Coons v. Henderson

• Docket Number: 1D21-3675.
• Decision Date: 08 February 2023
• Citation: 354 So.3d 1174
• Parties: Charles Patrick COONS, Appellant, v. Douglas HENDERSON, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

354 So.3d 1174

Charles Patrick COONS, Appellant,

v.Douglas HENDERSON, Appellee.

No. 1D21-3675.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

February 8, 2023.

Kyle S. Bauman of Anchors Smith Grimsley, Fort Walton Beach, for Appellant.

A. Benjamin Gordon and Brian Updike of AnchorsGordon, P.A., Fort Walton Beach, for Appellee.

Per Curiam.

Appellant, Charles Patrick Coons, challenges the stalking injunction entered by the trial court that prohibited him from placing cameras on his property above the fence belonging to Appellee, Douglas Henderson, his neighbor. Although Appellee presented testimony below that would have supported a finding that Appellant installed the cameras to see Appellee's pool area, the trial court accepted the testimony of both Appellant and his wife and found that they installed the cameras in order to "protect themselves" from Appellee doing something to his fence and blaming it on them. This finding established that Appellant had a legitimate purpose for installing the cameras and precluded the entry of the stalking injunction. Yet, the trial court proceeded to find that the location of the cameras made Appellant's purpose illegitimate. The trial court's determination that the protection Appellant and his wife sought could be provided by cameras installed below the fence line did not convert the legitimate purpose of protection into the harassment necessary for the entry of a stalking injunction. See § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2021) (noting that stalking occurs when a person "willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person") (emphasis added); § 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2021) (defining "harass" to mean "engag[ing] in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose") (emphasis added); see also O'Neill v. Goodwin, 195 So.3d 411, 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (explaining that courts have generally held that contact is legitimate if there is a reason for the contact other than to harass the victim); Alter v. Paquette, 98 So.3d 218, 220 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (holding that a series of text messages seeking the repayment of a loan were insufficient to support a finding of stalking because it could not be said that the messages served no legitimate purpose).

Accordingly, we reverse the injunction.

REVERSED.

Lewis, Roberts, and Winokur, JJ., concur.