Contreras-Velazquez v. Family Health Ctrs. of San Diego, Inc.
| Decision Date | 18 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | D075577 |
| Citation | 62 Cal.App.5th 88,276 Cal.Rptr.3d 358 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Rosario CONTRERAS-VELAZQUEZ, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. FAMILY HEALTH CENTERS OF SAN DIEGO, INC., Defendant and Appellant. |
Mulvaney Barry Beatty Linn & Mayers, John A. Mayers, Patrick L. Prindle, San Diego; Law Offices of Mary A. Lehman and Mary A. Lehman, Coronado, for Defendant and Appellant.
Law Office of Martin N. Buchanan, Martin N. Buchanan, Oceanside; Hogue & Belong, Jeffrey L. Hogue and Tyler Belong, San Diego, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Rosario Contreras-Velazquez (Velazquez) sued her former employer, Family Health Centers of San Diego, Inc. (Family Health), alleging disability discrimination and related causes of action after she suffered a work-related injury and Family Health terminated her employment. A jury found Family Health not liable, but the trial court ordered a new trial as to three of Velazquez's causes of action after finding the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict—a ruling we affirmed in a prior appeal. ( Contreras-Velazquez v. Family Health Centers of San Diego, Inc. (Aug. 9, 2017, D071083) 2017 WL 3403146 [nonpub. opn.] (hereafter, Velazquez I ).)
At the ensuing retrial, a jury found in favor of Velazquez. The jury awarded her $915,645 in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive damages. However, the trial court granted in part a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and reduced the punitive damages award to $1,831,290 (a 2:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages). The court reasoned a punitive damages award equal to twice the compensatory damages award was the maximum amount permissible under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Family Health appeals the judgment and contends certain special verdict findings returned by the first jury estopped Velazquez from prevailing at the retrial under the issue preclusion doctrine. Family Health also appeals the JNOV order on the basis that the reduced punitive damages award remains grossly excessive in violation of Family Health's due process rights. Family Health requests the punitive damages award be further reduced to $915,645 (a 1:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages). Velazquez cross-appeals the JNOV order and requests reinstatement of the $5 million punitive damages award.
We conclude the first jury's special verdict findings did not constitute a final adjudication of any issue and, therefore, the trial court correctly ruled that the issue preclusion doctrine did not require entry of judgment in Family Health's favor. Further, we conclude the trial court properly reduced the punitive damages award to an amount equal to twice the compensatory damages award—and no further. Therefore, we affirm both the judgment and the JNOV order.
From 2003 to 2006, Velazquez worked as a medical records clerk and a patient service representative for Family Health, a non-profit organization that operates community health clinics. She stopped working for Family Health in 2006, but was rehired to Family Health's medical records department in 2008.
In 2012, Velazquez suffered a work-related repetitive stress injury to her right upper arm. She underwent surgery to treat the injury, but the surgery was not effective.
Velazquez returned to work after her surgery and, in December 2013, was transferred to Family Health's call center to work as an appointment technician. In her new position, Velazquez was required to use a headset and a computer mouse repetitively for approximately 6–8 hours per day. Family Center provided Velazquez a right-handed computer mouse and a pull-out tray for her mouse situated on the right side of her desk.
Within days of beginning her new position, Velazquez experienced pain in her right arm. She told her supervisor about her condition and requested an accommodation such as a left-handed mouse or a roller mouse. Family Health provided Velazquez a roller mouse, but it did not function properly. A week and a half after Velazquez began her new position, Velazquez's supervisor instructed her to stop coming into work, schedule an appointment with her doctor, and provide a doctor's report before returning to work.
The next day, Velazquez saw her doctor, who prepared a report indicating Velazquez complained of pain on both sides, did not feel able to do her usual job duties, and wanted to be taken completely off work because of significant discomfort. Nonetheless, the report indicated she could return to modified work with four restrictions: (1) "Limited use of right upper extremity"; (2) "Repetitive hand, wrist and keyboard work limited to 10 minutes per hour"; (3) "No overhead lifting or reaching with the right upper extremity"; and (4) "No forceful pushing and pulling with the right upper extremity." The report stated Velazquez was "eventually going to wind up with some fairly profound limitations in the long run" and Family Health should contact her doctor to discuss her work status because "whatever they have her doing at work is just aggravating everything, which is going to be to nobody's advantage."
A few days after the doctor's visit, Velazquez provided the doctor's report to her supervisor and spoke with a human resources representative regarding her injury.
The human resources representative instructed Velazquez to refrain from coming into work and to continue seeing her doctor. For the next three months, Velazquez did not come into work per her instructions. She visited her doctor once per month and provided Family Health a doctor's report after each visit.
Family Health did not contact Velazquez's doctor to discuss possible work arrangements to accommodate her injury. However, one of Family Health's human resources representatives searched online for employment positions that were available and suitable for Velazquez given her qualifications and work restrictions. She was unable to identify a position appropriate for Velazquez.
Family Health terminated Velazquez's employment in April 2014. In two separate conversations, Velazquez told one of Family Health's human resources representatives she wanted to remain employed and asked whether there were any job positions available for her. The human resources representative stated Family Health could not accommodate Velazquez's disability and could no longer employ her.
Velazquez sued Family Health alleging six causes of action under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA): disparate treatment based on physical disability ( Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (a) ); failure to accommodate physical disability ( id. , § 12940, subd. (m) ); failure to engage in the interactive process ( id. , § 12940, subd. (n) ); hostile work environment ( id. , § 12940, subd. (j) ); retaliation ( id. , § 12940, subd. (h) ); and failure to prevent discrimination ( id. , § 12940, subd. (k) ); as well as a cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.
The case proceeded to a jury trial resulting in a verdict in favor of Family Health on all seven causes of action. For the disparate treatment and failure to accommodate causes of action, the jury returned special verdict findings that Velazquez was unable to perform essential job duties with reasonable accommodation for her physical disability. For the interactive process cause of action, the jury returned a special verdict finding that Family Health did not fail to participate in a timely, good-faith interactive process with Velazquez to determine whether a reasonable accommodation could be made. For the failure to prevent discrimination cause of action, the jury returned a special verdict finding that Family Health did not fail to take all reasonable steps to prevent discrimination. The jury found Family Health not liable on the remaining causes of action for reasons not pertinent to this appeal.
After the court entered judgment in favor of Family Health, Velazquez moved for a new trial on grounds that the evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict. In her motion, she did not limit the scope of her request for a new trial; therefore, she presumably sought a new trial as to all seven causes of action. However, in a supplemental brief filed with the court's permission, Velazquez limited the scope of her new trial request to three causes of action—the FEHA causes of action for failure to accommodate, failure to engage in the interactive process, and failure to prevent discrimination.
The court granted the motion for a new trial as limited by Velazquez in her supplemental brief. The new trial order stated in relevant part as follows: "It is not only the right, but the duty of the trial court to grant a new trial when, in its opinion, the court believes the weight of the evidence to be contrary to the finding of the jury.
[Citation.] [¶] [Velazquez] has met her burden on this motion. [¶] The weight of the evidence in this case was that (1) [Family Health] failed to participate in a timely, good faith interactive process with [Velazquez] to determine whether reasonable accommodation could be made; (2) [Velazquez] was able to perform essential job duties with reasonable accommodation for the physical disability; and (3) [Family Health] failed to provide reasonable accommodation for [Velazquez]." Based on these findings, the court ordered a new trial for the failure to accommodate, failure to engage in the interactive process, and failure to prevent discrimination causes of action.
Family Health appealed the order granting a partial new trial. It argued among other things that substantial evidence did not support the trial court's reasons for granting a new trial.
We rejected Family Health's sufficiency of the evidence argument and affirmed the partial new trial order. ( Velazquez I,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Tukes v. Richard
...litigants from harassment by vexatious litigation." ( Contreras-Velazquez v. Family Health Centers of San Diego, Inc . (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 88, 100, 276 Cal.Rptr.3d 358.)The probate court found that Richard properly asserted issue preclusion to each of Tukes's claims against the Bennett Tr......
- Planet Bingo LLC v. Burlington Ins. Co.
-
Amavizca v. Nissan N. Am.
...damages can in some cases-or perhaps in many cases where the compensatory damages award is substantial-be the constitutional maximum.” Id. at 109. “However, ‘there is no fixed formula that requires a court to set punitive damages equal to compensatory damages' whenever compensatory damages ......
-
Nolan v. Ford Motor Co.
...Centers of San Diego, Inc., supra, 62 Cal.App.5th 88, the court found that the defendant's "conduct was moderately reprehensible." (Id. at p. 108.) defendant's net worth was $213 million. (Id. at p. 110.) However, "[t]he punitive damages award . . . was . . . $1, 831, 290 - quite a large fi......
-
$137 Million Racial Harassment Verdict Against Tesla Slashed By New Jury!
...and the substantial amount of the compensatory damages award); Contreras-Velasquez v. Family Health Ctrs. of San. Diego, Inc., 62 Cal. App. 5th 88, 108 (2021) ("When compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermos......
-
$137 Million Racial Harassment Verdict Against Tesla Slashed by New Jury!
...and the substantial amount of the compensatory damages award); Contreras-Velasquez v. Family Health Ctrs. of San. Diego, Inc., 62 Cal. App. 5th 88, 108 (2021) (“When compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermos......