Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Com'n

• Decision Date: 21 April 1982
• Docket Number: No. 66003,66003
• Citation: 318 N.W.2d 162
• Parties: 39 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 132, 2 A.D. Cases 303 FOODS, INC., Appellee, v. IOWA CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION and Theresa C. Harkin, Appellants.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 162

318 N.W.2d 162

39 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 132, 2 A.D. Cases 303

FOODS, INC., Appellee, v. IOWA CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION and Theresa C. Harkin, Appellants.

No. 66003.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 21, 1982.

Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., and Scott H. Nichols, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellants.

Paul R. Tyler, F. Richard Lyford, and Jon P. Sullivan of Dickinson, Throckmorton, Parker, Mannheimer & Raife, Des Moines, for appellee.

Considered by REYNOLDSON, C. J., and LeGRAND, HARRIS, McGIVERIN, and SCHULTZ, JJ.

SCHULTZ, Justice.

The fighting issue in this case is whether the discharge of a cafeteria worker because of a convulsive epileptic seizure constitutes an unfair employment practice in violation of section 601A.6, The Code. The Iowa Civil Rights Commission determined that the discharge was discriminatory and awarded back pay and ordered reinstatement. On judicial review the district court reversed the Commission. We now reverse the district court and remand for entry of a judgment affirming the Commission's decision.

In January 1976 Theresa Cain Harkin was employed by Foods, Inc., which does business as Dahl's, as a cafeteria worker. Although Harkin stated on her employment application that she had no "physical defects," she had been aware since 1971 that she suffered from epilepsy. She had experienced occasional petit mal seizures and suffered grand mal seizures, during which she lost consciousness, in April 1973 and October 1976. Harkin had received medical treatment for her epilepsy, however, and was taking medication to control the condition when, on March 2, 1977--after fourteen months of satisfactory performance of her employment duties--she suffered a grand mal seizure while on the job. She was discharged by Foods three days later.

Harkin subsequently filed a complaint with the Commission pursuant to section 601A.15, The Code. Following an investigation, a finding of probable cause was made and conciliation was unsuccessfully attempted. A hearing was then held. The hearing officer determined that Foods had committed an unfair employment practice by discriminating against Harkin on the basis of physical disability in violation of section 601A.6(1)(a), The Code. The officer awarded Harkin back pay and ordered Foods to reinstate her. The Commission adopted the hearing officer's decision. On judicial review, the district court disagreed with most of the Commission's conclusions of law and reversed its decision.

The issues, as stated by the parties in their briefs and during oral argument, are unnecessarily numerous and complex. Although we have thoroughly considered all of the arguments and contentions advanced by the parties, we will discuss only those matters we consider necessary to decide this appeal: (1) whether the hearing officer erred in construing a Commission rule and in determining that there was sufficient evidence in the record that Harkin had a disability; (2) whether the hearing officer erred in determining that Harkin's epilepsy was the reason for her discharge and was unrelated to the nature of her job; (3) whether the hearing officer erred in refusing to dismiss the complaint because of alleged procedural irregularities: (a) whether the Commission's investigation was sufficiently prompt and thorough to meet the requirements of section 601A.15(3)(a), The Code, and (b) whether the Commission violated the nondisclosure requirement of section 601A.15(4), The Code, by engaging in an ex parte communication with an officer of the Epilepsy Foundation of America; and (4) whether the hearing officer erred in computing damages.

I. Scope of review. The Iowa Administrative Procedure Act (IAPA), ch. 17A, The Code, provides for judicial review of final agency action. § 17A.19, The Code. See also § 601A.17(1), The Code ("Judicial review of the actions of the commission may be sought in accordance with the terms of the Iowa administrative procedure Act."). Section 17A.20, The Code, provides:

An aggrieved or adversely affected party to the judicial review proceeding may obtain a review of any final judgment of the district court under this chapter by appeal to the supreme court. The appeal shall be taken as in other civil cases, although the appeal may be taken regardless of the amount involved.

"In 'other civil cases,' this court sits to correct errors of law. Iowa R.App.P. 4. Thus, this court's duty, under the IAPA, is to correct errors of law made by the district court." Jackson County Public Hospital v. Public Employment Relations Board, 280 N.W.2d 426, 429 (Iowa 1979).

The district court, when exercising the power of judicial review conferred by section 17A.19, is itself functioning in an appellate capacity to correct errors of law, as specified in section 17A.19(8). ¹ Id.; Iowa Public Service Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Commission, 263 N.W.2d 766, 768 (Iowa 1978). "Thus, when this court reviews a decision of a district court rendered pursuant to section 17A.19, the sole question is whether the district court correctly applied the law. In order to make that determination, this court applies the standards of section 17A.19(8) to the agency action to determine whether this court's conclusions are the same as those of the district court." Jackson County Public Hospital, 280 N.W.2d at 429-30.

II. Construction and application of rule 6.1.

A. Certification. Disability is defined in section 601A.2(11):

"Disability" means the physical or mental condition of a person which constitutes a substantial handicap. In reference to employment, under this chapter, "disability" also means the physical or mental condition of a person which constitutes a substantial handicap, but is unrelated to such person's ability to engage in a particular occupation.

At the time of the hearing, Commission rule 6.1 (then rule 7.1) required that a disability be certified:

The term "physical and mental disability" shall mean blindness, deafness or any other physical or mental condition which constituted or constitutes a substantial handicap and which is unrelated to the person's ability to perform jobs or positions which are available to him or her. A substantial handicap shall be certified by the commission through the use of standards and criteria which are established by the state education and services branch of the Iowa department of public instruction and/or a medical examination or through medical records and evidence which have been submitted by a physician, psychiatrist or psychologist.

240 I.A.C. § 6.1 (rescinded and replaced May 23, 1979).

At the close of Harkin's evidence, Foods moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that there was no evidence of a physical "disability," within the meaning of section 601A.2(11) and rule 6.1. Foods maintained that no evidence from the Department of Public Instruction had been presented and that Harkin therefore had to rely on a medical examination or medical records and evidence submitted by a physician, psychiatrist, or psychologist to prove that she had a disability. Foods pointed out that no such admissible evidence had been presented, however, and contended that it had therefore been denied the right to cross-examine testimony concerning Harkin's medical condition.

The hearing officer interpreted Foods' assertions as an objection that there had been no certification of a "substantial handicap" as required by rule 6.1. The hearing officer "concluded that there was no requirement that the substantial handicap be certified by medical records and evidence submitted at the hearing." (Emphasis original). The district court determined that the Commission's construction was not reasonable or consistent with the IAPA and held that a substantial handicap must be certified by submission of expert medical evidence at the hearing.

In its motion to dismiss at the hearing and in its brief on appeal Foods has confined its assertions to the contention that the evidence presented at the hearing was insufficient to prove that Harkin had a disability. It has not placed in issue the question whether certification need be proved at the hearing; its contentions concern only the type of evidence that must be presented to prove the existence of a disability. We therefore limit our inquiry to the issue preserved for appeal: whether medical evidence of the type specified in rule 6.1 must be presented at the hearing to prove a disability.

We conclude that the certification requirements of rule 6.1 pertain to the procedures to be followed by the agency prior to taking action on a complaint, not to the type of evidence that must be presented at the hearing if one should eventuate. The obvious purpose for requiring certification is to ensure that an alleged "disability" constitutes a "substantial handicap" before the Commission takes action on a complaint, which not only conserves agency resources but also guards against unfounded charges of unfair employment practices. The hearing on a complaint occurs only after there has been a determination of probable cause and there have been attempts to eliminate the allegedly discriminatory practice by conference, conciliation, and persuasion. § 601A.15(3)(c), The Code.

The hearing is conducted pursuant to the provisions of the IAPA for contested cases. § 601A.15(7), The Code. The standard of adequacy for evidence in contested case proceedings is defined by the IAPA as follows: "A finding shall be based upon the kind of evidence on which reasonably prudent persons are accustomed to rely for the conduct of their serious affairs, and may be based upon such evidence even if it would be inadmissible in a jury trial." § 17A.14(1), The Code. This provision specifies the standard for determining the kind of evidence necessary to prove a disability, as defined in section 601A.2(11) and rule 6.1, at the hearing. We now turn to the question whether, under this standard, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the conclusion that...