1052; Coleman v. State, 281 Md. 538, 546-547, 380 A.2d 49 (1977); In re Appeals Nos. 1022 & 1081, 278 Md. 174, 178, 359 A.2d 556 (1976); Slate v. Zitomer, supra; Patapsco...