Continental Distributing Co. v. Smith

• Decision Date: 04 June 1913
• Citation: 132 P. 631,74 Wash. 10
• Parties: CONTINENTAL DISTRIBUTING CO. v. SMITH et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

132 P. 631

74 Wash. 10

CONTINENTAL DISTRIBUTING CO. v. SMITH et al.

Supreme Court of Washington

June 4, 1913

Department 1. Appeal from Superior Court, Stevens County; Daniel H Carey, Judge.

Action by the Continental Distributing Company against Jane Smith and others. Judgment the defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Fred M Williams and R. M. Webster, both of Spokane, and Jackson &amp Bailey, of Colville, for appellant.

Jesseph & Grinstead, of Colville, for respondents.

CROW C.J.

This action was commenced by the Continental Distributing Company, a corporation, against the widow, heirs at law, and administratrix of the estate of O. T. Smith, deceased, to set aside a tax deed and quiet plaintiff's title to the east half of lot 7 in block 4 in the town of Squire City (now Springdale), Stevens county, Washington. From a judgment and decree in defendants' favor the plaintiff has appealed.

The lot, one-half of which is now in question, was originally platted as lot 7 in block 4 of the town of Squire City. In 1895 the Legislature changed the name of Squire City to Springdale. Session Laws 1895, c. 54, p. 97. Taxes for 1902, which were levied upon the half not under the name of Squire City, and in the name of 'W. D. Storer' as owner, became delinquent. In September, 1908, Stevens county commenced a general tax foreclosure against this property, and other lots and tracts, upon a delinquency certificate theretofore issued to the county. In all these foreclosure proceedings, save and except the tax deed, the name of the owner appeared as 'W. B. Storer.' A foreclosure decree was entered, sale was made, and on December 5, 1908, a tax deed was issued to O. T. Smith, now deceased. On June 10, 1905, appellant purchased the property from F. R. Bean and Nellie E. Bean, his wife, who then executed and delivered to appellant a warranty deed, describing the real estate as 'The east one-half (1/2) of lot numbered seven (7) in block numbered four (4) of the original town of Squire City, now Springdale according to the recorded plat thereof.' Thereafter, and prior to the tax sale, appellant improved and rented the porperty. When the tax deed was delivered, O. T. Smith demanded of the tenant that rent be paid to him, which was done. Thereafter negotiations were commenced between appellant and O. T. Smith for an adjustment, whereby appellant could regain the title. These negotiations failed, and this action was commenced after the death of Mr. Smith.

Many assignments are presented in appellant's brief, which raise but two questions: (1) Whether the fact that the property was assessed upon the tax rolls as east one-half of lot 7 in block 4 in Squire City, instead of the town of Springdale, avoided the tax levy, the foreclosure, and the tax deed; and (2) whether the use of the name 'W. B. Storer' in the foreclosure proceedings, instead of the name 'W. D. Storer,' which appeared on the tax rolls as owner, invalidates the foreclosure and tax deed. The deed by which appellant acquired title described the property as being located in the 'original town of Squire City, now Springdale.' This was notice to appellant that the lot as platted was located in Squire City, and that the name had been changed. Appellant seems to rely upon the warranty in the deed executed by its grantors at its excuse for failing to ascertain the fact that the taxes were delinquent. Without regard to this deed it was appellant's duty to ascertain at its peril whether all taxes had been paid by its grantors.

In Ontario Land Co. v. Yordy, 44 Wash. 239, 87 P. 257 this court held a description used in a tax levy and subsequent foreclosure was sufficient to identify the property and locate the same. It appeared that the taxing officers had used serial numbers for tracts of land they considered to be blocks in harmony with the numbers of other blocks on the original plat, although the property in question had not been subdivided into blocks and lots, but had been marked 'Reserved.' In commenting upon the sufficiency of the description thus adopted this court said: 'It is a well-established principle of...