Green v. State
| Decision Date | 30 October 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 882S326,882S326 |
| Parties | Joan GREEN, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender, David P. Freund, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., G. Douglas Seidman, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Following a trial by jury, Defendant (Appellant) was convicted of murder, Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-1-1 (Burns 1979), upon a verdict of "guilty, but mentally ill" pursuant to Ind.Code Sec. 35-5-2-3 (Burns 1979) []. Her direct appeal presents seven (7) issues for our review:
1. Whether the verdict is contrary to law;
2. Whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to present evidence first and to open and close the arguments to the jury;
3. Whether the trial court erred in granting portions of the State's motion in limine;
4. Whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion for mistrial;
5. Whether the trial court erred in enhancing Defendant's sentence;
6. Whether the trial court erred in giving two of its final instructions;
7. Whether Ind.Code Sec. 35-5-2-3, the statute providing for the guilty but mentally ill verdict, is unconstitutional.
The record disclosed that on September 14, 1981, the Defendant bludgeoned her ten-year old daughter, Rebecca, to death with an iron skillet.
Defendant presented an insanity defense at trial; however, the jury found her to be guilty, but mentally ill. Ind.Code Sec. 35-5-2-3. When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, he bears the burden of proof on the issue, Ind.Code Sec. 35-41-4-1(b) (Burns 1979); Basham v. State, (1981) Ind., 422 N.E.2d 1206, 1209, and he may challenge the jury verdict only by an assignment that the verdict is contrary to law. Price v. State, (1980) 274 Ind. 479, 412 N.E.2d 783, 786. Our standard of review in such case was set forth in Turner v. State, (1981) Ind., 428 N.E.2d 1244, 1246, as follows:
Ind.Code Sec. 35-41-3-6(a) (Burns 1979) provides for the defense of insanity as follows:
"A person is not responsible for having engaged in prohibited conduct if, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law."
Three of the four psychiatrists who testified at trial opined that Defendant was insane at the time she committed the offense. A fourth psychiatrist, Dr. Musselman, testified that, in his opinion, the Defendant realized that her act was wrong. He offered no opinion as to whether she could conform her conduct to the requirements of the law: Hence, Defendant argues, there was no "meaningful" conflict in the evidence; and, inasmuch as the evidence established that Defendant was insane at the time of the offense, the verdict is contrary to law. We do not agree.
There was other evidence from which the jury could have concluded that the Defendant was not insane. Detective Gary Kenawell testified that, in his opinion, after having observed and conversed with the Defendant the day after the murder, the Defendant was sane. The jury may disregard psychiatric testimony that a Defendant was insane and rely upon lay testimony that the Defendant was sane. Taylor v. State, (1982) Ind., 440 N.E.2d 1109, 1110. Moreover, there was additional evidence of probative value from which the jury could have inferred that Defendant was sane. After beating her daughter with the skillet, Defendant changed her clothing, told her daughter's schoolmate that Rebecca was not going to school, packed a suitcase, ripped a page from an address book bearing the name of a friend in Chicago, withdrew money from the bank, purchased a bus ticket, and went to her friend's house. Dr. Musselman testified that these acts "demonstrate sane type behavior."
When police officer Smith went to the home in Chicago where Defendant was staying the day following the murder, he found Defendant to be calm and able to converse with him. She knew where she was and who he was. He did not notice "anything else unusual about her."
Inasmuch as there was conflicting evidence regarding Defendant's sanity, under our standard of review, the verdict cannot be said to be contrary to law. Taylor v. State, 440 N.E.2d at 1110-1111; Thomas v. State, (1981) Ind., 420 N.E.2d 1216, 1218; Stader v. State, (1983) Ind.App., 453 N.E.2d 1032, 1033.
Defendant assigns as reversible error the trial court's denial of her motion to present the initial opening statement, to present her case first, and to have the opening and closing arguments. Her argument is that, inasmuch as she had filed an "Admission of Facts" to the effect that she had caused her daughter's death by repeatedly striking her with an iron skillet, the sole issue to be contested was whether she was sane. The reasoning then continues that because she had the burden of proof on the issue of insanity she should have been allowed to present her statements, evidence, and argument in the order requested. Her argument fails for two reasons. First, Ind.Code Sec. 35-1-35-1 [] provides that the prosecuting attorney has the privilege to open, to present his evidence first, and to have the opening and closing arguments. Second, although Defendant did bear the burden of proof on the insanity issue, the State had the ultimate burden of proving that the Defendant knowingly or intentionally killed her daughter. The fact that Defendant had the burden of establishing her affirmative defense does not alter the requisite that the State prove its case.
The Defendant's reliance upon Toussaint v. State, (1922) 92 Tex.Cr.R. 374, 244 S.W. 514 is misplaced. Instead of supporting her position, it supports our holding here. Therein the court observed:
Defendant assigns as reversible error the trial court's granting of the State's motion in limine with regard to testimony of various aspects of Defendant's behavior. However, the State correctly notes in its brief that rulings on motions in limine are not reviewable on appeal. Wilson v. State, (1982) Ind., 432 N.E.2d 30, 33; Akins v. State, (1981) Ind., 429 N.E.2d 232, 237; McCraney v. State, (1981) Ind., 425 N.E.2d 151, 152. In order to have preserved error for appeal the Defendant was required to offer the evidence that was subject to the motion and to obtain, thereby, a final ruling on its admissibility.
During the testimony of the doctor who had performed the autopsy on the body of Defendant's daughter, the court admitted several photographs which were discussed and displayed to the jury. In addition, the doctor demonstrated his theory of how the blows had been inflicted. At that time, one of the jurors became ill. The court recessed, and Defendant moved for a mistrial, arguing that the jurors would be prejudiced by the illness of the juror.
The denial of a motion for mistrial will be reversed only upon a showing that the defendant has been placed in a "position of grave peril to which he should not have been subjected." Morgan v. State, (1981) Ind., 419 N.E.2d 964, 967. Defendant has not demonstrated how she was placed in a position of grave peril by the incident related.
Defendant argues that inasmuch as the jury found her guilty but mentally ill, it was improper for the trial...
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