Thomas v. Police Commissioner of Baltimore City

• Decision Date: 07 December 1956
• Docket Number: No. 39,39
• Citation: 211 Md. 357,127 A.2d 625
• Parties: Frances G. THOMAS, Administratrix of the Estate of James F. Thomas, Deceased v. POLICE COMMISSIONER OF BALTIMORE CITY, etc.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 357

211 Md. 357

127 A.2d 625

Frances G. THOMAS, Administratrix of the Estate of James F Thomas, Deceased v. POLICE COMMISSIONER OF BALTIMORE CITY, etc.

No. 39.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Dec. 7, 1956.

Charlotte W. Main and Hugh J. Monaghan, II, Baltimore, for appellant.

Alexander Harvey, II, Asst. Atty. Gen. (C. Ferdinand Sybert, Atty. Gen., on the brief), for appellee.

Before BRUNE, C. J., and COLLINS, HENDERSON, HAMMOND and PRESCOTT, JJ.

HAMMOND, Judge.

This appeal is from an order sustaining a demurrer by the Police Commissioner of Baltimore, without leave to amend, in an action for mandamus by the widow of a policeman, as his administratrix, to compel the refund of contributions the husband had made to the police pension fund. The case turns on whether the policeman died before or after the right to receive the refund, newly created by legislative act, had become vested.

Chap. 266 of the Acts of 1900 in order to provide, among others, a new source of revenue for the so-called Special Fund for retirement benefits for Baltimore policemen, which had been created in 1886, required every member of the force, who elected to become a member, to contribute 2% of his salary to the fund. It is conceded that the fund has never been and is not now actuarially sound and that the City budgets and makes available to the fund all monies needed in its operation not otherwise available. From its inception, there have been provisions in the law governing the fund for payments to the widow of a policeman killed in, or as the result of, the performance of duty. There was no provision for the refund of contributions of a policeman who for any reason ceased to be such, or for refund to the estate of a policeman who died of natural causes while on the force, as did James F. Thomas, the husband of the appellant. The Attorney General in 20 Op.Atty.Gen. 632 (1935) and 24 Op.Atty.Gen. 637 (1939) ruled that a policeman leaving the force for any reason other than retirement could not get back his contributions to the fund.

In 1951 the Legislature for the first time provided a refund to one who left the force. Chap. 502 of the Acts of 1951 added a new section to the Public Local Law governing the fund, which reads as follows: '593A. Beginning on January 1, 1952, any officer or employee of the said Police Department who is a member of the said Special Fund and who for any reason ceases to be such an officer or employee shall forthwith be paid by the Police Commissioner a sum of money equal to that paid into the said Fund by the said officer or employee during the time he served as such.'

In 1953 the Legislature added a second sentence to sec. 593A, which it had enacted two years before. Chap. 660 of the Acts of 1953 provided in sec. 1: 'Beginning on January 1, 1954, the Police Commissioner shall pay to the personal representative of any deceased officer or employee of the Police Department who was a member of the said Special Fund and who, because of death, ceased to be such officer or employee, a sum of money equal to that paid into the said Fund by the said officer or employee to maintain eligibility for his retirement during the time he served as such.'

In sec. 2 the Legislature said '* * * this Act shall take effect June 1, 1953.' James F. Thomas, the husband of the claimant, died on September 27, 1953, while a member in good standing of the police force of Baltimore and of its Special Fund. He had contributed $1,268.42 to the fund, which appellant seeks to reclaim from the police commissioner who, under the statute, is trustee of the fund. It is agreed that Thomas was not killed in, or as a result of, the performance of duty. The appellant's first contention is that since her husband died after June 1, 1953, the effective date of the Act of 1953, his estate became entitled at the moment of his death to the refund, although, under the terms of the Act, payment was to be made only after January 1, 1954. Her second contention is that if she is not entitled to prevail under the Act of 1953, then the terms of the 1951 Act are broad enough to cover separation from the force by death--that the 1953 Act was merely declaratory of pre-existing rights and created no new right.

The trial judge ruled against appellant on both contentions. He decided that the provision in the body of the Act that refund should be made beginning 'January 1, 1954' was a legislative mandate so clear and unequivocal that the 'customary effective date of June 1st must be treated as surplusage.'

We find no need to consider appellant's second contention since we think the Act of 1953 gives her the right to the refund she seeks.

It is a hornbook rule of statutory construction that, in ascertaining the intention of the Legislature, all parts of a statute are to be read together to find the intention as to any one part and that all parts are to be reconciled and harmonized if possible. Bickel v. Nice, 173 Md. 1, 6, 192 A. 777; Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Deegan, 163 Md. 234, 238, 161 A. 282; Pittman v. Housing Authority, 180 Md. 457, 463, 25 A.2d 466; Maguire v. State, 192 Md. 615, 623, 65 A.2d 299; Frazier v. Warfield, 13 Md. 279, 301. A corollary rule of construction is that if there is no clear indication to the contrary and it is reasonably possible, a statute is to be read so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase shall be rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory. This was stated negatively in Pressman v. State Tax Commission, 204 Md. 78, 102 A.2d 821, where it was noted that words in a statute may be rejected as surplusage if they are incapable of any sensible meaning or are repugnant to the rest of the statute and tend to nullify it.

It is clear that the provision as to the effective date of an act is an integral part of the act. Constitution of Maryland, Art. 3, Sec. 31, provides that 'No law passed by the General Assembly shall take effect until the first day of June next after the session at which it may be passed, unless it be otherwise expressly declared therein.' In 1915 there was added a provision, as part of the referendum amendment in Art. 16 of the Constitution that 'No law enacted by the General Assembly shall take effect until the first day of June next after the session at which it may be passed, unless it contains a Section declaring such law an emergency law * * *.' After the adoption of the referendum amendment, the question arose as to whether there was any conflict between the two provisions of the Constitution. Beall v. State, 131 Md. 669, 103 A. 99, held that Art. 16 did not supersede Sec. 31 of Art. 3 of the Constitution. Attorney General Ritchie suggested in 1 Op.Atty.Gen. 286 that it would be wise to add a section stating that 'This Act shall take effect from the first day of June, 1916' to all bills enacting laws not permitted by the Constitution, unless expressly stated otherwise, to take effect before June first. Since the opinion of Attorney General Ritchie, it has been customary for the Legislature to make such provision as to most of the laws it passes. It may, however, provide for an earlier or a later date if it expressly so states in the act and many times the Legislature has provided that an act shall take effect on a date other than June first. One such act is Chap. 784 of the Acts of 1941, which provided for an increased leave of absence with pay for members of the police force. The second section of the Act provided: 'And be it further enacted, That this Act shall take effect January 1, 1942.' See, for a general discussion of the matter, Everstine, The Legislative Process in Maryland, 10 Md.L.R. 91, 131. The fact that the Legislature may make an act effective earlier or later than June first, or may provide that it shall be effective on June first, suggests that the effective date must be an integral part of the act and this Court has so held. See Culp v. Commissioners of Chestertown, 154 Md. 620, 622, 141 A. 410, 412. There one section of an Act providing for a bond issue declared it to be an emergency measure. The Court held this was surplusage and should be rejected, '* * * leaving intact that portion of section 7 of the act which declares that the same shall take effect from the date of its passage.' See also Robey v. Broersma, 181 Md. 325, 344, 26 A.2d 820, 29 A.2d 827, 146 A.L.R. 687, and Strange v. Levy, 134 Md. 645, 107 A. 549.

The Act of 1953 showed a clear legislative intent that the estate of a policeman who had died while a member of the force should receive the contributions he had made to the Special Fund. The Legislature, in so many words, said that this intent should be put into effect on June 1, 1953. No reason has occurred to us, nor has any been suggested, why the Legislature should have meant that a policeman who died after May thirty-first and who was otherwise within the terms of the Act, should be deprived of its benefits. The parties were in agreement at the argument that the fiscal year of the City of Baltimore is the calendar year. It was suggested by the appellee that the Legislature postponed the operation of the act because the additional money required by the execution of its provisions could not be received by, or be available to, the commissioner earlier than January 1, 1954. The argument advanced was that the commissioner could estimate the number of policemen likely to die in the...