Cooper v. University of Michigan

• Decision Date: 15 September 1980
• Docket Number: Docket No. 44527
• Citation: 15 A.L.R.4th 249,298 N.W.2d 677,100 Mich.App. 99
• Parties: Margaret COOPER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN and Michigan Employment Security Commission, Defendants-Appellees. 100 Mich.App. 99, 298 N.W.2d 677, 15 A.L.R.4th 249
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 677

298 N.W.2d 677

Margaret COOPER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN and Michigan Employment Security Commission, Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 44527.

100 Mich.App. 99, 298 N.W.2d 677, 15 A.L.R.4th 249

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Sept. 15, 1980.

Released for Publication Dec. 9, 1980.

Michael E. Leonard, Ypsilanti, for plaintiff-appellant.

[100 MICHAPP 100] William P. Lemmer, Ann Arbor, for University of Michigan.

Edward Jan Setlock, Detroit, for Michigan Employment Sec. Com'n.

Before CYNAR, P. J., and KELLY and GILLESPIE, ^* JJ.

KELLY, Judge.

On April 14, 1976, plaintiff, Margaret Cooper, filed a claim against her former employer, the University of Michigan, for unemployment benefits. On May 12, 1976, the Michigan Employment Security Commission (MESC) made a determination that the plaintiff was not entitled to unemployment benefits. On June 23, 1976, MESC made a redetermination pursuant to plaintiff's request and affirmed the denial of unemployment benefits to the plaintiff. Plaintiff filed an appeal from this redetermination. On January 17, 1977, a hearing was held before MESC Referee Raymond K. Sewell, Jr. Referee Sewell affirmed the MESC redetermination. Plaintiff again appealed. On June [100 MICHAPP 101] 7, 1978, the Michigan Employment Security Board of Review affirmed the referee's decision. Plaintiff again appealed. On May 16, 1979, Washtenaw County Circuit Court Judge Ross W. Campbell issued an opinion affirming the Michigan Employment Security Board of Review's decision. Plaintiff appeals to this Court as of right.

The facts in the present case are undisputed. Plaintiff began work for the defendant on February 24, 1975. In August of 1975, the plaintiff began work in the accounting department as a clerical worker. Plaintiff's duties required taking care of the incoming cash receipts, balancing and filing. In January of 1976, plaintiff told her immediate supervisor that she did not have enough work to do and that she had too much spare time in the afternoon. In March of 1976, plaintiff discussed her dissatisfaction with a woman in the personnel department, who advised her that she could attempt to transfer to another job. Plaintiff attempted to effect such transfer but was unsuccessful due to lack of seniority.

Plaintiff then told Elex Makarewich, the supervisor over her immediate supervisor, of her discontent with the lack of work. Plaintiff also tendered a resignation at this time. Makarewich told plaintiff that she could occasionally do some work for the accountants in the department clearing erroneous accounts. Plaintiff then withdrew her resignation in order to consider the supervisor's proposal. After talking with an accountant, plaintiff learned that clearing the erroneous accounts would take only a few hours a month and that if she did this work, the accountants would not have enough to do. Plaintiff subsequently tendered her resignation on April 9, 1976.

On April 14, 1976, plaintiff filed her claim for [100 MICHAPP 102] unemployment benefits. This claim was denied throughout the appeals process based upon a finding that the plaintiff voluntarily left her work without good cause attributable to the employer.

M.C.L. § 421.29(1); M.S.A. § 17.531(1) provides in part:

"An individual shall be disqualified for benefits in all cases in which he:

"(a) Has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employer or employing unit."

Three issues related to the above statute are raised on appeal: (1) whether the burden of proof relevant to the above standard falls upon the claimant or employer, (2) whether an employee's dissatisfaction with the amount of work assigned constitutes good cause, and (3) whether this determination as to the existence of good cause is a question of law or fact.

It is defendants' position that the burden of proving eligibility for benefits rests with the claimant. Dwyer v. Unemployment Compensation Comm., 321 Mich. 178, 187, 32 N.W.2d 434 (1948), Clapp v. Unemployment Compensation Comm., 325 Mich. 212, 221, 38 N.W.2d 325 (1949). In the absence of Michigan precedent pertinent to the more specific question raised here, defendants cite cases from foreign jurisdictions which hold that when an employee voluntarily leaves employment the burden is on him to show good cause for doing so. E. g., Szojka v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 187 Pa.Super. 643, 146 A.2d 81, 83 (Pa.1958). Plaintiff relies on those cases which hold that the employer bears the burden of proof in a disqualification situation. Smith v. Employment Security Comm., 89 Mich.App. 212, 216, 280 N.W.2d 489 (1979), lv. gtd., 406 Mich. 1006 (1979), Lasher v. Mueller Brass Co, 62 Mich.App. 171, 175, 233 [100 MICHAPP 103] N.W.2d 513 (1975), Fresta v. Miller, 7 Mich.App. 58, 63-64, 151 N.W.2d 181 (1967).

While we are clearly presented with a disqualification question, we disagree with plaintiff's position that the employer bears the burden of proof in all cases involving an employee's disqualification for unemployment benefits. Those cases on which plaintiff relies do not turn on the "good cause" conduct of the claimant; rather, they impose the burden of proof on the employer in the following instances. One: When the employee is to be disqualified for benefits due to the employer's discharge for misconduct, Fresta, supra. See M.C.L. § 421.29(1)(b); M.S.A. § 17.531(1)(b). Two: When the employee is to be disqualified for failure to accept "suitable" work offered by the employer, Lasher, supra. ¹ See M.C.L. § 421.29(1)(e); M.S.A. § 17.531(1)(e). Three: When an employee is to be disqualified because his unemployment is due to a labor dispute in progress, Smith, supra. See M.C.L. § 421.29(8); M.S.A. § 17.531(8).

In each situation the conduct, knowledge, reasoning, and control of the employer is critical in order to determine whether disqualification is justified. However, potential disqualification, for benefits under M.C.L. § 421.29(1)(a); M.S.A. § 17.531(1)(a), as here, requires inquiry into whether plaintiff's behavior in terminating employment was voluntary and plaintiff's reasons for doing so, the answers to these questions being within the exclusive knowledge of the claimant. Plaintiff herein left work because she was dissatisfied with the amount of work assigned to her. In light of the undisputed facts attending the plaintiff's cause, whether this [100 MICHAPP 104] motivation constitutes "good cause attributable to the employer or employing unit" is a question of law. Thomas v. Employment Security Comm., 356 Mich. 665, 668, 97 N.W.2d 784 (1959).

Cases decided in both Pennsylvania and New York, which have similar statutory schemes, provide some guidance as to whether voluntary termination of employment due to an employee's determination of insufficient quantity of work should be considered within the purview of "good cause".

In Sabloff v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 194 Pa.Super. 63, 166 A.2d 95 (1960), a planning official voluntarily left his employment because he was not doing the type of work for which he had been employed and because he believed his general inactivity to be a waste of government funds. The Pennsylvania Court ruled that the plaintiff was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits.

In Welker v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 180 Pa.Super. 534, 119 A.2d 658 (1956), the claimant was a laboratory technician who voluntarily left her employment because there was not enough specialized laboratory analysis work to occupy her full time. The claimant decided to resign rather than do general laboratory work. The Welker Court also ruled that the plaintiff was not entitled to unemployment benefits.

In Albright v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 176 Pa.super. 290, 106 A.2d 879 (1954), a bookkeeper quit his job because he did not have enough to do. The court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to unemployment benefits.

The language of the Pennsylvania and Michigan statutes differs in that the former legislation provides[100 MICHAPP 105] that a person is ineligible for compensation if "his unemployment is due to voluntarily leaving work without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature". 43 Pa.Stat.Ann. 802(b)(1). However, as Albright, supra, indicates, the above criteria is the equivalent of "good cause".

Plaintiff's attempt to distinguish the above cases and Eisenberg v. Catherwood, 29 App.Div. 1019, 289 N.Y.S.2d 498 (1968), on the ground that plaintiffs therein did not specifically request additional work is not persuasive since the argument fails to substantively bolster her stance that lack of work equals good cause. Furthermore, plaintiff's reliance on Kovach v. Employment Division, 35 Or.App. 609, 582 P.2d 460 (1978), Industrial Comm. of Colorado v. McIntyre, 162 Colo. 229, 425 P.2d 279 (1967), and Clay v. Crooks Industries, 96 Idaho 78, 529 P.2d 774 (1974), is misplaced because, as plaintiff concedes, they do not deal with an employee who has voluntarily left work for the reason offered here.

Plaintiff also directs our attention to a Wayne County Circuit Court decision, John Johnson Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm. (Docket No. 231, 402, Nov. 19, 1943), which not only lacks precedential value, but is also factually distinguishable from the present case since the plaintiff in Johnson left a part-time job to seek full-time employment.

Finally, we summarily reject plaintiff's argument that she was subjected to a disguised lay-off when, despite the unavailability of...