Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v. Cedar Rapids Civil Rights Com'n, 84-125

• Decision Date: 17 April 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-125,84-125
• Parties: 48 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1563, 37 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 35,297, 1 A.D. Cases 724 CONSOLIDATED FREIGHTWAYS, INC., Appellee, v. CEDAR RAPIDS CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION and Willard Wright, Appellants.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 522

366 N.W.2d 522

48 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1563,

37 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 35,297, 1 A.D. Cases 724

CONSOLIDATED FREIGHTWAYS, INC., Appellee, v. CEDAR RAPIDS CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION and Willard Wright, Appellants.

No. 84-125.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 17, 1985.

David P. McManus, Asst. City Atty., Cedar Rapids, for appellant commission.

Mark H. Rettig of Hines, Pence, Day & Powers, Cedar Rapids, for appellant Wright.

John R. Carpenter, Iris E. Muchmore, and Roger W. Stone of Simmons, Perrine, Albright & Ellwood, Cedar Rapids, for appellee.

Considered en banc.

McCORMICK, Justice.

This civil rights case is based on a claim of employment discrimination in violation of an ordinance of the City of Cedar Rapids. Respondent Cedar Rapids Civil Rights Commission held that petitioner Consolidated Freightways, Inc. violated the ordinance when it discharged its employee, intervenor Willard Wright, upon his return from thirty days of treatment for alcoholism. The district court reversed the commission in a judicial review proceeding, and the commission and Wright appealed. We reverse the district court and remand the case to the commission for a determination of damages.

We must address questions concerning the nature of judicial review of decisions of municipal civil rights commissions, the standard for interpreting substantive provisions of civil rights ordinances, the meaning of the term "disability" in the Cedar Rapids ordinance, the sufficiency of evidence that Wright suffered from a disability, the sufficiency of evidence that Wright was discriminated against on the ground of a protected disability, and the necessity of remanding the case to the commission for a hearing on damages.

This employment discrimination claim is based on a theory of disparate treatment. Wright alleges he is an alcoholic, that his alcoholism did not prevent successful performance of his employment responsibilities, but that nevertheless he was discharged by his employer. Wright asserts that the discharge was discriminatory within the meaning of the Cedar Rapids civil rights ordinance because he was discharged for a disability that is not related to his ability to perform his job in a reasonably competent and satisfactory manner.

The dispute was tried as a contested case before a hearing officer for the Cedar Rapids Civil Rights Commission. The hearing officer made extensive findings of fact and held that Wright had been subjected to disability discrimination under the ordinance. The commission adopted the hearing officer's findings and awarded damages to Wright, including back pay and attorney fees.

Upon the employer's petition for judicial review, the district court held that the commission finding of discrimination was unsupported by substantial evidence and therefore reversed the commission decision. In this appeal, Wright and the commission contend the district court erred in its holding on the discrimination issue. Although they contend the employer did have an opportunity to participate in the proceeding by which damages were determined, they do not resist remand of the case to the commission for a hearing on the damages issue.

Many of the critical facts in this case are disputed. Most of them concern Wright's employment history during the last several months before his termination and the credibility of witnesses who testified about the circumstances surrounding the termination. Other background facts are not in serious dispute.

Wright, who was thirty-nine years old at the time of the commission hearing, had been employed by Consolidated in Cedar Rapids as a sales representative since December 1978. His responsibilities included calling on shippers to obtain their truck freight business. He was required to entertain customers, including purchasing alcoholic beverages for them. He was not required to drink alcoholic beverages with the customers but did so. This included drinking at lunch as well as dinner. Company policy required him to conceal purchases of alcoholic beverages on his expense accounts by classifying them as other items. Wright testified that he had experienced a problem with alcohol since he took his first drink, approximately twenty years earlier. He sporadically attempted to control the problem and occasionally attended Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, but in the last year of his employment the problem became more severe. His employment was terminated on September 25, 1981.

Although Wright denied that his drinking ever adversely affected his job performance, he acknowledged that the problem reached critical proportions in his personal life. He was charged and convicted of assaulting his wife in December 1980. During that same month he was told by his supervisor, terminal manager Delbert Wyss, that he had had too much to drink at a company dinner and should cut down. During the late evening of July 2, 1981, he was arrested and charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Wyss fired him because of that incident, but the decision was overruled on the same date by the Consolidated division manager in Peru, Illinois. The division manager subsequently came to Cedar Rapids, had dinner with Wright, and told him the incident should be forgotten.

In the meantime, Wright's relationship with his family continued to deteriorate. After an altercation with his stepson, a complaint of child abuse was lodged against him. Finally, in August 1981, he was charged again with assaulting his wife. Following discussions with his lawyer and doctor, he agreed to seek alcoholism treatment. He entered the Lakeside Alcohol Treatment Center in Marion, Iowa, on August 21, 1981, for a thirty-day period of residential treatment. The employer consented to the treatment, and the employer's insurance carrier paid for it. It was after his release from Lakeside on September 21, 1981, when Wright sought to return to work, that he learned his job was in jeopardy. He was placed on sick leave for four days and then notified by Wyss that his employment was terminated.

I. Nature of review. District court review was obtained in this case through a petition for judicial review under the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act. See Iowa Code § 17A.19 (1985). Because a municipal civil rights commission is not an "agency" under the definition in section 17A.2(1), the district court's jurisdiction depends on separate statutory authority for judicial review. This court has found the requisite statutory authority in the Iowa Civil Rights Act of 1965, Code chapter 601A. Under section 601A.19 a final decision by a "referral agency" is "subject to judicial review as provided in section 601A.17 in the same manner and to the same extent as a final decision of the commission." A municipal civil rights commission like the one in Cedar Rapids is deemed a "referral agency" for purposes of this provision. See Dietz v. Dubuque Human Rights Commission, 316 N.W.2d 859, 860-61 (Iowa 1982).

Therefore the district court acquired jurisdiction of the case upon the employer's petition for judicial review. Moreover, the scope of review is determined by the provisions of section 17A.19(8) as interpreted in our cases. See, e.g., Jackson County Public Hospital v. PERB, 280 N.W.2d 426, 429-30 (Iowa 1979). Thus the courts review action of the Cedar Rapids commission as if it were an agency expressly covered by the IAPA.

II. The standard of interpretation. Local civil rights ordinances must be consistent with the civil rights statute. § 601A.19; Dietz, 316 N.W.2d at 861. It follows that when ordinances contain provisions identical to those in the statute the provisions have the same meaning. This court has previously interpreted disability discrimination provisions in the statute that correspond to the provisions of the Cedar Rapids ordinance. Therefore those interpretations are applicable in determining the meaning of the ordinance. Because the elements of proof of a discrimination claim are derived from the substantive provisions of the ordinance, they are also dictated by comparable statutory interpretations.

III. Meaning of "disability." The Cedar Rapids ordinance copies section 601A.6(1)(a) by making it a discriminatory practice for an employer to discriminate in employment against an individual because of a disability of the individual. Using language almost identical to that in section 601A.6(1)(a), the ordinance provides: "If a disabled person is qualified to perform a particular occupation by reason of training or experience, the nature of the occupation shall not be the basis for exception to the unfair or discriminatory practices prohibited by this subsection." Also in a manner almost identical to section 601A.2(11), the ordinance defines disability as follows:

"Disability" means the physical or mental condition of a person which constitutes or constituted a substantial handicap. In reference to employment, under this chapter, "disability" also means the physical or mental condition of a person which constitutes or constituted a substantial handicap, but is unrelated to such person's ability to engage in a particular occupation.

In interpreting a rule of the Iowa Civil Rights Commission in Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 318 N.W.2d 162, 166-67 (Iowa 1982), this court recognized that a disability is protected under this definition when it does not prevent the individual from performing the job in a reasonably competent and satisfactory manner.

As explained in Foods, Inc., a disability may have some effect on an individual's job performance and nevertheless be protected. The employer is required to make reasonable accommodation for the condition. See Foods, Inc., 318 N.W.2d at 167. The same principle has been recognized in the context of alleged religious discrimination. See King v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 334 N.W.2d 598, 602 (Iowa 1983).

The meaning of "disability" under the ordinance is a question of...