Corbett v. General Engineering & Machinery Co.

• Citation: 37 So.2d 161,160 Fla. 879
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida
• Decision Date: 12 October 1948
• Parties: CORBETT et al. v. GENERAL ENGINEERING & MACHINERY CO. et al.

37 So.2d 161

160 Fla. 879

CORBETT et al. v. GENERAL ENGINEERING & MACHINERY CO. et al.

Florida Supreme Court

October 12, 1948

Rehearing Denied Nov. 19, 1948.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Hillsborough County; L. L Parks, judge.

Morrice S Uman, of Tampa, and Walter E. Rountree, of Tallahassee, for appellants.

Fowler White, Gillen, Yancey & Humkey, of Miami, for appellees.

ADAMS, Justice.

This appeal relates to limitation of claims in workmen's compensation cases and presents this question: 'The question involved is whether or not Chapter 23908, Acts of 1947, had the effect of extending the statute of limitations to two years as to claims not barred on July 1, 1947.'

The injury occurred in August, 1946. The claim was filed in October, 1947. The legislature amended the law by enacting Chapter 23908, Acts of 1947, Section 440.19, Fla.Stat.1941, F.S.A., which provides:

'The right to compensation for disability under this chapter shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within two years after the time of injury, and the right to compensation for death shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within two years after the death, * * *'

The only change made by the amendment was to extend the period from one year to two years. The amendment is silent as to whether it will apply to claims then in existence; although it does in fact repeal the former act and all others in conflict. Since the one year statute was repealed there was no law to bar the claim other than the newly enacted two years' law.

The general rule of law is well stated in 34 Am.Jur., Sec. 29, page 35.

'Since limitation laws prescribing the time within which particular rights may be enforced relate to remedies only, it is well settled by the authorities that the legislature has the power to increase the period of time necessary to constitute limitation, and to make it applicable to existing causes of action, provided such change is made before the cause of action is extinguished under the pre-existing statute of limitations, and provided further that no agreement of the parties is violated. A statute of limitations enlarging the time within which an action may be brought as to pending cases is not retroactive legislation and does not impair any vested right.'

One of the leading cases more elaborately states the rule. Davis & McMillan v. Industrial Accident Commission, 198 Cal. 631, 246 P. 1046 1047, 46 A.L.R....