Cook v. Harding

• Decision Date: 12 January 2018
• Docket Number: No. 16-55968,16-55968
• Citation: 879 F.3d 1035
• Parties: Melissa Kay COOK, Individually; Melissa Kay Cook, as Guardian Ad Litem of Baby A, Baby B, and Baby C, Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. Cynthia Anne HARDING, M.P.H., Director of the Los Angeles County Department of Public Health, in her official capacity; Jeffery D. Gunzenhauser, M.D., M.H.P., Health Officer and Medical Director for the Los Angeles County Department of Public Health; Dean C. Logan, Registrar–Recorder/County Clerk for Los Angeles County in His Official Capacity; Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor of the State of California; Karen Smith, M.D., M.P.H., Director and State Public Health Officer for the California Department of Public Health; C. M., an adult male believed to be the genetic father of Baby A, Baby B and Baby C; Kaiser Foundation Hospital; Panorama City Medical Center ; Payman Roshan, Senior Vice President and Patient Administrator of Panorama City Medical Center ; Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

879 F.3d 1035

Melissa Kay COOK, Individually; Melissa Kay Cook, as Guardian Ad Litem of Baby A, Baby B, and Baby C, Plaintiffs–Appellants,

v.Cynthia Anne HARDING, M.P.H., Director of the Los Angeles County Department of Public Health, in her official capacity; Jeffery D. Gunzenhauser, M.D., M.H.P., Health Officer and Medical Director for the Los Angeles County Department of Public Health; Dean C. Logan, Registrar–Recorder/County Clerk for Los Angeles County in His Official Capacity; Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor of the State of California; Karen Smith, M.D., M.P.H., Director and State Public Health Officer for the California Department of Public Health; C. M., an adult male believed to be the genetic father of Baby A, Baby B and Baby C; Kaiser Foundation Hospital; Panorama City Medical Center ; Payman Roshan, Senior Vice President and Patient Administrator of Panorama City Medical Center ; Xavier Becerra,^* Attorney General, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 16-55968

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted November 9, 2017, Pasadena, California

Filed January 12, 2018

Harold J. Cassidy (argued), Joseph Zakhary, and Thomas J. Viggiano, The Cassidy Law Firm, Shrewsbury, New Jersey; Michael W. Caspino and Robert M. Dato, Buchalter Nemer, Irvine, California; for Plaintiffs–Appellants.

Daniel P. Barer (argued), Pollak Vida & Fisher, Los Angeles, California, for Defendants–Appellees Cynthia Anne Harding, M.P.H.; Jeffery D. Gunzenhauser, M.D., M.H.P.; and Dean C. Logan.

Robert R. Walmsley (argued) and Marlea F. Jarrette, Jarette & Walmsley LLP, Los Olivos, California, for Defendant–Appellee C.M.

Chara L. Crane (argued), Deputy Attorney General; Jennifer M. Kim, Supervising Deputy Attorney General; Julie Weng–Gutierrez, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Xavier Becerra, Attorney General; Office of the Attorney General, Los Angeles, California; for Defendants–Appellees Edmund G. Brown, Jr. and Karen Smith, M.D., M.P.H.

Dean Masserman, Vorzimer/Masserman – Fertility & Family Law Center, Woodland Hills, California, for Defendants–Appellees Kaiser Foundation Hospital, Panorama City Medical Center, and Payman Roshan.

Before: Stephen Reinhardt and Kim McLane Wardlaw, Circuit Judges, and Wiley Y. Daniel,^** District Judge.

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:

The California legislature enacted California Family Code Section 7962 (" Section 7962") to codify California cases that found gestational surrogacy contracts enforceable.¹ Among other matters, Section 7962 authorizes the judicial determination of legal parentage in accordance with the terms of a gestational surrogacy agreement prior to the birth of any child so conceived.

Melissa Cook entered into a gestational surrogacy agreement with C.M. pursuant to Section 7962. By the terms of the 75–page contract, titled "In Vitro Fertilization Surrogacy Agreement" ("Agreement"), Cook agreed to the implantation of embryos created with ova from an anonymous woman and sperm from C.M., to carry any pregnancy to term, and to surrender upon birth the child or children to C.M. Under the contract, Cook's parental rights would be terminated by court order prior to the birth of any child or children in accordance with Section 7962, and C.M. would be declared the only legal parent. Following the embryo transfer, Cook became pregnant, and eventually learned that she was carrying three fetuses. Cook's relationship with C.M. soured when they disagreed during her pregnancy about selective reduction of the fetuses. Triplets were born on February 22, 2016.

Prior to the birth, Cook began her legal quest to challenge the constitutionality of Section 7962. On January 4, 2016, she filed a complaint in the Los Angeles County Superior Court alleging that Section 7962 was unconstitutional and seeking a parentage declaration. The court struck this complaint because it was filed in the wrong court and without proper service. On January 6, 2016, C.M. filed a petition in the Children's Court within the Los Angeles County Superior Court to enforce the contract and be declared the sole legal parent of the children. On February 1, 2016, Cook filed a counterclaim in response to C.M.'s petition, again challenging the validity of the Agreement and the constitutionality of Section 7962. The following day, she filed a nearly identical complaint in federal district court against C.M. as well as state and county personnel, raising her constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C § 1983. The district court abstained pursuant to Younger v. Harris , 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), and dismissed the case. Cook v. Harding , 190 F.Supp.3d 921, 938 (C.D. Cal. 2016). Cook appealed.

DISCUSSION

"We review a district court's decision to abstain under Younger de novo and do not defer to the view of the district judge." Nationwide Biweekly Admin., Inc. v. Owen , 873 F.3d 716, 727 (9th Cir. 2017). We conduct the Younger analysis "in light of the facts and circumstances existing at the time the federal action was filed." Potrero Hills Landfill, Inc. v. Cty. of Solano , 657 F.3d 876, 881 n.6 (9th Cir. 2011).

"We may affirm the district court on any ground[ ] supported by the record." Schechner v. KPIX–TV , 686 F.3d 1018, 1022–23 (9th Cir. 2012).

I. Younger Abstention

" Younger ‘abstention remains an extraordinary and narrow exception to the general rule that federal courts "have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given." ’ " Nationwide , 873 F.3d at 727 (quoting Potrero Hills , 657 F.3d at 882 (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans , 491 U.S. 350, 358, 109 S.Ct. 2506, 105 L.Ed.2d 298 (1989) (" NOPSI "))). Abstention in civil cases "is appropriate only when the state proceedings: (1) are ongoing, (2) are quasi-criminal enforcement actions or involve a state's interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts, (3) implicate an important state interest, and (4) allow litigants to raise federal challenges." ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund , 754 F.3d 754, 759 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Sprint Commc'ns., Inc. v. Jacobs , ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 584, 593–94, 187 L.Ed.2d 505 (2013) ).

At issue is the second prong of the ReadyLink test: whether this case falls within either of the two types of civil cases—quasi-criminal enforcement actions or cases involving a state's interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts—in which Younger abstention is appropriate. The district court ignored Supreme Court precedent and our circuit's controlling law when it abstained without conducting this required analysis. See Cook , 190 F.Supp.3d at 934–38. Instead, it relied on previous applications of Younger abstention to family law cases and the state's unique interest and sole jurisdiction in the law of domestic relations. See id. We write to clarify that Younger abstention is improper in civil cases outside of the two limited categories referred to above, regardless of the subject matter or the importance of the state interest.

We explained in ReadyLink that the extension of Younger began shortly after that case was decided. See 754 F.3d at 758. This steady expansion included the application of Younger abstention to family law cases. Moore v. Sims , 442 U.S. 415, 435, 99 S.Ct. 2371, 60 L.Ed.2d 994 (1979) (abstaining from constitutional challenge to state custody removal proceedings); see also, e.g. , H.C. ex rel. Gordon v. Koppel , 203 F.3d 610, 613–14 (9th Cir. 2000) (abstaining where plaintiff sought injunction to vacate child custody determinations). As the class of cases in which federal courts abstained pursuant to Younger continued to grow, at least some eminent jurists objected that this thwarted the federal courts' "virtually unflagging obligation," Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States , 424 U.S. 800, 817, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976), to exercise the jurisdiction vested in them by Congress. See, e.g. , Juidice v. Vail , 430 U.S. 327, 343–44, 97 S.Ct. 1211, 51 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("It stands the § 1983 remedy on its head to deny the § 1983 plaintiff access to the federal forum .... Rather than furthering principles of comity and our federalism, forced federal abdication in this context undercuts ... the protection and vindication of important and overriding federal civil rights ....").

After more than forty years of unchecked doctrinal expansion, the Supreme Court changed course and made clear that Younger abstention was appropriate only in the two "exceptional" categories of civil cases it had previously identified: (1) "civil enforcement proceedings"; and (2) "civil proceedings involving certain orders ... uniquely in furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform their judicial functions." Sprint , 134 S.Ct. at 591 (quoting NOPSI , 491 U.S. at 368, 109 S.Ct. 2506 ). Our circuit soon adapted our law to comply with this holding. We explained that Sprint resolved any "interpretive dilemmas" about the types of proceedings to which Younger applies when it "squarely" held that abstention in civil cases is limited to these two categories. See ReadyLink , 754 F.3d at 759. Other circuits have done the same. See, e.g. , Doe v. Univ. of Ky. , 860 F.3d 365, 369 (6th Cir. 2017) ; Google, Inc. v. Hood , 822 F.3d 212, 222 (5th Cir. 2016) ; Banks v. Slay , 789 F.3d 919, 923 (8th Cir. 2015) ; Sirva Relocation, LLC v. Richie , 794 F.3d 185, 189, 191–93 (1st Cir. 2015) ; Falco v. Justices of the Matrimonial Parts of Sup. Ct. of Suffolk Cty. , 805 F.3d 425, 427–28 (2d Cir. 2015) ; Mulholland v. Marion Cty. Election Bd. , 746 F.3d 811, 815–16 (7th Cir. 2014) ; ACRA Turf Club, LLC v. Zanzuccki , 748 F.3d 127, 129, 132–38 (3d Cir. 2014).

We emphasize that federal courts cannot ignore Sprint 's strict limitations on Younger abstention simply because states have an undeniable interest in family law. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow , 542 U.S. 1, 12, 124 S.Ct....