Coomer v. Morriss
Decision Date | 02 November 2020 |
Docket Number | Case No: 4:19CV2649 HEA |
Parties | DALLIS F. COOMER, Petitioner, v. KELLY MORRISS, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
Petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 [Doc. No.1] on September 26, 2019. On October 28, 2019, Petitioner filed a Request for a Stay and Abeyance, [Doc. No. 9]. Respondent filed a Response to this request and to the Court's Order to Show Cause Why Relief Should Not be Granted [Doc. No. 10] on November 12, 2018. Briefing has been concluded in the matter. For the reasons set forth below, the Request for Stay and Abeyance is denied, as is Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
Petitioner seeks a stay in this matter so that he can exhaust his claim regarding "2014 S.B. 491." In this Request, Petitioner argues that his post-conviction counsel failed to file for a reduction of sentence pursuant to the newly enacted senate bill 491. Petitioner has not presented this claim before. As Respondent correctly argues, Petitioner's request should be denied.
Petitioner presents nothing to establish he has presented his claim to the Missouri courts, nor does he advise the Court of the reason for this failure. Although Petitioner is attempting in his Request to obtain a ruling from this Court as to counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to raise it, this claim is based on Missouri law and not a proper basis for granting habeas relief. "[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law, see, e.g., Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41, 104 S.Ct. 871, 874, 79 L.Ed.2d 29 (1984); Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21-22, 96 S.Ct. 175, 177-178, 46 L.Ed.2d 162 (1975) (per curiam)." Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990).
Moreover, even if this Court were the proper forum for Petitioner's claim, his request for a stay is without merit. Under Missouri law, Petitioner would not be entitled to raise the issue of Bill 491. The language from the previous statute has been removed from Mo.Rev.Stat. § 1.160.
No offense committed and no fine, penalty or forfeiture incurred, or prosecution commenced or pending previous to or at the time when any statutory provision is repealed or amended, shall be affected by the repeal or amendment, but the trial and punishment of all such offenses, and the recovery of the fines, penalties or forfeitures shall be had, in all respects, as if the provision had not been repealed or amended, except that all such proceedings shall be conducted according to existing procedural laws.
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.160 (2005). Thus, Petitioner would not be entitled to any benefit from granting a stay.
On May 22, 2017, Petitioner was sentenced to incarceration for a period of eight years on one counts of driving while intoxicated by the Circuit Court of Cape Girardeau County. Petitioner is currently within the custody of the Missouri Department of Corrections.
Petitioner claims his attorneys were ineffective for failing to locate and interview alibi witnesses.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ("AEDPA") applies to all petitions for habeas relief filed by state prisoners after the statute's effective date of April 24, 1996. When reviewing a claim that has been decided on the merits by a state court, AEDPA limits the scope of judicial review in a habeas proceeding as follows:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
In construing AEDPA, the United States Supreme Court, in Williams v. Taylor, held that:
Under the 'contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the U.S. Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the U.S. Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the 'unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the U.S. Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). Furthermore, the Williams Court held that "a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." 529 U.S. at 409.
A state court decision must be left undisturbed unless the decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or the decision wasbased on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in state court. Colvin v. Taylor, 324 F.3d 583, 586-87 (8th Cir. 2003).
A decision is contrary to United States Supreme Court precedent if it decides a case based on a different rule of law than the rule dictated by United States Supreme Court precedent, or it decides a case differently than the United States Supreme Court did on materially indistinguishable facts. Id. A decision may only be overturned, as an unreasonable application of clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent, if the decision is both wrong and an objectively unreasonable interpretation or application of United States Supreme Court precedent. Id. A federal habeas court may not disturb an objectively reasonable state court decision on a question of federal law even if the decision is, in the federal court's view, wrong under Eighth Circuit precedent, and even if the habeas court would have decided the case differently on a clean slate. Id. State court factual determinations are presumed to be correct and this presumption can only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1).
Review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is a review to determine whether a person "is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
The Missouri Court of Appeals, in reviewing the post-conviction motion denial considered Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The claims were considered with Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) as the legal compass. The Missouri Appeals Court concluded the ineffective assistance of counsel claims were without merit. In so doing, the Missouri court found:
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