Copen v. United States

• Decision Date: 06 July 2021
• Docket Number: No. 20-3136,20-3136
• Citation: 3 F.4th 875
• Parties: Kelly A. COPEN; Paul Copen, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America; Farmers Insurance, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

3 F.4th 875

Kelly A. COPEN; Paul Copen, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.UNITED STATES of America; Farmers Insurance, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 20-3136

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: October 9, 2020

Decided and Filed: July 6, 2021

ARGUED: Craig G. Pelini, PELINI, CAMPBELL & WILLIAMS, LLC, North Canton, Ohio, for Appellants. Ruchi V. Asher, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Cleveland, Ohio, for Federal Appellee. ON BRIEF: Craig G. Pelini, PELINI, CAMPBELL & WILLIAMS, LLC, North Canton, Ohio, for Appellants. Ruchi V. Asher, Karen E. Swanson Haan, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Cleveland, Ohio, for Federal Appellee.

Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; ROGERS and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.

STRANCH, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which SUTTON, C.J., joined, and ROGERS, J., joined in part. ROGERS, J. (pp. 884–87), delivered a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge.

Paul Copen was driving his daughter Kelly's vehicle when it was struck by a driver for the United States Postal Service (USPS). Kelly was riding in the passenger seat. The vehicle was damaged, and both Kelly and Paul state that they were physically injured in the accident. This case concerns whether the Copens properly presented their claim for damages to USPS under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671 – 80. Kelly Copen alone filed a Standard Form 95, SF 95, with USPS stating that both Kelly and Paul had been injured, but they never provided a dollar amount for their personal injury damages. The district court determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Kelly Copen had failed to provide a sum certain on her claim for personal injury, and because Paul Copen had not met the jurisdictional requirement of submitting his own claim form.

Neither Kelly nor Paul provided a sum certain to USPS, a mandatory requirement. But because we conclude that the sum certain requirement in the FTCA is not jurisdictional, we REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.¹

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The accident between the Copens and the USPS driver took place on May 19, 2017. On May 22, Kelly Copen filed her SF 95 with USPS. The SF 95 is provided by the government as a "convenient format for supplying the information necessary to bring an FTCA claim." DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DOCUMENTS AND FORMS , https://www.justice.gov/civil/documents-and-forms-0 (last visited May 19, 2021). Use of the form, however, "is not required to present a claim under the FTCA." Id.

Kelly listed herself as the claimant on the SF 95. In the box titled "Basis of the Claim," she provided information about the accident and noted: "Paul Copen (my father) was driving my vehicle and was injured and taken to Aultman Hospital, I was also examined at the hospital when I arrived." (R. 10-3, Mot. to Dismiss Exhibits, PageID 71) In the box titled "Personal Injury/Wrongful Death," Kelly listed herself and her father, and indicated that the extent of their injuries was unknown. Kelly alone signed the form, and she provided only her address and phone number. As to damages, the form requests a total amount and states: "[f]ailure to specify may cause forfeiture of your rights." On the cover page, Kelly wrote: "As we spoke earlier, I do not have rental car estimate yet or a total on medical. So I did not yet fill out those areas with numbers." (Id. at PageID 70) She included a vehicle repair estimate, and later that day, she sent a rental car estimate. Kelly sent USPS the final car repair bill on June 2, 2017. The Copens acknowledge that USPS paid Kelly for these items by check.

On June 16, 2017, USPS received a representation letter from counsel for Kelly Copen. The letter did not mention Paul. In response, USPS sent counsel a letter detailing the information the agency would need to consider a personal injury claim. The letter also explained: "A claim must be for a specific dollar amount (Sum Certain). That amount must be shown in the appropriate space(s); 12 A B & D, DOLLAR AMOUNT ONLY. " (Id. at PageID 83) (emphasis in original) USPS states that it did not receive any further information from the Copens concerning an amount of personal injury damages.

The Copens filed suit against USPS and the driver in state court on May 15, 2019, asserting claims for personal injury to both Kelly and Paul. The complaint includes general descriptions of the injuries both allegedly sustained and a demand for $25,000 in personal injury damages. USPS was served on May 22, 2019 and then removed the case to federal court. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d), the United States substituted itself as defendant for both USPS and the driver. The United States then moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that Kelly had failed to file a valid tort claim for personal injury because she had not identified a sum certain as required in 28 U.S.C. § 2675. The United States also argued that Paul Copen had failed to file a valid administrative claim because he had not submitted his own claim form. The district court agreed and dismissed the Copens’ claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

We review de novo the district court's dismissal of a complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Spurr v. Pope , 936 F.3d 478, 482 (6th Cir. 2019).

B. Discussion

1. Jurisdiction

We have an "independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party." Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp. , 546 U.S. 500, 514, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006). We first decide whether the FTCA's sum certain requirement is jurisdictional or is instead a mandatory claims-processing rule that "seek[s] to promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified times." Henderson v. Shinseki , 562 U.S. 428, 435, 131 S.Ct. 1197, 179 L.Ed.2d 159 (2011). The difference between jurisdictional and claims-processing rules is "not merely semantic but one of considerable practical importance for judges and litigants" because labeling a rule as jurisdictional "alters the normal operation of our adversarial system." Id. at 434, 131 S.Ct. 1197. Objections to a court's subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any point in the litigation, and the late-raising of such objections can "result in the waste of judicial resources" and can "unfairly prejudice litigants." Id. The consequences can be "especially harsh for the parties, as no one may forfeit or waive a court's subject-matter jurisdiction at the trial level—leading to new arguments on appeal, unanticipated debates on appeal, and outcome-changing results on appeal." United States v. Marshall , 954 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 2020). The Supreme Court has "urged that a rule should not be referred to as jurisdictional unless it governs a court's adjudicatory capacity, that is, its subject-matter or personal jurisdiction." Shinseki , 562 U.S. at 435, 131 S.Ct. 1197.

"Sovereign immunity generally bars claims against the United States without its consent," but "Congress, through the FTCA, waived this governmental immunity for claims brought" for several types of actions. Kohl v. United States , 699 F.3d 935, 939 (6th Cir. 2012). Congress established the jurisdiction of the federal courts over FTCA claims in 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) :

Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts, together with the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.

Housed within chapter 171 is 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), which lays out the FTCA's agency presentment requirement:

An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for money damages for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered mail. The failure of an agency to make final disposition of a claim within six months after it is filed shall, at the option of the claimant any time thereafter, be deemed a final denial of the claim for purposes of this section.

Section 2675(b) states that a claimant cannot institute an action "for any sum in excess of the amount of the claim presented to the federal agency, except where the increased amount is based upon newly discovered evidence not reasonably discoverable at the time of presenting the claim to the federal agency, or upon allegation and proof of intervening facts, relating to the amount of the claim." Thus, the requirement to present a sum certain claim first to the agency is mandatory. The question is whether it is also jurisdictional.

Our circuit has long referred to these procedures as jurisdictional prerequisites to filing suit. See, e.g. , Exec. Jet Aviation, Inc. v. United States , 507 F.2d 508, 514–15 (6th Cir. 1974) (footnote omitted) ("[T]he administrative claim procedure prescribed in 28 U.S.C. § 2675 is jurisdictional. No suit may be maintained under the Act in the absence of compliance, which cannot be waived by the Government."). However, in Arbaugh , the Supreme Court laid out a "bright line"...