Coppola v. Coppola
| Decision Date | 18 December 2007 |
| Docket Number | Docket: Cum-06-623. |
| Citation | 2007 ME 147,938 A.2d 786 |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
| Parties | Heather L. COPPOLA v. Robert E. COPPOLA. |
John H. Branson, Esq., Portland, ME, for appellant.
Kenneth Altshuler, Esq., Childs, Rundlett, Fifield, Shumway & Altshuler, Portland, ME, for appellee.
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and LEVY, SILVER, and MEAD, JJ.*
[¶ 1] Heather L. Coppola appeals from a divorce judgment entered in the District Court (Portland, Cole, J.) severing her marriage to Robert E. Coppola. Heather argues that the trial court: (1) erred by failing to consider net rental income when calculating child support; (2) abused its discretion by failing to consider net rental income in awarding spousal support; (3) abused its discretion by failing to consider the tax consequences of the spousal support award; and (4) abused its discretion by allocating to Robert two dependency exemptions without increasing child support. Both Heather and Robert contend that the trial court erred by finding that the School Street property had both a marital and nonmarital component. We conclude that the trial court may have erred by failing to take into account the parties' net rental income when calculating child support, but affirm the divorce judgment in all other respects.1
[¶ 2] Heather and Robert Coppola were married in Burlington, Massachusetts in May 1989. They have three children. Heather, who resides in the marital home in Gorham, is thirty-nine years old and attended two years of college, but has not obtained a degree. She has not worked full-time since the first year of the marriage when she was a bookkeeper. Robert, forty-five years old, managed his own auto body shop from 1983 until moving to Maine in 2003.
[¶ 3] In January 2005, Heather filed a complaint for divorce citing irreconcilable differences, and Robert filed a counterclaim for the same shortly thereafter. After a series of case management conferences and an unsuccessful attempt at mediation, the Family Law Magistrate (Driscoll, M.) issued an interim order requiring that Robert pay Heather both child and spousal support.
[¶ 4] At the onset of the two-day divorce hearing in May 2006, the trial court responded to an inquiry from Heather's attorney by stating that it would "either impute income to the—to either or both of them, or, assuming that their current vocations were to continue, based upon how we divide up the rental properties to take care of that." The trial court informed the parties that they could no longer expect to rely solely on the rental income and that "you both are going to need jobs." Following the hearing, Heather filed a proposed divorce judgment, recommending a child support award of $780.39 per month, based on an imputed income of $50,000 to Robert and $25,000 to Heather. In addition, the proposed judgment allocated to Heather all three children as dependency exemptions. Furthermore, Heather proposed that she be awarded spousal support, but in lieu of a direct payment, that Robert be solely responsible for the mortgage and costs of the marital residence. Lastly, the proposed divorce judgment acknowledged the mixed marital and nonmarital nature of the School Street property and recommended that it be awarded to Robert.
[¶ 5] In August 2006, the trial court issued a divorce judgment adopting many of the proposals submitted by Heather. The trial court awarded her $780.39 per month in child support based on the imputed incomes listed in the proposed judgment. The judgment, however, awarded Robert two of the three dependency exemptions and awarded Heather spousal support by ordering Robert to pay the mortgage and costs of the marital residence. The court awarded the School Street property to Robert, finding that it had both marital and nonmarital components.
[¶ 6] Robert then filed a motion for farther findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52(a), seeking additional fact-finding only on the School Street property. Heather did not move for further findings, but rather filed an objection to Robert's motion, contending that the divorce judgment "contain[ed] sufficient Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law." The trial court granted Robert's motion for further findings, stating that the School Street property had its roots in another property, 68 Winn Street in Woburn, Massachusetts,2 which was purchased for $114,000 in 1983 by Robert's mother, and conveyed to him later that same year. The trial court found that the mortgage on 68 Winn Street was paid prior to and during the parties' marriage through the use of marital and nonmarital funds. The trial court found that in June 2004, Robert executed an exchange of properties, trading 68 Winn Street, valued at approximately $750,000, for 2-8 School Street in Gorham,3 and concluded that the School Street property was one-third nonmarital and two-thirds marital property. This appeal and cross-appeal followed.
[¶ 7] Heather argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law by relying solely on the imputed income figures of $50,000 and $25,000 in calculating the child support obligation, contending that the court was required to take into account the parties' net rental income as determined by the magistrate in calculating the support obligation.
[¶ 8] If the court intended the $50,000 and $25,000 to represent imputed earned income, we would agree with Heather. We cannot determine, however, whether the court failed to take the parties' net rental income into account or instead intended the $50,000 and $25,000 to represent that rental income. If so, it may be that the court ultimately decided not to impute earned income to the parties. If that is the case, it would require a factual finding regarding the court's decision that was contrary to its original pronouncement.
[¶ 9] "Issues arising out of a divorce action, such as property division, alimony, custody and child support, are within the court's sound discretion," and are entitled to substantial deference. Sewall v. Snook, 687 A.2d 234, 235 (Me.1996) (quoting Knight v. Knight, 680 A.2d 1035, 1037 (Me.1996)). We review, however, the application of law to the facts of a case de novo. Warren v. Warren, 2005 ME 9, ¶ 20, 866 A.2d 97, 101.
[¶ 10] The child support guidelines define "gross income" as "income from an ongoing source" including, but not limited to, "rents minus ordinary and necessary expenses." 19-A M.R.S. § 2001(5)(A), (C) (2006). The definition of gross income is not discretionary, but rather requires the trial court, in determining the parties' gross incomes, to calculate income from each of the statutorily delineated sources, including net rental income. Accordingly, the trial court has a statutory duty to add the parties' net rental income to their gross income when calculating the child support obligation.
[¶ 11] Although the trial court may impute income to both Heather and Robert based on their current earnings capacity, 19-A M.R.S. § 2001(5)(D) (2006), it may not choose to impute income in lieu of the actual net rental income received by them when calculating child support. Rather, the guidelines require that the trial court tally all sources of imputed and actual income, including net rental income, when calculating the child support obligation. The trial court's actions otherwise would constitute a violation of a "positive rule of law." Because the trial court's decision is ambiguous on these important issues, we must vacate the trial court's award of child support and remand for further action by the court.
[¶ 12] Both parties appeal the trial court's divorce judgment and further findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the School Street property, concluding that the property was one-third nonmarital and two-thirds marital. Heather argues that the School Street property is entirely marital, while Robert argues that it is entirely nonmarital.
[¶ 13] Often, a trial court is called upon to dispose of the parties' marital and nonmarital property pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 953 (2006). The trial court must first set apart to each spouse that spouse's nonmarital property and then divide the marital property in proportions it considers just after considering all relevant factors.4 19-A M.R.S. § 953(1). Marital property is defined as "all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage." 19-A M.R.S. § 953(2). Title 19-A M.R.S. § 953(2) lists several exceptions to the definition of marital property, including "[p]roperty acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to the marriage. . . ." 19-A M.R.S. § 953(2)(B).
[¶ 14] We review the trial court's factual determination of the marital or nonmarital character of property for clear error. Sewall v. Saritvanich, 1999 ME 46, ¶ 14, 726 A.2d 224, 227. We will not disturb the trial court's determination if there is competent evidence in the record to support it. Id. ¶ 14, 726 A.2d at 227-28.
However, the determination of the law that is applied to the facts is reviewed de novo. Thus, when [this Court is] called upon to determine whether the source of funds rule, the transmutation doctrine, or other rule should be utilized in deciding whether property is marital or non-marital, we do so de novo without deferring to the trial court's view of the law but honoring the trial court's finding of the facts as long as they are supported by the evidence.
Spooner v. Spooner, 2004 ME 69, ¶ 7, 850 A.2d 354, 358 (citation omitted).
[¶ 15] Heather argues that the School Street property is entirely marital property because it was acquired during the marriage. In doing so, Heather seeks to invoke the statutory presumption that any property acquired by either party during the marriage is marital property. See 19-A ...
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