Coppinger v. Rawlins
| Decision Date | 14 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | E060664 |
| Citation | 239 Cal.App.4th 608,191 Cal.Rptr.3d 414 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Joseph COPPINGER, Jr. et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Rogelio RAWLINS et al., Defendants and Respondents |
Law Office of Michael V. Hesse and Michael V. Hesse, Riverside, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Dickman & Holt and John G. Dickman and Montessa D. Holt, Corona, for Defendants
and Respondents Rogelio Rawlins and Maria Rawlins.
Arias & Lockwood and Christopher D. Lockwood, San Bernadino; Dana M. Smith, Riverside County Counsel, for Defendants and Respondents County of Riverside.
Prior owners subdivided their land into two parcels, dedicating narrow lots “A,” “B,” and “C,” (Lots A, B, and C) to defendant County of Riverside (County) for public road and utility purposes. The County accepted the dedication in 1980, with the proviso that Lots B and C would not immediately become part of the county-maintained road system. In 1984, plaintiffs Connie and Joseph Coppinger, Jr., purchased one parcel. Defendants Rogelio and Maria Rawlins purchased the other parcel, and used Lot C for ingress and egress. Plaintiffs erected a gate to prevent the Rawlinses from using Lot “C,” and eventually filed a lawsuit against the Rawlinses and the County for quiet title, trespass, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief. The Rawlinses and the County demurred to the third amended complaint, and the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. Plaintiffs appealed.
On appeal, plaintiffs argue that (1) the dedication of the public right of way constituted a “taking” from the prior owners under the federal Bill of Rights; and (2) the County's acceptance of the dedicated lots did not constitute an unconditional acceptance within the meaning of the Subdivision Map Act (Gov. Code, § 66410 et seq. ), constituting rejection of the dedication, and reverting title to Lot C to plaintiffs. We affirm.
Prior to October 1980, the property in question, consisting of 2.43 acres in the County, was owned by John and Nancy Robinson. The property is situated at the intersection of Nance Street and Clark Street in an unincorporated portion of the County.
In October 1980, Robinson subdivided the property into “Parcels 1” and “Parcel 2,” and dedicated Lots A through C, comprising 30-foot strips of land, for public use for street and public utility purposes. According to “Parcel Map No. 14895,” Lot A runs along Clark Street, Lot B runs along Nance Street on one side of Parcel 2, while Lot C, an extension of Lot B, runs along Nance Street on the same side of Parcel 1. The County accepted the offer of dedication. Lot A was accepted as part of the county-maintained road system, while Lots B and C were accepted to vest title in the county on behalf of the public “for said purposes, but said road shall not become part of the county-maintained road system until accepted by resolution of the County Board of Supervisors.”
On December 4, 1984, the Robinsons executed a grant deed, conveying Parcel 1, along with Lot C, to plaintiffs. That deed was recorded on February 26, 1985, and refers to Parcel Map No. 14895. The Rawlinses own a lengthy parcel running roughly east and west, located immediately to the north of Lots B and C. To perform an improvement on the westerly portion of their property, the Rawlinses needed access over the dedicated public right of way, that is, Lots B and C. A fence runs along the boundary line between Lot C and the Rawlinses' property; plaintiffs alleged this fence was erected by their predecessors in interest, while the Rawlinses alleged that plaintiffs erected it to bar public access to and across Lot C.
The Rawlinses filed a complaint to abate a nuisance against plaintiffs in November 2012, but this action was voluntarily dismissed shortly thereafter. Then plaintiffs filed a complaint against the Rawlinses in December 2012. Eventually, a third amended complaint was filed on August 22, 2013, against the Rawlinses and the County, seeking (a) to quiet title to Lot C (first cause of action, against all defendants), (b) damages for trespass (second cause of action, against Rawlinses), (c) injunctive relief to abate a nuisance (third cause of action, against Rawlinses), and (d) declaratory relief (fourth cause of action, against all defendants).
The County and the Rawlins defendants demurred to the first, second, and fourth causes of action of the third amended complaint. On October 31, 2013, the trial court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the third cause of action. Following the entry of judgment of dismissal of the entire action, plaintiffs appealed.
The County and the Rawlins defendants demurred to the third amended complaint on multiple grounds. Their main objection was that the complaint failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action because the County's acceptance of the Robinsons' offer of dedication was absolute, such that the complaint failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action under Code of Civil Procedure section 771.010, affecting plaintiffs' right to quiet title to the property, seek damages for trespass, and obtain injunctive relief. The trial court ruled that the County had accepted the dedication, although it did not accept it into the road maintenance system. On appeal, plaintiffs make several arguments under separate headings challenging the trial court's ruling that the County had properly accepted the Robinsons' offer of dedication of the public right of way on Lot “C.”
On appeal, when a demurrer has been sustained, we determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and, when it is sustained without leave to amend, we decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has abused its discretion and we reverse. (Loeffler v. Target Corp. (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1081, 1100, 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 189, 324 P.3d 50.) We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but we do not assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. (Aubry v. Tri–City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 92, 831 P.2d 317.) We liberally construe the pleading to achieve substantial justice between the parties, giving the complaint a reasonable interpretation and reading the allegations in context. (Code Civ. Proc., § 452 ; Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 457, 79 P.3d 569.) The judgment must be affirmed if it is correct on any ground stated in the demurrer, regardless of the trial court's stated reasons. (Aubry v. Tri–City Hospital Dist., supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 967, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 92, 831 P.2d 317 ; Fremont Indem. Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 111, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 621.)
When a demurrer is sustained, we determine de novo whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.
(McCall v. PacifiCare of Cal., Inc. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 412, 415, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 271, 21 P.3d 1189.) When a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, we must also decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.
(Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318, 216 Cal.Rptr. 718, 703 P.2d 58.) If the complaint can be cured, the trial court has abused its discretion in sustaining without leave to amend. (Ibid. ; see Arce v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 481–482, 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 545.)
Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint, and in opposition to defendants' demurrers, that all of the conditions of Code of Civil Procedure section 771.010 were satisfied, as the basis for all causes of action. At issue, therefore, is the second condition: whether there was an acceptance of the dedication made and recorded within 25 years after the map was filed. As to this condition, plaintiffs urged in the trial court and now urge on appeal that the County's acceptance of the offer of dedication was ineffectual.
Code of Civil Procedure, section 771.010, relating to proposals to dedicate real property for public improvement, provides that there is a conclusive presumption that the proposed dedication was not accepted if all of the following conditions are satisfied: (a) the proposal was made by filing a map only; (b) no acceptance of the dedication was made and recorded within 25 years after the map was filed; (c) the real property was not used for the purpose for which the dedication was proposed within 25 years after the map was filed; and (d) the real property was sold to a third person after the map was filed and used as if free of the dedication.
A dedication is the transfer of an interest in real property to a public entity for the public's use. (Biagini v. Beckham (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1009, 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 171.) A statutory dedication is effected when, in compliance with the version of the Subdivision Map Act then in force, an offer of dedication is accepted by the public agency. (Ibid; see Scott v. City of Del Mar (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1296, 1302, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 317.) A public agency's mere nonuse of dedicated land does not show abandonment or give rise to an estoppel claim. (Scott v. City of Del Mar, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 1304, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 317.) Doubts and conflicts appearing upon a map prepared and recorded by the owner of real property for the purpose of creating a subdivision of it are to be construed most strongly against him, but the law has never allowed private property to be taken for public purposes except upon clear...
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