Consul General of the Republic of Indonesia v. Bill's Rentals, Inc., Civil No. 3-98-CV-90135 (S.D. Iowa 4/6/2000)
| Decision Date | 06 April 2000 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 3-98-CV-90135. |
| Parties | CONSUL GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, Plaintiff, v. BILL'S RENTALS, INC., COLTON & ASSOCIATES, INC., AND DAVID KEVIN MCGRATH, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa |
This matter is before the Court on two renewed motions to dismiss, one filed by defendant Bill's Rentals, Inc. ("Bill's Rentals") and one filed jointly by defendants Colton & Associates, Inc. ("Colton & Associates") and David Kevin McGrath ("McGrath"). After the original motions were filed and oral argument heard, the Court granted additional time to conduct discovery on the limited issues of standing and real party in interest. As matters outside the pleadings were submitted to, and considered by, this Court, the renewed motions are converted to motions for summary judgment as required.1 See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). The motions are considered fully submitted without additional oral argument.
On September 2, 1996, twelve Indonesian citizens, all students at the University of Iowa, were returning to Iowa City, Iowa from a weekend sightseeing trip. The rental van they were riding in was owned by, and rented from, Bill's Rentals, located in Iowa City, Iowa. The driver of the rented van, one of the students, attempted to enter a rest stop off of Interstate 80 near Ogallala, Nebraska. The driver lost control of the rental van and struck the rear of a tractor-trailer parked on the right shoulder of the exit ramp in a posted "No Parking" zone. The tractor-trailer was being operated by McGrath in the course of his employment for Colton & Associates. Five of the passengers died as a result of the accident and the remaining six passengers sustained injuries.
The Consul General of the Republic of Indonesia, Soejono Soerjoatmodjo, (the "Consul General") invokes the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a)(4), 1603. The complaint alleges eleven counts of negligence against Bill's Rentals under Iowa's owner liability statute, Iowa Code § 321.493, which imputes a driver's negligent behavior to the owner of a vehicle. The complaint specifically alleges five counts of wrongful death, five counts of loss of spousal consortium, and five counts of loss of a child's consortium.
The complaint also alleges eleven counts of negligence against McGrath, imputed to his employer Colton & Associates under Iowa Code § 321.493 and the doctrine of respondeat superior. Specifically, the complaint alleges five counts of wrongful death, five counts of loss of spousal consortium, and five counts of loss of a child's consortium. In addition, the Consul General asks for punitive damages as a result of McGrath's reckless and willful behavior.
As a threshold matter, this Court must inquire as to the Consul General's ability to bring this suit in federal court. In order to invoke the power of a federal court, Article III of the United States Constitution requires a party allege an actual "case or controversy." See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493 (1974). At the heart of this requirement is that plaintiff must have standing to bring suit. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975). Issues of standing may be raised by a federal court sua sponte. See U.S. v. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192, 197 (1956), cited in 6A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1542.
"The doctrine of standing focuses on whether the plaintiff before the court is the proper party to request adjudication of a particular issue." United Food and Commercial Workers Int'l Union v. IBP, Inc., 857 F.2d 422, 426 (8th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). Standing requires injury in fact, causation, and redressability. See Muasolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1301 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). In addition to the constitutional requirements, there are prudential barriers to standing, as well. See DuPree v. United States, 559 F.2d 1151, 1153 (9th Cir. 1977). For example, the presence of harm to a party does not permit her to assert the rights of third parties in order to obtain redress for herself.2 See Warth, 422 U.S. at 509, cited in DuPree, 559 F.2d at 1153.
The common law rights of authorized consuls to protect the property interests of nationals of the countries they represent have been generally limited to claims for the restitution of specific property and the representation of their nationals' interests in estate matters. See DuPree, 559 F.2d at 1154 . The matter before this Court is neither a property nor an estate matter, despite the fact that some of the students died in the accident; the Consul General has filed a tort action in its own name.3 International law does not, therefore, seem to provide a basis for standing.
However, common law rights have in most instances been reinforced or replaced by specific treaties or statutes which may grant standing to a party who otherwise fails to meet the constitutional requirements or prudential limitations. See DuPree, 559 F.2d at 1154 (citations omitted). International conventions may serve the same function in affording standing. See DuPree, 559 F.2d at 1153 (citing Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888)). To this end, the Consul General relies on Articles 5(a), (g), and (i) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (the "convention") to which the United States and Indonesia are parties. Article 5(a) states that consular functions consist of "protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State and of its nationals, both individuals and bodies corporate, within the limits permitted by international law." Vienna Convention, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. Article 5(g) states that consular functions also include "safeguarding the interests of nationals, both individuals and bodies corporate, of the sending State in cases of succession mortis causa4 in the territory of the receiving State, in accordance with the laws and regulations of the receiving state." Id. Article 5(i) seems to lend the most support to the Consul General's claim, stating that a consul's functions include:
subject to the practices and procedures obtaining in the receiving State, representing or arranging appropriate representation for nationals of the sending State before the tribunals and other authorities of the receiving State, for the purpose of obtaining, in accordance with the laws and regulations of the receiving State, provisional measures for the preservation of the rights and interests of these nationals, where, because of absence or any other reason, such nationals are unable at the proper time to assume the defence [sic] of their rights and interests.
Vienna Convention, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
In DuPree the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Mexican Consul did not have standing to intervene on behalf of three named plaintiffs, Mexican nationals, in a class action in which they alleged they were wrongfully held as alien material witnesses. The DuPree Court specifically found that the Convention did not support the Consul's standing in that case because the consular right to represent or arrange appropriate representation for its nationals in the receiving country is subject to the receiving country's practices and procedures, including principles of standing. See DuPree, 559 F.2d at 1155 (citing Vienna Convention, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261). This Court, however, finds the instant matter distinguishable from DuPree. In this case, because of the deaths of five of the students and because an unspecified number of the injured students have returned to Indonesia because their visas have expired, the Convention seems to grant the Consul General standing by granting him the right to obtain provisional measures for the preservation of the rights and interests of these nationals because of absence or other reason.
The consular rights in the Convention are granted "in accordance with the laws and regulations of the receiving State" and "subject to the practices and procedures obtaining in the receiving state," Vienna Convention, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, including Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a). "The question of in whose name the suit must be brought is within the province of federal law." Garcia v. Hall, 624 F.2d 150, 152 fn.4 (10th Cir. 1980). Specifically, the Rule states that "[e]very action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest." Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(a). The real party in interest is a party who, under governing substantive law, possesses the rights sought to be enforced. See Iowa Public Service Co. v. Medicine Bow Coal Co., 556 F.2d 400, 404 (8th Cir. 1977). Governing substantive law is ordinarily state law. See Iowa Public Service Co., 556 F.2d at 404. In this case there is a question as to whether Iowa or Nebraska is the governing state law. Therefore, the Court must first determine which state's law governs in order to finish the Rule 17 inquiry.
"A district court, sitting in diversity, must follow the choice-of-law approach prevailing in the state in which it sits." Dorman v. Emerson Elec. Co., 23 F.3d 1354, 1358 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing Birnstill v. Home Sav. of Am., 907 F.2d 795, 797 (8th Cir. 1990)). In deciding choice of law questions, however, a court must first determine the nature of the causes of action, see Drinkall v. Used Car Rentals, Inc., 32 F.3d 329, 331 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing O'Neal v. Kennamer, 958 F.2d 1044, 1046 (11th Cir. 1992)) because a state may have adopted different choice of law approaches depending on the nature of the claim. The law of the forum state, in this case Iowa, controls this question. See Drinkall, 32 F.3d at 331. Id. Under the...
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