Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v. Maine Cent. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 08 December 1916
• Citation: 99 A. 259,115 Me. 449
• Parties: CONTINENTAL PAPER BAG CO. v. MAINE CENT. R. CO.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

99 A. 259

115 Me. 449

CONTINENTAL PAPER BAG CO.

v. MAINE CENT. R. CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Dec. 8, 1916.

Report from Supreme Judicial Court, Cumberland County, at Law.

Action by the Continental Paper Bag Company against the Maine Central Railroad Company. On report and agreed statement of facts. Judgment for defendant.

Argued before SAVAGE, C. J., and CORNISH, KING, BIRD, HALEY, and PHILBROOK, JJ.

Verrill, Hale, Booth & Ives and Benjamin B. Sanderson, all of Portland, for plaintiff. Charles H. Blatchford, of Portland, for respondent.

BIRD, J. This is an action for damages upon a bill of lading issued by defendant to plaintiff. The case comes before us upon report on an agreed statement of facts, which is summarized in the brief of plaintiff as follows:

"The plaintiff delivered a carload of paper bags and wrapping paper to the defendant at Rumford, Me., on March 6, 1013, consigned to Dayton, Ohio. The shipment was delayed in transit several days, owing to the admitted negligence of one or more of the connecting carriers, arriving at Dayton for delivery on Sunday, March 22d. The next day an extremely severe rainstorm occurred throughout the day, making it practically impossible for the consignee to unload the shipment. On Tuesday, the 24th day of March, there was an unprecedented flood in Dayton amounting to an act of God, which partially submerged the car containing the plaintiff's goods, at that time stationed on the railroad siding, and damaged them. It is admitted that, but for the negligent delay, the damage, in all probability, would not have occurred. The goods, in damaged condition, were subsequently tendered to the consignee, who refused the same, and after failure to receive instructions from the plaintiff as to their disposition, were sold at auction.

"The bill of lading, which is made a part of the agreed statement of facts, provides in section 1 that the carrier shall not be liable for any loss or damage or delay caused by the act of God. Also in section 3 that the carrier's liability for damage shall be based on the value of the property at the time of shipment, unless a lower valuation is determined by the classification or tariff upon which the rate is based, whether or not such damage occurs from negligence.

"The agreed statement provides that it shall be immaterial, for the purposes of this suit, which carrier negligently delayed the shipment."

It may be added to this summary that by paragraph 5 of the statement it is agreed that the tariffs governing the movement of the shipment in question were filed and published as provided by law; that there were two rates in effect, one the rate used by plaintiff, upon executing the uniform bill of lading, "Exhibit A," and the other a rate 10 per cent. higher, to be applied in case the property was shipped under full common carrier's liability.

Under this statement of facts, a single issue only is presented, whether a common carrier, engaged in interstate commerce, is liable for damage to goods which are subjected while in his custody to injury by an act of God because of the carrier's negligent delay in transportation, and but for whose negligence the goods would not have been injured.

The solution of the question depends upon the interpretation of the Carmack Amendment, so called, in conformity to the provisions of which the bill of lading was drawn and issued. The portion of the amendment involved in the present inquiry is:

"That any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company receiving property for transportation from a point in one state to a point in another state shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor and shall be liable to the lawful holder thereof for any loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it or by any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company to which such property may be delivered or over whose line or lines such property may pass, and no contract, receipt, rule, or regulation shall exempt such common carrier, railroad, or transportation company from the liability hereby imposed: Provided, that nothing in this section shall deprive any holder of such receipt or bill of lading of any remedy or right of action which he has under existing law." 34 U. S. Stats. at Large, ch. 3591, pp. 593, 595.

The exclusiveness and paramount character of a federal law in relation to any subject within the constitutional powers of Congress cannot be questioned. The enactment of such a statute removes its subject-matter from the sphere of state action. Nor. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Washington, 222 U. S. 370, 375, 378, 32 Sup. Ct. 160, 56 L. Ed. 237. In actions brought in the state courts under such statutes, while questions of procedure and evidence are to be determined according to the laws of the forum, questions inseparably connected with the right of action, such as those of the liability of defendant and the proper measure of damages, must be settled according to general principles of law as administered in the federal courts. C., etc., Ry. Co. v. Kelly, 241 U....