Cooke v. Iverson

• Decision Date: 09 July 1909
• Docket Number: 16,267 - (214)
• Citation: 122 N.W. 251,108 Minn. 388
• Parties: L. O. COOKE v. SAMUEL G. IVERSON
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

122 N.W. 251

108 Minn. 388

L. O. COOKE v. SAMUEL G. IVERSON

Nos. 16,267 - (214)

Supreme Court of Minnesota

July 9, 1909

Action in the district court for Ramsey county to restrain defendant, as state auditor of the state of Minnesota, from executing any warrants addressed to the state treasurer of the state of Minnesota in favor of any county, city, village or township treasurer directing the payment of any of the moneys appropriated by chapter 219, Laws 1907, as amended by Laws 1909, c. 91, and distributed or appropriated by Laws 1909, c. 505. From an order, Brill, J., overruling defendant's demurrer to the complaint and granting a motion for a temporary injunction, he appealed. Affirmed.

SYLLABUS

When Courts Can Control Action of Executive Department.

Courts cannot, by injunction, mandamus or other process, control or direct the head of the executive department of the state in the discharge of any executive duty involving the exercise of his discretion; but where duties purely ministerial in character are conferred upon the chief executive, or any member of the executive department, as defined by our constitution, and he refuses to act, or where he assumes to act in violation of the constitution and laws of the state he may be compelled to act or restrained from acting, as the case may be, at the suit of one who is injured thereby in his person or his property, for which he has no other adequate remedy.

Acts Unconstitutional -- Appropriations for Roads and Bridges.

Chapters 91, 505, pp. 82, 638, Laws 1909, purporting to appropriate money out of the general revenue fund of the state for the building and repairing of roads and bridges, are unconstitutional, for the reason that they violate section 5 art. 9, of the state constitution, forbidding the state to be a party to the carrying on of "works of internal improvement," and section 16, art. 9, prescribing the manner and limiting the extent of state aid in the construction of public highways and bridges.

George T. Simpson, Attorney General, and Lyndon A. Smith, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.

W. B. Douglas, for respondent.

OPINION

START, C.J.

This action was brought in the district court of the county of Ramsey to enjoin the defendant, as state auditor, from issuing any warrants, payable out of the general revenue fund of the state, pursuant to chapter 91, p. 82, and chapter 505, p. 638, of the Laws of 1909. The defendant demurred to the complaint, and appealed from an order overruling his demurrer. The record presents two constitutional questions for our decision.

1. The first one is whether this action can be maintained against the state auditor. This involves a consideration of the general proposition whether the judiciary has, in any case, jurisdiction to control or direct the chief executive, or any of the other officers constituting the executive department, of the state, as defined by article 5, § 1, of the state constitution.

Judicial decisions on this question in the different states are in hopeless conflict. Nor are the decisions of our own court, relevant to the subject, entirely consistent. This has resulted in some uncertainty as to what the rule is in this state, which ought to be set at rest. It is settled beyond all controversy that courts cannot, by injunction, or mandamus, or other process, control or direct the head of the executive department of the state in the discharge of any executive duty involving the exercising of his discretion. This necessarily follows from the constitutional division of the state government into three co-ordinate, distinct, and independent branches -- legislative, executive, and judicial. Neither is responsible to the other for the manner in which it exercises its discretion in the performance of duties which are governmental or political in their character. Thus far there is no conflict of judicial authority. The conflict arises upon the question whether the rule stated is subject to the qualification that where duties purely ministerial in character are conferred upon the chief executive, and he refuses to act, or when he assumes to act in violation of the constitution and laws of the state, he may be compelled to act, or restrained from acting, as the case may be, by the courts at the suit of one injured thereby in his personal or property rights, for which he has no other adequate remedy.

This court, in the case of Chamberlain v. Sibley, 4 Minn. 228, 229 (309), recognized this exception to the general rule of the immunity of the chief executive from judicial process, and stated the rule and the exception in these words: "This court will not undertake to compel the Governor of the state to the performance of any duty devolving upon him as the chief executive, and properly pertaining to such office. In all such matters the executive is of necessity independent of the judiciary. But when some official act, not necessarily pertaining to the duties of the executive of the state, and which might be performed as well by one officer as another, is directed by law to be done, then any person who clearly shows himself entitled to its performance, and has no other adequate remedy, may have a writ of mandamus against such officer, even although the law may have designated the chief executive of the state as a convenient officer to perform the duty."

In Rice v. Austin, 19 Minn. 74 (103), 18 Am. 330, the court, without referring to the case of Chamberlain v. Sibley, held, in effect, that the rule that the courts could not enforce the performance of official duties by the Governor included duties of a purely ministerial character involving no discretion. The duty sought to be enforced in that case was not purely a ministerial one, and what was said as to such duties was not necessary to the decision. The case of Rice v. Austin was followed in the case of State v. Dike, 20 Minn. 314 (363) and it was held that the rule included all of the officers named in article 5, § 1, of the state constitution, which provides that: "The executive department shall consist of a governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, auditor, treasurer, and attorney general." It was again broadly stated in Western R. Co. v. De Graff, 27 Minn. 1, 6 N.W. 341, following the cases we have referred to, that no act done or threatened to be done by any member of the executive department of the state, in his official, but not in his individual, capacity, could be brought under judicial control or interference, even where such acts were purely ministerial in their character. The duties enjoined upon the Governor under consideration in that case were not ministerial in their character, but involved the exercise of discretion on his part. The rule, without the qualification as to purely ministerial duties, was stated and applied to the state auditor in the cases of State v. Whitcomb, 28 Minn. 50, 8 N.W. 902, and State v. Braden, 40 Minn. 174, 41 N.W. 817.

In the case of Hayne v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 67 Minn. 245, 69 N.W. 916, this court was confronted with the question whether a member of the executive department of the state was subject to judicial control as to purely ministerial duties. In that case certain securities had been deposited with the state auditor for the security of the policy holders by an insurance company, which became insolvent, and for which a receiver was appointed. The receiver demanded of the state auditor a delivery of the securities, to the end that they might be marshaled for the benefit of their real owners, the policy holders. The demand was refused, and the action was brought to compel the statute auditor to comply with the demand. He demurred to the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over him as a member of the executive department of the state. His contention was sustained in the district court, but on appeal this court held otherwise, on the ground that the auditor was holding the securities, in which the state had no interest, as custodian, a ministerial duty, and that in respect to their disposition he was subject to the jurisdiction of the courts. In reaching this conclusion the court (page 251) said:

"This court has undoubtedly gone further than any other in holding executive officers of the state exempt from the control of the courts in the performance of their official duties. This is especially true as to executive officers other than Governor. It will be found, however, that in many of these case what was said went further than what was decided. * * * It cannot be that because this trust fund, in which the state has not a dollar's interest, happens to be in the possession -- and unlawfully at that -- of an executive officer of the state, he can refuse to surrender the property, continue to hold it unlawfully, and thus deprive the policy holders of what belongs to them, and yet the courts can give them no relief, because an executive officer of the state is not subject to the control of the judicial department of the state government."

In the cases of Higgins v. Berg, 74 Minn. 11, 76 N.W. 788 42 L.R.A. 245, Davidson v. Hanson, 87 Minn. 211, 91 N.W. 1124, 92 N.W. 93, and State v. Hanson, 93 Minn. 178, 100 N.W. 1124, 102 N.W. 209, this court entertained proceedings against the secretary of state to direct him with reference to the making up of the official state ballots, as provided by the statute (G.S. 1894, § 48). This the court clearly could not have done if the constitution forbade the control by the courts of any member of the executive department of the state in the discharge of ministerial duties. These election cases and the case of Hayne v. Metropolitan Trust Co. necessarily hold that such officer may be controlled by the courts in the discharge of purely...