Hall v. State
| Docket Number | 2022-CP-01097-COA |
| Decision Date | 29 August 2023 |
| Parties | ELIJAH T. HALL A/K/A ELIJAH HALL APPELLANT v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE |
| Court | Mississippi Court of Appeals |
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY ASHLEY LAUREN SULSER
¶1. Elijah Hall was indicted as a habitual offender for first-degree murder and possession of a weapon by a felon, standing accused of murdering Joyce Haynes. On March 12, 2018, he plead guilty to the lesser charge of second-degree murder for the killing of Ms. Haynes, without the habitual enhancement, and with the possession charge "retired to the files." He was sentenced to be incarcerated for 25 years.
¶2. Not long after, in October of the same year, Hall petitioned for post-conviction relief, alleging a host of errors with his indictment, his counsel, and other matters. In a 2019 order, the trial court found his PCR was without merit, not supported by proof, and belied by his statements at his guilty plea, where he admitted his guilt in the killing of Ms. Haynes.
¶3. In 2022, over three years after his guilty plea, Hall filed a new series of motions before the trial court. In these, he alleged being misled by his lawyer into pleading guilty due to a representation that he would serve less time, that his lawyer had coaxed him into pleading by telling him he would be eligible for parole, and that he should have been evaluated for mental competency before taking the plea. As a result, Hall argued his retained counsel was ineffective and his plea was involuntary. In a subsequent filing, he argued his petition "should be exempt from all bars inherent" to the PCR statutes "for violations to Mr. Hall[']s fundamental rights."
¶4. The trial court found Hall's petition was filed over a year outside the period allowed to file a PCR, and dismissed the case as time-barred. "Notwithstanding the time bar, the petitioner's claims lack merit," the trial court reasoned, detailing why a mental evaluation was not required before Hall's plea (because he withdrew the motion for such an exam, and the trial court believed he had been malingering to obtain such an exam in the first place), that his lawyer had not been ineffective, and that the guilty plea was not involuntary, as he had been repeatedly told he would be sentenced to 25 years. Indeed, during the plea colloquy, the trial court had asked Hall, The petitioner had said, "Yes, sir."
¶5. Hall appealed and the case was assigned to us for review. He re-urges these same three issues, and in response, the State argues the time-bar should be applied.[1] ¶6. "When reviewing a trial court's denial or dismissal of a PCR petition, we will only disturb the trial court's factual findings if they are clearly erroneous; however, we review the trial court's legal conclusions under a de novo standard of review." Cuevas v. State, 304 So.3d 1163, 1167 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020). In the case of a guilty plea, PCR claims must be made "within three (3) years after entry of the judgment of conviction." Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 2020). The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that PCR claims are time-barred if filed beyond the three-year time period unless the claim fits within one of the express statutory exceptions. Howell v. State, 358 So.3d 613, 615-16 (¶¶8, 12) (Miss. 2023).
¶7. These express statutory exceptions include "an intervening decision of the Supreme Court of either the State of Mississippi or the United States which would have actually adversely affected the outcome of his conviction or sentence"; new evidence which was "not reasonably discoverable at the time of trial"; if "there exists biological evidence not tested" or subject to new "DNA testing" that would have impacted the conviction or sentence; or where a movant's "sentence has expired or his probation, parole or conditional release has been unlawfully revoked." Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2)(a)-(b).
¶8. Hall's trio of claims were filed a year beyond the three-year window after his 2018 guilty plea. They are not subject to any of the exceptions. As we have previously held in another PCR case, a petitioner "must prove an exception applies." Bell v. State, 207 So.3d 705, 707 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (emphasis added). Because Hall has not proved that a statutory exception applies to his claims, and they were filed after the running of the three-year statute of limitations, the trial court properly dismissed his PCR motion as time-barred.
¶9. AFFIRMED.
WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY McDONALD, J.; BARNES, C.J., AND McCARTY, J., JOIN IN PART.
AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
¶10. The majority concludes that because Hall's motion for post-conviction collateral relief (PCR) was filed more than three years after the date of his sentence, and none of the express statutory time-bar exceptions apply, then this Court is barred from addressing Hall's mental incompetence claim on the merits. Although I agree with the disposition of this case because I respect our Supreme Court's recent decision in Howell v. State, 358 So.3d 613, 615-16 (¶¶8, 12) (Miss. 2023), I write separately because, in my view, the inquiry does not end there. ¶11. Clearly, there are intrinsic constitutional circumstances that lift (or usurp) the statutory time-bar. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 2020). The Supreme Court stated as much in Howell:
We acknowledge that other arguments may be used to attack the constitutionality of the statutory bars, either as applied to particular cases or on their face, and we have no intent to address their validity one way or the other here. We further recognize that, in specific cases, other arguments or doctrines, e.g., equitable tolling, might be available to afford relief from the statute of limitations.
Howell, 358 So.3d at 616 (¶12) (emphasis added).[2] Following Howell's admission to its logical end, I write to propose that the three-year time-bar, as applied after Howell, may violate the right to substantive due process. The question is whether section 99-39-5(2) of the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act (UPCCRA)[3] may offend the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States, as applied in certain cases, by infringing upon a prisoner's right to petition for post-conviction collateral relief. See Miss. Const. art. 3, § 24 (); State v. McPhail, 182 Miss. 360, 180 So. 387, 392 (1938) (); accord U.S. Const. amend. 1 (); Miss. Const. art. 3, § 11 (); cf. BE &K Const. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 536 U.S. 516, 525 (2002) ().
¶12. "[T]he Due Process Clause-in addition to setting procedural minima for deprivations of life, liberty, or property-bars outright 'certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.'" Brennan v. Steward, 834 F.2d 1248, 1255 (5th Cir. 1988). One form of substantive due process is the idea that those rights explicitly provided for in the Bill of Rights are "'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' (and only those rights) are protected against state intrusion by the Due Process Clause." Id. at 1256. "Where a right is either explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the constitution, that right is 'fundamental.'" King v. Miss. Dep't of Corr., 721 So.2d 1126, 1129 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 1998). "If a right is fundamental, strict scrutiny applies." Franklin v. United States, 49 F.4th 429, 435 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997)).
¶13. Substantive due process prohibits "the government . . . infringe[ment] . . . [of] 'fundamental' liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest." Washington, 521 U.S. at 721. When a petitioner claims their due process rights have been infringed, the petitioner must provide a "careful description" of the asserted fundamental liberty interest that is implicated. Id. Our courts begin the analysis "by examining our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices." Id. at 710. An analysis of this history is necessary because "neither liberty nor justice would exist if [the rights] were sacrificed." Id. at 721. Only then will the Court apply strict scrutiny. Id.
¶14. Few rights are more fundamental than the right to petition the courts for redress of wrongs. See Chrissy F. ex rel. Medley v. Miss. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 925 F.2d 844, 851 (5th Cir. 1991) ("Meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental constitutional right, grounded in the First Amendment right to petition and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process clauses."). The coined phrase "due process of law" that is the cornerstone of our Fifth...
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