Cordice v. Liat Airlines, 14-cv-2924 (RRM) (LB)
| Decision Date | 22 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | 14-cv-2924 (RRM) (LB) |
| Parties | DOROTHY CORDICE, Plaintiff, v. LIAT AIRLINES, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Dorothy Cordice brings this action pro se against LIAT Airlines ("LIAT") seeking $10,000 in money damages for personal injuries sustained during a flight from Trinidad and Tobago to St. Vincent. LIAT has filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that it is not subject to the Court's personal jurisdiction. For the reasons that follow, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over LIAT. Accordingly, LIAT's motion is granted.
Cordice alleges that, on a LIAT flight from Trinidad and Tobago to St. Vincent, a flight attendant knocked over a cup of hot water, spilling it onto her legs. (Compl. (Doc. No. 1) at 2.1) Cordice asked the flight attendant for some ice and cold water to cool the area, but the flight attendant instead asked if the seat was wet and offered to dry it. (Id.) Once Cordice arrived in St. Vincent, she told a LIAT employee about the incident, but the employee did not offer any assistance. (Id. at 3.) Cordice asked for a supervisor and indicated that her seatmate had witnessed the incident, but after an hour of waiting, no one offered her a ride to the emergencyroom or provided any other assistance. (Id.) When Cordice returned to the United States, her doctor told her that she had sustained second-degree burns. (Id.)
On May 7, 2014, Cordice filed a complaint seeking $10,000 in damages. (Id. at 1.) On the civil cover sheet accompanying her complaint, Cordice indicated that she was invoking the Court's diversity jurisdiction. (Civil Cover Sheet (Doc No. 1-1) at 4.) In her complaint, Cordice also purported to invoke this Court's jurisdiction "pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 - 7-759 Article 17," (Compl. at 1), which the Court interprets as an attempt to invoke the Court's federal question jurisdiction based upon Article 17 of the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air ("Montreal Convention").2 See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, May 28, 1999, T.I.A.S. No.13,038 (), reprinted in S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-45, 1999 WL 33292734 (2000).
LIAT argues that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction because LIAT is a corporate entity with its principal place of business in Antigua and has no offices or employees "in the State of New York or in any other state in the United States." (LIAT Rule 56.1 Statement (Doc. No. 20-2) at ¶¶ 2, 7, 11.) LIAT indicated that it does maintain bank accounts in Puerto Rico and the United States Virgin Islands. (Id. at ¶ 12.) It also operates flights to both of these territories, as well as to fifteen other locations throughout the Caribbean, but it does not operate any flights to or from the continental United States. (Id. at ¶ 4 ().)
Cordice responded to LIAT's motion for summary judgment by noting that she purchased her ticket from within the United States, but does not provide a more precise point of purchase.3 (See Aff. in Opp'n (Doc. No. 20-6) at 1.) Cordice also indicates that her flight was "from New York City to other connecting flights." (Id.) She does not identify which airline operated her flight from New York City or from whom she purchased her tickets for any leg of her flight.
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists where "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When determining whether an issue of material fact exists, the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id. at255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970)); see also Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 195 n.1 (2004).
Because Cordice is proceeding pro se, the Court must construe her pleadings liberally, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 213-14 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted), and must read them to "raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Green v. United States, 260 F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). However, the Court "need not argue a pro se litigant's case nor create a case for the pro se which does not exist." Molina v. New York, 956 F. Supp. 257, 259 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). For the reasons that follow, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over LIAT. As such, plaintiff's claims cannot survive.
I. Personal Jurisdiction over Defendant
Cordice bears the burden of proving the Court's personal jurisdiction over LIAT. See Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 507 (2d Cir. 1994). Where, as here, the Court relies solely on the pleadings and supporting affidavits, a plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction. Id. In construing jurisdictional allegations liberally, the court may take as true uncontroverted factual allegations. Id. (citing Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 411 (1986); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Herrmann, 9 F.3d 1049, 1052 (2d Cir.1993)). However, the Court may not draw "argumentative inferences" in the plaintiff's favor. Id. (quoting Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Balfour Maclaine Int'l Ltd., 968 F.2d 196, 198 (2d Cir.1992).
Determining personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant in a federal-question case typically involves a two-step inquiry. Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 732F.3d 161, 168 (2d Cir. 2013). The Court must first look to the law of the forum state, which in this case is New York. Id. (citing Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 2007)). If jurisdiction lies in the forum state, the Court must then determine whether its exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant comports with due process protections established under the United States Constitution. See id. (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Best Van Lines, Inc., 490 F.3d at 242.) Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2) ("Rule 4(k)(2)") provides an alternative means of conferring personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant who is otherwise beyond the state's long-arm statute or the reach of the federal law under which the claim was brought. See In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 807 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Rule 4(k)(2) confers jurisdiction in cases arising under federal law where (1) "the foreign defendant lacks sufficient contact with any single state to subject it to personal jurisdiction there", and (2) "the defendant has sufficient aggregate contacts with the United States to comport with constitutional notions of due process." United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 945 F. Supp. 609, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
New York's general jurisdiction statute, New York Civil Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR") § 301, confers general jurisdiction over "corporate defendants who are present in New York 'with a fair measure of permanence and continuity.'" Brown v. Web.com Grp., Inc., 57 F. Supp. 3d 345, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting Landoil Res. Corp. v. Alexander & Alexander Servs., Inc., 77 N.Y.2d 28, 34 (1990)). However, a court's exercise of general jurisdiction over a corporation is consistent with due process under the Constitution only where the corporation's contacts with the forum state are "so 'continuous and systematic,' judged against thecorporation's national and global activities, that it is 'essentially at home' in that state." Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 135 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761-62 (2014)). Aside from a possible "exceptional case," a corporation is at home only in the state of its formal place of incorporation or principal place of business. Id. (citing Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 761 n.19).
LIAT is incorporated under the laws of Antigua and Barbuda, with its principal place of business in Antigua. (LIAT Rule 56.1 Statement at ¶ 2.) It does not maintain an office or have employees, bank accounts, or even a phone listing in New York. (Id. at ¶¶ 11, 12.) Nor does LIAT operate flights into or out of New York City.
Cordice asserts the following in opposition:
I purchased a ticket round trip with my discover card from New York City to other connecting flights and my designation was St. Vincent. The defendant said that Liat doesn't participate in any business in the United States. If so why was I able to purchase my ticket in the United States? Liat should make the passengers purchase their connecting tickets in the Carribbean not in the USA.
(Aff. in Opp'n at 1.)
However, even assuming these facts as true, they would not render LIAT "presen[t] in New York with fair measure of permanence and continuity," let alone "essentially at home" in the state. The Court therefore lacks general personal jurisdiction under CPLR § 301.
A court that lacks general personal jurisdiction under CPLR § 301 may still exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant under New York's long-arm statute, CPLR § 302, when the cause of action arises out of activity conducted within the state. Energy Brands Inc. v. Spiritual Brands, Inc., 571 F. Supp. 2d 458, 468-69 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citingUnited States v. Montreal Trust Co., 358 F.2d 239, 242 (2d Cir.1966)). Section 302 applies to causes of action arising from:
To continue reading
Request your trial