Cooper v. Colvin
| Decision Date | 17 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. C15-2026-CJW,C15-2026-CJW |
| Parties | LAWANNA COOPER, on behalf of her daughter, NJS, a minor, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
Plaintiff, Lawanna Cooper, on behalf of her minor child, a daughter, seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the Commissioner) denying her daughter's application for Social Security supplemental security income benefits (SSI), under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (Act). Plaintiff contends that the administrative record (AR) does not contain substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's decision that she was not disabled during the relevant period. For the reasons that follow, the Commissioner's decision is affirmed.
The minor child was born in 2000, completed seven years of schooling, and attended special education. AR 212, 236, 272. Plaintiff filed the application for SSI on March 9, 2012, alleging a disability onset date of that same day. AR 109, 118. She contends that the child is disabled due to attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), oppositional defiant disorder (ODD), and possibly a learning disorder. AR 23. Plaintiff's claims were denied initially and on reconsideration. AR 109, 118. She then requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). ALJ Eric Basse conducted a hearing on September 4, 2013 (the Hearing) (AR 20-53), and issued a decision denying plaintiff's claim on December 24, 2013. AR 17.
Plaintiff sought review by the Appeals Council, which denied review on March 4, 2015, AR 1, leaving the ALJ's decision as the final decision of the Commissioner. On April 27, 2015, plaintiff filed a complaint (Doc. 3) in this court seeking review of the Commissioner's decision. On September 30, 2015, with the consent of the parties (Doc. 13), the Honorable Linda R. Reade transferred this case to a United States Magistrate Judge for final disposition and entry of judgment. The parties have now briefed the issues, and the matter is fully submitted.
The Social Security Act requires a child seeking SSI benefits to prove the following:
An individual under the age of 18 shall be considered disabled for the purposes of this subchapter if that individual has a medically determinable physical or mental impairment, which results in marked and severe functional limitations, and which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i); see Brown ex rel. Williams v. Barnhart, 388 F.3d 1150, 1151 (8th Cir. 2004).
In determining whether a claimant under the age of eighteen is disabled, the ALJ undertakes a sequential three-step evaluation. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a); see England v. Astrue, 490 F.3d 1017, 1019-20 (8th Cir. 2007); Neal ex rel. Walker v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 685, 688-89 (8th Cir. 2005). First, the Commissioner determines whether a child is engaged in "substantial gainful activity." 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a) & (b). If so, then the Commissioner will determine the child is not disabled and deny the claim. Id. If the child is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, then the Commissioner will determine whether the child's impairment, or combination of impairments, is "severe," meaning theimpairment causes more than minimal functional limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a) & (c). If the impairment is not severe, then the child is not disabled and the claim is denied. Id. If the impairment is severe, then the Commissioner looks to see whether the impairment meets, medically equals, or functionally equals, an impairment listed in the Regulations, and whether the impairment has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a) & (d). To be "functionally equivalent," the child's limitations must be at least equal in severity and duration to limitations associated with a listed impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926.
The "functionally equivalent" analysis requires the Commissioner to analyze the following six "domains," which are "broad areas of functioning intended to capture all of what a child can or cannot do." 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1). The six domains are: "(i) Acquiring and using information; (ii) Attending and completing tasks; (iii) Interacting and relating with others; (iv) Moving about and manipulating objects; (v) Caring for [one]self; and, (vi) Health and physical well-being." Id.
A finding of functional equivalence will be made only if a child has "marked" limitations in two domains of functioning, or an "extreme" limitation in one domain. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(a); see Moore v. Barnhart, 413 F.3d 718, 722 (8th Cir. 2005). A "marked" limitation in a domain means the claimant's impairment interferes seriously with his/her ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities. This may mean serious limitation exists in only one activity, "or when the interactive and cumulative effects of [the] impairment(s) limit several activities." 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(2)(i). A marked limitation also may mean "a limitation that is more than moderate" but "less than extreme.'" Id. The regulations point to standardized testing results as an indicator of whether a limitation is "marked," and contain other age-based criteria. See id.; see also Scales v. Barnhart, 363 F.3d 699, 703-04 (8th Cir. 2004).
An "extreme" limitation is the rating given to the "worst limitations," and occurs in a domain when a claimant's impairment interferes "very seriously" with his/her abilityto independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(3)(i). An "extreme" limitation is "more than marked," but "does not necessarily mean a total lack or loss of ability to function." Id. Again, the regulations point to standardized testing scores and certain age-based criteria as indicators of whether a limitation is "extreme." See id.
The regulations provide detailed descriptions of the types of information that are relevant to consideration of each of the domains. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(g )-(l ). The ultimate "responsibility for deciding functional equivalence rests with the Administrative Law Judge or Appeals Council." 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(n).
In evaluating the child's claim, the ALJ followed the familiar five-step sequential evaluation process outlined in 20 C.F.R § 416.924a. AR 20-23. The ALJ found the claimant had not engaged in substantial gainful activity during the relevant time period. AR 23. The ALJ next found the claimant had one or more severe impairments, including ADHD and ODD. AR 23. The ALJ further found these impairments did not meet or equal the Listings of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. AR 23. The ALJ then assessed the child's functioning in the various domains for a school-age child, finding the claimant had:
As the ALJ did not find an extreme limitation in any domain and found a marked limitation in only one domain, the ALJ determined that the child's condition did not functionally equal the Listings. As a result, the ALJ found the claimant was not disabled. AR 33.
The Commissioner's decision must be affirmed "if it is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole." Pelkey v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 575, 577 (8th Cir. 2006); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (). "Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but enough that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Lewis, 353 F.3d at 645. The Eighth Circuit explains the standard as "something less than the weight of the evidence and [that] allows for the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions, thus it embodies a zone of choice within which the [Commissioner] may decide to grant or deny benefits without being subject to reversal on appeal." Culbertson v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 934, 939 (8th Cir. 1994).
In determining whether the Commissioner's decision meets this standard, the court considers "all of the evidence that was before the ALJ, but it [does] not re-weigh the evidence." Wester v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 886, 889 (8th Cir. 2005). The court considers both evidence which supports the Commissioner's decision and evidence that detracts from it. Kluesner v. Astrue, 607 F.3d 533, 536 (8th Cir. 2010). The court must "search the record for evidence contradicting the [Commissioner's] decision and give that evidence appropriate weight when determining whether the overall evidence in support is substantial." Baldwin v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 549, 555 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Cline v. Sullivan, 939 F.2d 560, 564 (8th Cir. 1991)).
In evaluating the evidence in an appeal of a denial of benefits, the court must apply a balancing test to assess any contradictory evidence. Sobania v. Sec'y of Health &Human Servs., 879 F.2d 441, 444 (8th Cir. 1989). The court, however, does not "reweigh the evidence presented to the ALJ," Baldwin, 349 F.3d at 555 (citing Bates v. Chater, 54 F.3d 529, 532 (8th Cir. 1995)), or "review the factual record de novo." Roe v. Chater, 92 F.3d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Naber v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 186, 188 (8th Cir. 1994)). Instead, if after reviewing the evidence, the court finds...
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