Cooney v. Osgood Machinery, Inc.

• Decision Date: 24 April 1992
• Citation: 582 N.Y.S.2d 873,179 A.D.2d 240
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
• Parties: Dennis J. COONEY, Respondent, v. OSGOOD MACHINERY, INC., Defendant-Third-Party Plaintiff-Respondent, v. PAUL MUELLER COMPANY, Third-Party Defendant-Appellant, Hill Acme Company, Kling Brothers, Inc., and American Standard, Inc., Third-Party Defendants-Respondents.

Page 873

582 N.Y.S.2d 873

179 A.D.2d 240

Dennis J. COONEY, Respondent, v. OSGOOD MACHINERY, INC., Defendant-Third-Party Plaintiff-Respondent, v. PAUL MUELLER COMPANY, Third-Party Defendant-Appellant,

Hill Acme Company, Kling Brothers, Inc., and American

Standard, Inc., Third-Party Defendants-Respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Fourth Department.

April 24, 1992.

Hurwitz & Fine, P.C. by Sheldon Hurwitz, Buffalo, for third-party defendant-appellant.

Smith, Murphy & Schoepperle by Victor Oliveri, Buffalo, for third-party plaintiff-respondent Osgood Machinery, Inc.

Bouvier & O'Connor by Chris Trapp, Buffalo, for third-party defendant-respondent Hill Acme Co.

Saperston & Day, P.C. by Joseph Schnitter, Buffalo, for third-party defendant-respondent Kling Bros., Inc.

Farrell & Quackenbush, Buffalo, for third-party defendant-respondent American Standard, Inc.

Dempsey & Dempsey by Ellen Krebs, Buffalo, for respondent Dennis J. Cooney.

Before CALLAHAN, J.P., and GREEN, BALIO, LAWTON and FALLON, JJ.

FALLON, Justice:

Plaintiff, a Missouri resident, was injured on October 26, 1978, during the course of his employment with third-party defendant Paul Mueller Company (Mueller), a Missouri corporation. The injury was sustained while plaintiff was cleaning a binding roll machine at Mueller's facility in Missouri. Defendant, Osgood Machinery, Inc. (Osgood), a New York corporation, was the distributor or broker on the original sale of the machine. The machine was resold when the original purchaser ceased operations and thereafter purchased by Mueller. Osgood was not involved in either of those transactions.

Prior to the incident giving rise to plaintiff's injuries, Mueller is alleged to have made certain modifications to the machine, which Osgood contends rendered the machine unsafe, and significantly increased the likelihood of plaintiff's injuries. Following commencement of plaintiff's action, Osgood commenced this third-party action against Mueller seeking contribution pursuant to CPLR article 14 (see, Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 282 N.E.2d 288).

In denying Mueller's motion for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint and all cross claims, Supreme Court held that New York law and not Missouri law should apply here. Missouri law does not permit a third-party action for contribution against an employer in a situation such as this ¹ (MoRevStat § 287.120[1] [1986]; State ex rel. Maryland Heights Concrete Contractors, Inc. v. Ferriss, 588 S.W.2d 489).

Traditional analysis of choice-of-law problems in tort actions typically involved application of the law of the place of the wrong (see, Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279; Restatement [First] of Conflict of Laws § 377). With the recognition that the law of a particular jurisdiction where only some of the parties were domiciled often had more contacts with and interest in the outcome of the litigation than the place of the wrong, the rule of lex loci delicti gradually gave way to more flexible approaches such as those which are founded on "grouping of contacts" and "interest analysis". Ultimately, "interest analysis" took hold as the prevailing analytical tool because quantitative contact grouping was found to be indiscriminate in the sense that it placed too much emphasis on certain contacts regardless of their significance in a particular case (see, Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., 65 N.Y.2d 189, 196-197, 491 N.Y.S.2d 90, 480 N.E.2d 679; see also, Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 576, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519, 249 N.E.2d 394; Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 15-16, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734, 237 N.E.2d 877; Matter of Clark, 21 N.Y.2d 478, 485-486, 288 N.Y.S.2d 993, 236 N.E.2d 152; Matter of Crichton, 20 N.Y.2d 124, 135, 281 N.Y.S.2d 811, 228 N.E.2d 799). Thus, the rule which evolved looked to "the law of the jurisdiction having the greatest interest in the litigation" and while contacts remained relevant to the inquiry, the only "facts or contacts which obtain significance in defining State interests are those which relate to the purpose of the particular law in conflict" (Miller v. Miller, supra, 22 N.Y.2d at 15-16, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734, 237 N.E.2d 877). By and large, those contacts found to be most significant under that rule are the locus of the tort and the domicile of the parties (see, Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., supra, 65 N.Y.2d at 197, 491 N.Y.S.2d 90; Tooker v. Lopez, supra, 24 N.Y.2d at 576-577, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519; Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 128, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64, 286 N.E.2d 454). In the final analysis, the relative interest of the domicile and locus jurisdiction in having their law apply depends upon whether the rules in conflict are "conduct-regulating" or "loss-allocating" (Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., supra, 65 N.Y.2d at 200, 491 N.Y.S.2d 90).

Rules which govern the ability of a tortfeasor to implead another potentially responsible party for contribution are matters of substantive law which exclusively relate to loss allocation and distribution (see, Viera v. Uniroyal, Inc., 142 Misc.2d 1099, 1107, 541 N.Y.S.2d 668, affd. 148 A.D.2d 349, 538 N.Y.S.2d 986). Thus, we deal here with conflicting laws that are loss allocating. Admittedly, the locus jurisdiction has less concern in protecting party expectations and in furthering a rule designed to govern future conduct where the conflicting rule is loss allocating as compared to its concern where the rule defines a standard of care (see, Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., supra, 65 N.Y.2d at 198, 491 N.Y.S.2d 90). Nonetheless, in the absence of common...