Corder v. Champion Road Machinery Intern. Corp., 0326

• Decision Date: 17 September 1984
• Docket Number: No. 0326,0326
• Citation: 283 S.C. 520,324 S.E.2d 79
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: Lila Mae CORDER, Respondent, v. CHAMPION ROAD MACHINERY INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, Appellant, and Leroy JACKSON, Respondent, v. CHAMPION ROAD MACHINERY INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, Appellant. (two cases). . Heard

Page 79

324 S.E.2d 79

283 S.C. 520

Lila Mae CORDER, Respondent, v. CHAMPION ROAD MACHINERY INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, Appellant, and Leroy JACKSON, Respondent, v. CHAMPION ROAD MACHINERY INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION,

Appellant. (two cases).

No. 0326.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard Sept. 17, 1984.

Decided Dec. 5, 1984.

Julian H. Gignilliat, of Gignilliat & Savitz, Columbia, for appellant.

Angus F. Carter, III, and Billy R. Oswald of Oswald & Floyd, West Columbia, for respondents.

BELL, Judge:

Leroy Jackson and Lila Mae Corder brought these actions against their former employer, Champion Road Machinery International Corporation, for termination of their employment. The complaints in the two cases are substantially identical. They both allege that the plaintiffs suffered on the job injuries, that they filed worker's compensation claims, that they were threatened with termination of their employment if they did not withdraw the claims, and that they were discharged when they did not withdraw their claims. Based on these facts, the complaints alleged causes of action for (1) intentional infliction of emotional distress and (2) invasion of privacy. Champion demurred to both complaints on the ground that they failed to state a cause of action. The circuit court overruled the demurrers. Champion appeals. We reverse and remand.

On appeal from an order overruling a demurrer, the complaint must be liberally construed in favor of the pleader and sustained if the facts and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom entitle him to relief on any theory of the case. Todd v. South Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co., 276 S.C. 284, 278 S.E.2d 607 (1981). But in passing on a demurrer, the court is limited to consideration of the allegations of the complaint. A demurrer admits the well pleaded facts in the complaint; it does not admit conclusions of law. Akers v. Hard, 275 S.C. 100, 267 S.E.2d 536 (1980).

I.

The complaints allege as a first cause of action intentional infliction of emotional distress, i.e., the tort of outrage. To state a claim for outrage, the plaintiff must allege: (1) conduct by the defendant which is atrocious, utterly intolerable in a civilized community, and so extreme and outrageous as to exceed all possible bounds of decency; (2) the defendant acted with intent to inflict emotional distress or acted recklessly when it was certain or substantially certain such distress would result from his conduct; (3) the actions of the defendant caused the plaintiff to suffer emotional distress ; and (4) the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it. Ford v. Hutson, 276 S.C. 157, 276 S.E.2d 776 (1981).

Champion concedes the complaints, liberally construed, sufficiently allege elements (2), (3), and (4) of the tort. It argues, however, that alleged threats of discharge and retaliatory discharge for filing a worker's compensation claim do not, as a matter of law, constitute the extreme, atrocious, utterly intolerable conduct required to satisfy element (1).

In Todd v. South Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co., 321 S.E.2d 602 (S.C.App.1984), we emphasized a critical element of the tort of outrage is outrageous conduct. We stated the "insistence that the conduct be extreme and outrageous is no mere happenstance." Id. 610. We further held the quality of the defendant's conduct is to be judged by an objective standard, i.e., whether it can reasonably be considered extreme, outrageous, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Id. at 609.

In our view, allegations of retaliatory discharge, without more, are not sufficient to state a claim for outrage. See Raley v. Darling Shop of Greenville, 216 S.C. 536, 59 S.E.2d 148 (1950); Hudson v. Zenith Engraving Co. Inc., 273 S.C. 766, 259 S.E.2d 812 (1979). While wrongful discharge for any reason is reprehensible conduct and may cause mental anguish to the discharged employee, it is not in itself the kind of extreme conduct which gives rise to a legal claim for outrage. This is apparent from the prior decisions of our Supreme Court.

In Raley v. Darling Shop of Greenville, supra, as in these cases, the plaintiff alleged she was injured during the course of her employment. She further alleged her employer threatened her with discharge unless she withdrew a worker's compensation claim she had filed with the South Carolina Industrial Commission. When she did not withdraw the claim, the employer allegedly discharged her in retaliation for making the claim. The complaint alleged the employer's conduct was willful, wanton, and malicious with the intent to deprive her of her legal rights and that she suffered mental anguish as a result thereof. The Supreme Court held the complaint was properly dismissed on a demurrer for failure to state a cause of action.

The result in Raley was approved in Hudson v. Zenith Engraving Co., supra. In Hudson, the plaintiff also alleged he was discharged in retaliation for filing a worker's compensation claim. For the purpose of summary judgment, this allegation was taken as proved. However, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the argument that the act of maliciously and intentionally discharging the plaintiff in retaliation for pursuit of a worker's compensation claim in itself constituted outrageous conduct. The Court quoted with approval from Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 46, comment d (1977):

[it] has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by "malice," or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort. Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a...