Connolly v. State, 41653

Decision Date12 August 1971
Docket NumberNo. 41653,41653
PartiesCharles B. CONNOLLY, Respondent, v. STATE of Washington, Department of Motor Vehicles, Appellant. * %
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Slade Gorton, Atty. Gen., William M. Gingery, Asst. Atty. Gen., Olympia, for appellant.

Barrett White, Olympia, for respondent.

HUNTER, Associate Justice.

This is an appeal by the Department of Motor Vehicles of the state of Washington from a judgment of the Superior Court of Thurston County, reversing the department's decision to revoke the motor vehicle driver's license of the defendant, Charles B. Connolly, for 6 months under the 'Implied Consent' statute, RCW 46.20.308, by reason of his failure to submit to a chemical test of his breath following his arrest for operating a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.

The sole issue in this case revolves around the failure of the arresting officers to advise the defendant that, in addition to the 'chemical tests' of his breath administered at the direction of a law enforcement officer, he has a right to tests administered by any qualified person of his own choosing as provided in RCW 46.61.506.

The pertinent part of the implied consent statute, as related to this appeal, is as follows:

(1) Any person who operates a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state shall be deemed to have given consent, subject to the provisions of RCW 46.61.506, to a chemical test or tests of his breath or blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood if arrested for any offense where, at the time of the arrest, the arresting officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person had been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The test or tests shall be administered at the direction of a law enforcement officer having reasonable grounds to believe the person to have been driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Such officer shall inform the person of his right to refuse the test, and of his right to have additional tests administered by any qualified person of his choosing as provided in RCW 46.61.506. The officer shall warn the driver that his privilege to drive will be revoked or denied if he refuses to submit to the test. Unless the person to be tested is unconscious, the chemical test administered shall be of his breath only.

(Italics ours.) RCW 46.20.308(1).

It is the contention of the department that this additional warning by the arresting officers is not a condition precedent to revocation; that to hold otherwise would be adding another element, which is not presently in the statute, essential as grounds for revocation of a defendant's driver's license by reason of his failure to take the test, and that the material elements essential for a revocation are as follows:

(1) Arrest of the person by an officer having reasonable grounds to believe he has been driving, or in physical control, of a vehicle on a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor;

(2) Refusal of the person, on request of an officer, to submit to the test;

(3) Having been warned that refusal will result in the revocation or denial of his privilege to drive.

They also contend that these are the only elements, in the arresting officers' report to the department, essential to a revocation of a defendant's driver's license under the statute, RCW 46.20.308(3), and that again these are the only elements mentioned under the statute within the scope of the administrative hearing when requested by the defendant. RCW 46.20.308(4).

We disagree with this rationale of the department. The language of the statute, as contended by the defendant, is clear and unambiguous, and in mandatory language in the conjunctive:

Such officer Shall inform the person of his right to refuse the test, And of his right to have additional tests administered by any qualified person of his choosing as provided in RCW 46.61.506.

(Italics ours.) RCW 46.20.308(1).

This language must be considered in context with the remainder of the statute, and with the statute in its entirety. In re Bracken's Estate, 56 Wash.2d 17, 351 P.2d 151 (1960); DeGrief v. Seattle, 50 Wash.2d 1, 297 P.2d 940 (1956).

To consider this additional warning in isolation, unrelated to the remainder of the statute, would render the language meaningless and superfluous. The fundamental rule of statutory construction requires that language within a statute must be construed to have a meaning and purpose, and that it not be rendered superfluous. Kasper v. City of Edmonds, 69 Wash.2d 799, 420 P.2d 346 (1966). Groves v. Meyers, 35 Wash.2d 403, 213 P.2d 483 (1950).

The department argues,...

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32 cases
  • State v. Baird
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • December 22, 2016
    ...his right to have a physician, etc., of his own choosing administer an additional test or tests."Connolly v . Dep't of Motor Vehicles , 79 Wash.2d 500, 504, 487 P.2d 1050 (1971) (quoting Couch v. Rice , 23 Ohio App.2d 160, 161, 261 N.E.2d 187 (1970) ). This court has further held that the w......
  • State v. Chelan Cnty. Dist. Court
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • November 16, 2017
    ...Commanda because "the petitioners challenge pretrial orders, not postconviction consequences").5 See Connolly v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 79 Wash.2d 500, 503, 487 P.2d 1050 (1971) ; Cooper v. Dep't of Licensing, 61 Wash. App. 525, 529, 810 P.2d 1385 (1991) (administrative case; holding offi......
  • Smith v. State
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • October 18, 2021
    ...proceeding entirely separate and distinct from the criminal charge for which the driver was arrested.") (citing Connolly v. State, 79 Wash.2d 500, 487 P.2d 1050 (1971) ).26 See Spokane County, 192 Wash.2d at 458, 430 P.3d 655 (statutes are not interpreted to produce absurd results).27 Wheth......
  • Thompson v. State Dept. of Licensing
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • August 19, 1999
    ...The words "knowingly and intelligently" in the context of the implied consent warning first appeared in our law in Connolly v. State, 79 Wash.2d 500, 504, 487 P.2d 1050 (1971). The failure to provide the driver with the opportunity to make a knowing and intelligent decision whether to take ......
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