Copper ex rel. Copper v. Denlinger

Decision Date29 January 2010
Docket NumberNo. 526A08.,526A08.
Citation688 S.E.2d 426,363 N.C. 784
PartiesAngell COPPER, by his mother and guardian ad litem, Sherry COPPER; Desmond Johnson, by his father and guardian ad litem, Wilmer Johnson; Eric Warren and Dion Warren, by their mother and guardian ad litem, Deann Warren; Joshua Thorpe, by his mother and guardian ad litem, Treco Thorpe; Todd Douglas, deceased, by his mother and administratrix of his estate, Sheryl Smith; Deantonio Rhodes, by his mother and guardian ad litem, Linda Rhodes; Jazmyn Jenkins; and Gina Solari; as individuals and as representatives of the class of similarly situated Durham Public School students v. Ann T. DENLINGER, individually and as Superintendent of Durham Public Schools; The Durham Public School Board of Education; Gail Heath, individually and as Chair of the Durham Public School Board of Education; Heidi Carter, Steve Martin, and Steve Schewel, individually and as members of the Durham Public School Board of Education; Larry McDonald, individually and as former Principal of Southern High School; Richard Webber, individually and as Principal of C.E. Jordan High School; Rodriquez Teal, individually and as Principal of Southern High School; Worth Hill, Durham County Sheriff; and R.A. Sipple and Joseph Costa, individually, as agents and employees of the Durham County Sheriff, as agents of the Superintendent of Durham Public Schools, and as agents of the Durham Public School Board of Education.
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 193 N.C.App. 249, 667 S.E.2d 470 (2008), affirming in part and reversing in part an order entered 5 October 2006 by Judge Orlando F. Hudson, Jr. in Superior Court, Durham County, and remanding for further proceedings. On 5 February 2009, the Supreme Court allowed defendants' petition for discretionary review of additional issues. Heard in the Supreme Court 5 May 2009.

Frances P. Solari, Durham, for plaintiff-appellees.

Tharrington Smith, LLP, by Ann L. Majestic and Christine Scheef, for Durham Public Schools Board of Education; and Cranfill, Sumner & Hartzog, L.L.P., Raleigh, for Ann T. Denlinger, defendant-appellants.

Allison B. Schafer, General Counsel, for North Carolina School Boards Association, amicus curiae.

North Carolina Justice Center, by Jack Holtzman, Raleigh, for North Carolina Justice Center, ACLU of North Carolina Legal Foundation, Advocates For Children's Services Of Legal Aid Of North Carolina, North Carolina State Conference of NAACP Branches, Triangle Lost Generation Task Force, and North Carolina Black Leadership Caucus, amici curiae.

HUDSON, Justice.

On 24 March 2006, plaintiffs, Durham public high school students or their parents,1 filed a purported class action complaint2 in Superior Court, Durham County, seeking compensatory and punitive damages, a declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief against the Durham Public Schools Board of Education (the "Board"), Board secretary and Durham Public Schools Superintendent Ann Denlinger in her official and individual capacities, and various other individuals later dismissed from the suit. According to the allegations in the complaint, the Board, Ms. Denlinger, school principals, and other individuals affiliated with public high schools in Durham had subjected minority students "to more severe disciplinary measures for less serious offenses than white students," including imposing school suspensions "without due process of law," and had "[f]alsely and indiscriminately label[ed]" minority students as "`gang affiliated.'"

In connection with these factual allegations, plaintiffs contended that defendants had conspired "to deny minority students an equal educational opportunity in the Durham Public Schools." Plaintiffs asserted that, specifically with respect to school suspensions, defendants had violated several of plaintiffs' federal and state constitutional rights, including their rights to due process, equal protection, and a sound basic education. In seeking a declaratory judgment, plaintiffs argued that the Board's policy related to gangs "does not provide adequate notice to students of the precise conduct prohibited," "gives excessive subjective discretion to school officials and school resource officers to pick and choose what conduct by what students to punish," and "is unconstitutionally vague and therefore void and unenforceable."

On 5 October 2006, the trial judge dismissed all claims against the Board, Ms. Denlinger and the school board members and the named school principals.3 As to the particular claims before this Court, the trial court based the dismissals on the following grounds: (1) regarding the Douglas state constitutional claims against the Board for violating his right to procedural due process, an adequate state statutory remedy was available to challenge suspension decisions, and the student had failed to allege either that he had exhausted his administrative remedies or that these remedies were inadequate; (2) regarding the Douglas federal procedural due process claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, brought against Ms. Denlinger in her individual capacity, the student had failed to demonstrate that he had exhausted his administrative remedies or that Ms. Denlinger had violated rights "clearly established" under federal law, thereby entitling Ms. Denlinger to qualified immunity in her individual capacity; and (3) regarding the Board's gang policy, it "defines a violation ... with sufficient definiteness that a student could understand what conduct was prohibited and it established standards to permit enforcement in a non-arbitrary, non-discriminatory manner."

The Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the majority of plaintiffs' claims against the majority of the named defendants. Copper ex rel. Copper v. Denlinger, 193 N.C.App. 249, 286, 667 S.E.2d 470, 495 (2008). The panel was divided in reversing the dismissal of the Douglas state constitutional claim against the Board, and his § 1983 claim against Ms. Denlinger in her individual capacity, for alleged violations of his procedural due process rights. Id. at 286-87, 667 S.E.2d at 495. Defendants appealed based on the dissent. Although the Court of Appeals unanimously reversed the dismissal of plaintiffs' claim concerning the Board's gang policy, id., we allowed defendants' petition for discretionary review of that issue. We also allowed review of the question of whether a school board may be held liable for monetary damages under the state constitution for the actions of its employees. Because we find that plaintiffs have not stated a claim for relief under the state constitution, we do not reach this issue.

The central question we address is whether the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to state a claim for relief against the Board under the state constitution and against Ms. Denlinger in her individual capacity under § 1983 for violations of Douglas's constitutional right to procedural due process. After careful consideration of each of the complaint's allegations concerning these Douglas claims and his treatment by the school, we hold that he did not.

The complaint here contains allegations of disciplinary actions taken against nine Durham public high school students and includes nearly six hundred paragraphs. Of these, roughly seventy-five pertain to the Douglas claims. We have summarized the pertinent facts below using plaintiffs' own statements from the complaint, which we treat as true when reviewing an order dismissing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). See, e.g., State ex rel. Cooper v. Ridgeway Brands Mfg., LLC, 362 N.C. 431, 442, 666 S.E.2d 107, 114 (2008) ("When reviewing a complaint dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), we treat a plaintiff's factual allegations as true.") (quoting Stein v. Asheville City Bd. of Educ., 360 N.C. 321, 325, 626 S.E.2d 263, 266 (2006) (citation omitted)).

State Constitutional Claim Against the Board

To assert a direct constitutional claim against the Board for violation of his procedural due process rights, a plaintiff must allege that no adequate state remedy exists to provide relief for the injury. See Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 782, 413 S.E.2d 276, 289 ("Therefore, in the absence of an adequate state remedy, one whose state constitutional rights have been abridged has a direct claim against the State under our Constitution."), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 985, 113 S.Ct. 493, 121 L.Ed.2d 431 (1992); see also Craig ex rel. Craig v. New Hanover Cty. Bd. of Educ., 363 N.C. 334, 340, 678 S.E.2d 351, 355 (2009) (noting that "an adequate remedy must provide the possibility of relief under the circumstances." (emphasis added)).

The complaint contends that the Board violated Douglas's state constitutional right to procedural due process by denying him a hearing before his long-term suspension from school. Because we find that an adequate state remedy exists to redress this alleged constitutional injury, we need not address whether the allegations in the complaint, when taken as true, would establish a violation of procedural due process under our state constitution. Indeed, our General Assembly has enacted two separate statutes that provide a means of redressing such an injury. Sections 115C-45(c) and 115C-391(e) allow an appeal to the Board, and then to superior court, "from any final administrative decision" related to student discipline and from a suspension lasting "in excess of 10 school days," respectively. N.C.G.S. §§ 115C-45(c), 391(e) (2007).

The complaint appears to suggest that Ms. Denlinger and Larry McDonald, the principal of Southern High School, purposely backdated correspondence to Douglas and his mother, Sheryl Smith, to convert what had effectively become a long-term suspension into a short-term suspension and thereby thwart his right to appeal to the Board. However, the complaint fails to allege any facts or...

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