Cooper v. Town of Pinedale, 98-291.

• Decision Date: 30 March 2000
• Docket Number: No. 98-291.,98-291.
• Citation: 1 P.3d 1197
• Parties: A.L. COOPER; Kay Buston; Richard L. Stott; Vernon T. Delgado; Harry P. Schriver; Robert Carmean; Ralph Allen Steele; Phil Gabardi; Dennis Davison; and P.J. Paulos, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. TOWN OF PINEDALE, Appellee (Defendant).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

1 P.3d 1197

A.L. COOPER; Kay Buston; Richard L. Stott; Vernon T. Delgado; Harry P. Schriver; Robert Carmean; Ralph Allen Steele; Phil Gabardi; Dennis Davison; and P.J. Paulos, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. TOWN OF PINEDALE, Appellee (Defendant).

No. 98-291.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

March 30, 2000.¹

Representing Appellants: John S. Mackey, Pinedale, WY; and Philip White Jr., Laramie, WY. Argument presented by Mr. White.

Representing Appellee: Van Graham of Mason & Graham, Pinedale, WY. Argument presented by Mr. Graham.

Representing Amicus Curiae Wyoming Association of Municipalities: Kathleen A. Hunt of Lewis & Hunt, LLC, Laramie, WY.

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and HILL, JJ.

HILL, Justice.

The Appellants, taxpayers and water service purchasers (collectively Cooper), challenge the authority of the Town of Pinedale (Town) to borrow money from the State of Wyoming for the purpose of reconstructing the municipal water system. The district court ruled that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-1-103(a)(xlii)(Michie 1997)² was a specific statute affording such authority to the Town, and it also ruled that the question had become moot because of the construction of the water system. We hold that the matter had not become moot, but we agree with the district court that the Town possessed the authority to act under the circumstances of this case. We affirm the Order of the district court granting a summary judgment in favor of the Town.

ISSUES

This Statement of the Issues is found in the Brief of Appellants:

I. Did the trial court err in its determination that the matter was moot:

a) when, under the law, a municipal obligation entered into without observance of statutory and constitutional requirements is void ab initio;

b) where there is no evidence in the record that the Town has already imposed all water assessments necessary to meet its repayment obligations under the loan, and thus a judgment declaring the Town is without authority to impose those assessments would be effective and enforceable;

c) when there is no evidence in the record to indicate that the state loan has been advanced to or spent by the Town of Pinedale;

d) where the trial court improperly took "judicial notice" of a water project and thereby decided an issue of fact;

e) when it was the Town that delayed a decision by insisting on oral argument instead of a ruling on the briefs, and by taking several months to modify the promissory note.

II. Did the trial court err in ruling that Wyoming Statutes did not require approval at an election before the Town Council could legally enter into a binding indebtedness for this loan[?]

III. Did the trial court err in ruling that under Wyoming law a mere resolution of the Town Council, rather than an ordinance, was sufficient to legally authorize Town officials to incur a $1,171,500 debt by signing the note, mortgage and other documents evidencing the loan? Was passage of a motion sufficient to modify the note?

IV. Do the Wyoming Constitution Art. 16 § 4 and W.S. § 15-7-109 require approval at an election of Town of Pinedale residents to legally enter into this indebtedness, in that the Town has mortgaged not just the new pipeline to be constructed with the loan, but all of the Town's existing water facilities and water rights as well?

This Statement of the Issues is found in the Brief of Appellee:

I. Whether the trial court erred in finding the appellants' action moot?

II. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the promissory note executed by the Town of Pinedale in favor of the State of Wyoming is not a bond requiring an election?

III. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the Town of Pinedale could become a party to a promissory note by authority of a resolution?

IV. Whether the constitutional issue raised by appellants can be raised for the first time on appeal?

The Wyoming Association of Municipalities, as amicus curiae, accepts the statement of the issues set forth in Appellee's brief. The Reply Brief of Appellants raises no new issues.

FACTS

The Wyoming Legislature passed an Omnibus Water Bill in 1996 that authorized a grant and a loan to the Town of Pinedale for the construction of a new municipal and domestic water supply. The legislation provided for a grant of up to $2,378,500.00 and a loan of up to $1,171,500.00. On April 29, 1996, the State's Water Development Commission (the Commission) sent the Town's mayor, Miriam Carlson (Carlson), a project agreement, promissory note, mortgage, and assignment and pledge of revenues. An accompanying letter instructed Carlson to, among other things, "... have the Town Council pass a resolution consistent with the wording in the Assignment and Pledge form." One week later, the Town Council passed the required resolution, and Carlson executed the documents.

Cooper filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment on July 2, 1997, asking the district court to declare that the Town had no authority to enter into the loan agreement. Cooper argued that the Town violated the Wyoming Constitution and state statutes by entering into the loan without voter approval. Amid extensive briefing and motion practice, the parties entered into negotiations. As a result of the negotiations, the Town persuaded the Commission to modify the promissory note to specify that the Town would pay the note only with water revenues. On February 3, 1998, the Town Council passed a resolution to approve the modification.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On July 30, 1998, the parties stipulated that no constitutional issues remained, and the only unresolved issues were:

9.1 whether the note is a bond requiring an election pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 15-7-102(b) and Wyo. Stat. §§ 22-21-101 et seq., or whether the Town of Pinedale could enter into the indebtedness without an election pursuant to its authority under Wyo. Stat. § 15-1-103(a)(xlii); and

9.2 whether the actions taken by the Town of Pinedale could be taken pursuant to resolutions rather than pursuant to ordinances.

The district court heard oral arguments on the respective motions for summary judgment on July 31, 1998. In ruling in favor of the Town's motion for summary judgment, the court concluded that the case was moot, reasoning that work had already begun on the project, expenses incurred, and that no matter the outcome, an election could not change those facts. The court went on to provide alternative findings on the merits, which also favored the Town.

Cooper filed a Motion to Reconsider and/or Alter or Amend Order, which the district court denied. Cooper filed a timely Notice of Appeal to this Court. After receiving the appellate briefs of both parties, we granted the petition of the Wyoming Association of Municipalities to file a brief amicus curiae.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Our standard when reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment is found in W.R.C.P. 56 and Cities Serv. Oil & Gas v. State, 838 P.2d 146, 150 (Wyo.1992). In accordance with the cited rule, we will affirm a summary judgment if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. We will examine the record from the point of view most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment and give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences that we may fairly draw from the record. Davis v. Wyoming Medical Center, Inc. 934 P.2d 1246, 1250 (Wyo.1997). In the case before us, the parties have agreed that no material facts are in dispute. We, therefore, have only to determine whether the district court properly granted summary judgment as a matter of law. Cities Serv. Oil & Gas, 838 P.2d at 150.

Because the parties' arguments depend upon conflicting interpretations of statutes, a review of our rules of statutory construction is also in order. Our controlling consideration in interpreting statutes is the intent of the legislature. Wright v. State ex rel. Workers Safety, 952 P.2d 209, 213 (Wyo. 1998). To ascertain that intent, we construe statutes in pari materia with other statutes. Corkill v. Knowles, 955 P.2d 438, 445 (Wyo. 1998). When possible, we will harmonize statutes relating to the same subject matter. Gerstell v. Dept. of Revenue & Taxation, 769 P.2d 389, 394 (Wyo.1989). Accordingly, we apply the rule that a specific statute will govern over a general statute. Id.

As another preliminary matter, we recall a prior discussion relating to the powers of cities and towns:

Before reviewing and discussing the various statutory provisions which we consider applicable to the facts of this appeal, it is necessary to review some general principles of law regarding the powers of a municipal corporation to legislate.

It is settled that municipal corporations are creatures of the legislature and thereby subject to statutory control. 2 McQuillin Mun Corp (3d Ed), § 4.03, p. 8; Wyoming State Treasurer v. City of Rawlins, Wyo., 510 P.2d 301 (1973). Thus, the legislature, except as limited by the Wyoming Constitution, may confer on municipal corporations such authority as it considers proper, and municipalities can exercise only those powers which are expressly or impliedly conferred. 2 McQuillin, supra, §§ 10.08 and 10.09, p. 755; City of Buffalo v. Joslyn, Wyo., 527 P.2d 1106 (1974); Scarlett v. Town Council, Town of Jackson, Teton County, Wyo., 463 P.2d 26 (1969); May v. City of Laramie, 58 Wyo. 240, 131 P.2d 300 (1942); Edwards v. City of Cheyenne, 19 Wyo. 110, 111, 114 P. 677 (1911). We have recognized in the past that the powers of a municipality are not necessarily limited to those expressly conferred but that a municipality may also exercise powers fairly and necessarily implied from the grant contained in the statute or constitutional provision. Whipps v. Town of Greybull, 56 Wyo. 355, 109 P.2d 805, 146 ALR 596 (1941).

Coulter v. City of Rawlins, 662 P.2d 888, 894-95 (Wyo.1983).

DISCUSSION

Mootness

We must first decide whether the...