Cook v. State

• Decision Date: 30 June 2020
• Docket Number: NO. 2019-CP-01231-COA,2019-CP-01231-COA
• Citation: 301 So.3d 766
• Parties: Joseph COOK, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee
• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals

301 So.3d 766

Joseph COOK, Appellant

v.STATE of Mississippi, Appellee

NO. 2019-CP-01231-COA

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

June 30, 2020

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JOSEPH COOK (PRO SE)

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: LISA L. BLOUNT, Jackson

BEFORE BARNES, C.J., McDONALD AND McCARTY, JJ.

McDONALD, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. In September 1997, Joseph Cook allegedly stole two four-wheelers valued in excess of $250 from two separate locations. Pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-17-41 (Supp. 1997), Cook was indicted for two separate counts of grand larceny by a Rankin County grand jury on November 18, 1997. He entered a guilty plea on February 27, 1998, which the Rankin County Circuit Court accepted the same day. On March 20, 1998, Cook was sentenced to two concurrent four-year sentences, which were subsequently suspended on the condition that Cook complete a Regimented Inmate Discipline (RID) program,¹ complete five years of supervised probation, pay $175 in restitution, and pay all court costs, fees, and assessments on or before the 90th day following his release from custody. Cook served no time in prison.

¶2. On April 10, 2013, Cook was convicted of two counts of sexual battery and one count of directing or causing a minor to commit a felony. Pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-19-81 (Rev. 2007), the circuit court found that Cook's prior two separate grand larceny convictions allowed him to be charged as a habitual offender. Cook appealed the conviction, which was affirmed on April 23, 2015, by the Mississippi Supreme Court. Cook v. State , 161 So. 3d 1057 (Miss. 2015).

¶3. On June 17, 2019, Cook filed a pro se "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with a Motion for Writ of Error Coram Nobis and/or Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Judgment." In his petition, he raised the following issues: (1) that the circuit court of Rankin County did not have jurisdiction over his 1998 grand larceny convictions and current petition; (2) that his petition is a petition for habeas corpus, not a PCR motion; (3) that he was entitled to a writ of error coram nobis; (4) that his petition was not procedurally barred; (5) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in 1998; and (6) that his 1997 indictments were fatally defective.

¶4. On July 15, 2019, the circuit court considered Cook's petition as a motion as a post-conviction collateral relief (PCR) and found the motion to be time-barred. The court also analyzed and rejected Cook's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim as well. The court denied the motion. Cook filed a notice of appeal on August 6, 2019, and raises the same issues he raised in his June 16 petition. We affirm the denial of Cook's petition.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

¶5. In September 1997, a long-time acquaintance of Cook approached him with the idea of stealing four-wheelers. Cook would receive payment in the form of marijuana. Cook stole two four-wheelers valued in excess of $250 from two separate locations: (1) 300 Garland Ponder Road, Mendenhall, Mississippi, and (2) 44 Old Highway 49S, Jackson, Mississippi. Pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-17-4, Cook was indicted for two separate counts of grand larceny by a Rankin County grand jury on November 18, 1997.

¶6. On February 27, 1998, Cook entered a guilty plea on both counts. In his petition to enter a guilty plea to the indictments, Cook acknowledged that he was waiving his constitutional rights:

I understand that the Constitution guarantees me all of the following rights, and that I am permanently waiving each of these rights by pleading guilty: (a) the right to a speedy and public trial by jury; (b) the right to see, hear, and cross-examine all witnesses called to testify; (c) the right to use the power and process of the Court to compel the production of evidence, including the attendance of any witness in my favor; (d) the right to have the presence and assistance of a lawyer at all stages of the trial and any appeal; (e) the right to challenge the composition of the Grand Jury which indicted me and the Petit Jury venire from which the trial jury would be selected; (f) the right to testify in my own defense if I chose to do so, or the right to remain silent without any adverse inferences drawn from my refusal to testify; (g) the right to a unanimous jury verdict of all jurors before I could be found guilty; (h) the right to be presumed innocent and to have the prosecution prove each and every element beyond a reasonable doubt before I could be found guilty.

¶7. Additionally, Cook acknowledged that his attorney provided him the necessary information to cognitively enter a guilty plea:

I have thoroughly discussed this case with my lawyer and I have made a full disclosure of all of the facts and circumstances known to me concerning the crime with which I am charged and to which I am entering this plea. I believe that my lawyer is fully informed on all such matters. My lawyer has advised me of the nature and elements of the charge, the specific acts which I am accused of having committed, and of the possible defenses available to me for consideration by the jury at a trial. I understand that I am finally and permanently waiving any and all defenses as well as any right I may have for the jury to consider a lesser included offense as an alternative to the primary offense. I have gone over this petition with my attorney thoroughly and in detail and have been informed of and fully understand the allegations contained in it as well as their purpose and effect.

Cook's guilty plea was accepted that same day.

¶8. On March 20, 1998, Cook was sentenced to two concurrent four-year sentences, which were subsequently suspended on the condition that Cook complete a Regimented Inmate Discipline (RID) program, complete five years of supervised probation, pay $175 in restitution, and pay all court costs, fees, and assessments on or before the ninetieth day following his release from custody. Cook served no prison time, which was a significant factor in his decision to plead guilty.

¶9. On August 28, 2012, Cook was indicted for (1) two counts of sexual battery in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-95(1)(d) (Rev. 2006) on his girlfriend's daughter; and (2) one count of directing or causing a minor (the girlfriend's son) to commit a felony pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-1-6 (Rev. 2014) in Rankin County. Pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-19-81,² the State moved to amend Cook's indictment to charge him as a habitual offender because the two grand larceny 1998 convictions qualified him as a habitual offender. The circuit court granted the motion.

¶10. After a three-day trial, on April 10, 2013, Cook was found guilty of all counts and sentenced to a life imprisonment without the possibility of parole because of his habitual offender status. Cook appealed his conviction to the Mississippi Supreme Court. Cook unsuccessfully argued that the circuit court manifestly erred by allowing the amendment to his indictment to charge him as a habitual offender because the two crimes he was charged with in 1997 should have been considered one incident. However, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that although the crimes occurred on the same day, Cook had been charged for stealing two separate four-wheelers from two different locations. On April 23, 2015, the Supreme Court affirmed Cook's conviction.³

¶11. On June 17, 2019, Cook filed a pro se "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with a Motion for Writ of Error Coram Nobis and/or Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Judgment." In his petition, he argued (1) that the circuit court of Rankin County had neither jurisdiction or venue to prosecute or convict him for grand larceny in 1998; (2) that relief via Writ of Error Coram Nobis was appropriate for his claim of deprivation of constitutional rights; (3) that the petition should not be misconstrued as a petition for post-collateral relief (PCR); (4) that although not a PCR, the PCR time-bar and "in custody requirement" for PCR, are unconstitutional both as a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and a violation of the Mississippi Constitution; (5) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in 1998; and (6) that the 1997 indictments of grand larceny were fatally defective because they failed to track the statutory language of a felony or otherwise omitted essential elements of the criminal statute. Cook sought relief in the form of vacating, setting aside, or correcting the 1998 judgment.

¶12. On July 15, 2019, the circuit court denied Cook's petition and found that he did not have standing to challenge his grand larceny convictions because he was no longer in custody or on parole for the convictions that he challenged. Additionally, the court found that the 1997 indictments showed that the grand larceny crimes took place in Rankin County, and therefore, Cook's claims of lack of jurisdiction and venue were without merit. Furthermore, the court found that: (1) despite Cook's contention that the petition was not a claim for PCR, the court found that it was a PCR motion; (2) the PCR motion was time-barred; and (3) Cook had not properly supported his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

¶13. Following the denial of his petition, Cook filed a notice of appeal on August 8, 2019. On appeal, Cooks raises the following issues: (1) that the circuit court of Rankin County did not have jurisdiction over his 1998 grand larceny convictions; (2) that his petition constitutes a petition for habeas corpus; (3) that he was entitled to a writ of error coram nobis; (4) that his petition was not procedurally barred; (5) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in 1998; and (6) that his 1997 indictments were fatally defective.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶14. "When reviewing a trial court's denial or dismissal of a PCR motion, we will...