Coral Constr., Inc. v. City of S.F.
Decision Date | 02 August 2016 |
Docket Number | A138901 |
Parties | CORAL CONSTRUCTION, INC., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(County of San Francisco Nos. 319549 & 421249)
This litigation began over a decade ago when, in 2001, Coral Construction, Inc. (Coral) filed a complaint against the City and County of San Francisco and various other related parties (collectively, the City), alleging that a City ordinance mandating race- and gender-based preferences in public contracting violated Proposition 209, codified in section 31 of article I of the California Constitution. Since that time, the matter has spawned two appellate court decisions and an opinion from the California Supreme Court. (See Coral Construction, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1218 (Coral II), review granted and opn. superseded by Coral Construction, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco (2010) 50 Cal.4th 315 (Coral Construction); Coral Construction, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 6 (Coral I).) Most recently, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings to determine the constitutionality of the challenged ordinance in accordance with the analytical framework set forth in its opinion. (Coral Construction, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 335-338.) Instead, the trial court—noting that the ordinance at issue had since been repealed—concluded that "it is now speculative to say that the City will enact race-or gender-conscious legislation in the future" and therefore dismissed the litigation as moot. Because we agree with the trial court that no justiciable controversy remains, we affirm.
Between 1984 and 2004 (when its continued enforcement was enjoined), the City operated under several iterations of its Minority/Women/Local Business Utilization Ordinance (Ordinance). In its various forms, the Ordinance called for race- and gender-conscious remedies to ameliorate the effects of past discrimination on minority-owned business enterprises (MBE's) and women-owned business enterprises (WBE's) in the awarding of City contracts. (Coral II, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 1225.) In Coral Construction, the Supreme Court admirably summarized the early history of the Ordinance and related developments in the law of preferences as follows:
Thereafter, effective November 6, 1996, the California electorate adopted Proposition 209, the California Civil Rights Initiative, adding article I, section 31, to the California Constitution (section 31). (Cal. Const., art. I, § 31; Coral II, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 1225.) Section 31 prohibits state and local governments from discriminating against, or granting preferential treatment to, "any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting." (Cal. Const., art I, § 31, subds. (a) & (f).) Certain actions, however, are exempted from the mandate of section 31. (Id., subds. (b)-(e).) Thus, for instance, the legislation does not apply if the action at issue isrequired to maintain eligibility for federal funds. (Id., subd. (e).) Further, the statute also contains a standard savings clause, which provides that "[i]f any part or parts of this section are found to be in conflict with federal law or the United States Constitution, the section shall be implemented to the maximum extent that federal law and the United States Constitution permit." (Id., subd. (h).) Under this language, if race- or gender-conscious remedies are required under the federal equal protection clause to remedy intentional discrimination, they would be exempted from the strictures of section 31. (See Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose (2000) 24 Cal.4th 537, 567 (High-Voltage).)
Events impacting the Ordinance in the wake of Proposition 209 were summarized by the Coral Construction Court as follows:
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