Copeland v. Hewett

• Decision Date: 12 August 1902
• Citation: 96 Me. 525,53 A. 36
• Parties: COPELAND v. HEWETT et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

53 A. 36

96 Me. 525

COPELAND

v. HEWETT et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Aug. 12, 1902.

(Official.)

Exceptions from supreme Judicial court, Knox county.

Assumpsit on a building contract by Oliver E. Copeland against James H. H. Hewett and others. Verdict for plaintiff, and defendants except. Exceptions overruled.

Following defendants' signatures to the contract were the words, "Building Committee of M. E. Church of Thomaston," and they contended that they executed the contract with the plaintiff as agent and as a committee of the church, and not as principals.

The plea was the general issue. Plaintiff had a verdict for $770.92.

Argued before WI SWELL, C. J., and WHITEHOUSE, SAVAGE, POWERS, PEABODY, and SPEAR, JJ.

C. E. & A. S. Littlefleld, for plaintiff.

D. N. Mortland and M. A. Johnson, for defendants.

POWERS, J. This is an action of assumpsit upon an account annexed for an alleged balance due upon a special contract to repair and make additions to a church building, and for extra work and materials.

The defendants contend that the contract was the contract of the Methodist Episcopal Church of Thomaston, and except to the ruling of the presiding justice that it was their personal contract. The principles of the common law, as modified by Rev. St. c. 73, § 15, applicable to this question, have been fully settled by this court, and require no further discussion here. Sturdivant v. Hull, 59 Me. 172, 8 Am. Rep. 409; Mellen v. Moore, 68 Me. 390, 28 Am. Rep. 77; Simpson v. Garland, 72 Me. 40, 39 Am. Rep. 297; Rendell v. Harriman, 75 Me. 497, 46 Am. Rep. 421; McClure v. Livermore, 78 Me. 390, 6 Atl. 11. The contract purports to be made between the plaintiff and the building committee of the Methodist Episcopal Church of Thomaston, and is signed and sealed by the defendants, with the words "Building Committee of M. E. Church of Thomaston" following their signatures. The intention of the parties is to be gathered from the whole Instrument it is not executed by the defendants in the name of their alleged principal, nor in their own names for such principal. If it was their intention to bind another, they have entirely omitted in the deed Itself to use any apt words indicating such an intention. On the contrary, the building committee, "the said party of the second part, for themselves and their successors, do hereby agree to pay unto the said party of the first part the sum of thirty-eight hundred dollars." If they were acting as agents, their successors would not mean their principal. It must mean those who succeeded them in their office, who voluntarily took their places, and assumed their obligations. The use of these words cannot control or modify the express obligation into which they entered, and the promise which they made "for themselves." Moreover, it nowhere appears that they had authority to bind another,—an essential element in determining the intention of the parties. An Intention to bind the defendants clearly appears upon the face of the contract. Its mode of execution was such they may be bound, and it necessarily follows that it is their personal contract

Defendants' second exception is to the admission of the testimony of certain witnesses introduced by the plaintiff to prove an implied contract on the part of the defendants to pay for an item of extra work charged in the account annexed. So far as this exception is based upon that provision of the contract that no claim shall be had for alterations and additions, unless first particularly described in writing, and the valuation thereof agreed upon, it is considered later on. Aside from that, it cannot be doubted that this testimony was competent; whether it was sufficient was for the jury to determine, and is not before us on exceptions.

The defendants requested the following in struction: "In order for the plaintiff to recover of these defendants the sums charged for extra work and materials he claims to have done and furnished, he must prove by a preponderance of evidence that the defendants employed the plaintiffs to do such work and furnish the materials for them, and not for the church or society, and that the defendants agreed to pay for the same; but the agreement to pay may result from the acts and understanding of the parties, without express words."

This request was declined, but the instruction had already in substance been given in the charge. The jury...