Cook v. State

• Decision Date: 19 November 1964
• Docket Number: No. 22722,22722
• Citation: 220 Ga. 463,139 S.E.2d 383
• Parties: Alvie B. COOK v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 383

139 S.E.2d 383

220 Ga. 463

Alvie B. COOK v. The STATE.

No. 22722.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Nov. 19, 1964.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The statute declaring it unlawful to operate or drive a vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor (Ga.L.1953 Nov.-Dec. Sess. 556, 575 Code Ann. § 68-1625) does not violate the due process clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions because it is made applicable 'upon highways and elsewhere throughout the State.' Ga.L.1953 Nov.-Dec. Sess., pp. 556, 564 (Code Ann. § 68-1601).

2. The words 'under the influence of intoxicating liquor' are not so vague and indefinite as to render the state (Code Ann. § 68-1625) unconstitutional and void.

3. The term 'intoxicating liquor' used in the statute (Code Ann. § 68-1625) includes 'intoxicating beers and wines.'

Marion W. Corbitt, Cartersville, for plaintiff in error.

Jere F. White, Sol. Gen., Cartersville, for defendant in error.

HEAD, Presiding Justice.

Alvin Bobby Cook was accused in the Superior Court of Bartow County 'with the offense of misdemeanor for that the said accused on the 20 day of Dec. 1963 in the County aforesaid, with force and arms, did unlawfully then and there while under the influence of intoxicating beers, wines, liquors and opiates did unlawfully operate a motor vehicle in said County contrary to the laws of this state and good order, peace and dignity thereof.' The accused filed a demurrer to the accusation on a number of grounds. This demurrer was overruled, and the exception is to this judgment.

1. Section 22 of Ga.L.1953 Nov.-Dec. Sess., pp. 556, 564 (Code Ann. § 68-1601) provides: 'The provisions of Articles IV and V shall apply upon highways and elsewhere where throughout the State.' Section 47(a) under Article V (Ga.L.1953 Nov.-Dec. Sess. pp. 556, 575, Code Ann. § 68-1625(a)) is as follows: 'It is unlawful and punishable as provided in Subdivision (d) [Code Ann. § 68-9927] of this section for any person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor to operate or drive any vehicle.' It is contended in the demurrer to the accusation that by these sections it is made a crime for a person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor to operate or drive a vehicle on private property, and that this offends the due process clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions.

Under the former law (Code of 1933, § 68-307) the crime of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of an intoxicating liquor could be committed only upon a public street or highway. Clearly it was the intention of the General Assembly by the 1953 Act to make it a crime for a person under the influence of an intoxicant to operate a vehicle anywhere in the State. Jordan v. State, 212 Ga. 337, 339, 92 S.E.2d 528.

The present widespread use of Motor vehicles, and the use of extensive private property for shopping centers and other purposes, with intricate mazes of roadways and driveways, indicate the need for protection to the public from drivers under the influence of intoxicants on places other than public streets and highways. Ordinarily there is no immunity from prosecution for crime because the act was committed on private property, even the private property of the accused. A person has the freedom to use his own property as he pleases only so long as he does not thereby endanger the rights of others. It is not an unreasonable restriction upon the right and use of private property, in violation of the due process clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions, to make it unlawful for a person under the influence of intoxicating liquor to operate or drive a vehicle anywhere in the State.

2. It is asserted that the allegations charging the accused with unlawfully operating his vehicle under the influence of named intoxicants are too broad, vague, and indefinite to be capable of enforcement, and that these allegations do not provide any standard of measurement or judgment whereby the jury may determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. It is contended that the term in the statute 'under the influence of intoxicating liquor' is so broad, general, vague, and indefinite that reasonable minds may differ as to its interpretation, and the accused is denied equal protection of the laws and due process of law in defending such a charge.

Counsel for the accused has not cited any case decided by this court wherein this question has been decided. The case cited is not in point on its facts with the present case. The Court of Appeals, as a rule of evidence, has held that a person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor when it appears that it is less safe for such person to operate a motor vehicle than it would be if he were not so affected. Harper v. State, 91 Ga.App. 456(2), 86 S.E.2d 7; Sims v. State, 92 Ga.App. 169, 88 S.E.2d 186; Turner v. State, 95 Ga.App. 157, 97 S.E.2d 348; Bartley v. State, 95 Ga.App. 422, 98 S.E.2d 110; Hardrick v. State, 96 Ga.App. 670(2), 101 S.E.2d 99; Flanders v. State, 97 Ga.App. 779, 104 S.E.2d 538; Hooks v. State, 97 Ga.App. 897, 104 S.E.2d 623.

In State v. Hightower, 238 La. 876, 882, 116 So.2d 669, 701, it was stated: 'Statutes making it a criminal offense to operate or drive a motor vehicle 'while intoxicated,' 'while in an intoxicated condition' or 'under the influence of intoxicating liquor' have been adopted in practically all jurisdictions and have been generally recognized as a valid exercise of the state's police power to regulate the use and operation of motor vehicles and to safeguard the people from injury or death caused by drivers who operate their cars while under the influence of...