Corey v. Knight

Decision Date06 May 1957
Docket NumberNo. 22068,22068
Citation150 Cal.App.2d 671,310 P.2d 673
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesGlenn D. COREY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Goodwin J. KNIGHT, Governor of the State of California, et al., Defendants, Clarke Gray, Respondent. Civ.

Waite & Drapeau, by David R. Drapeau, Ventura, for appellant.

Charles Kaplan, Beverly Hills, Arden T. Jensen, Solvang, amici curiae.

Roy A. Gustafson, Dist. Atty., Ventura County, Ventura, for respondent.

FOURT, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment in a declaratory relief action wherein it was adjudged 'that if plaintiff is Judge of the Justice Court of the Ventura Judicial District at the time when the district is found to have over 40,000 inhabitants, (1) a Municipal Court will thereupon supersede the Justice Court, (2) plaintiff will be ineligible to be Judge of the Municipal Court, (3) a vacancy will exist to be filled by appointment of the Governor, (4) plaintiff will be compulsorily retired and (5) plaintiff will receive retirement benefits under the County Employees Retirement Law of 1937 [Gov.Code, § 31450 et seq.].'

A resume of the facts in the case is as follows: In about 1947, the legislature requested the Judicial Council to make a survey of all courts in California exercising jurisdiction inferior to the superior court. After an extensive study the Judicial Council, in 1949, recommemded to the legislature a plan for the reorganization of such courts (Twelfth Binnial Report [1948], Judicial Council of California). The legislature, through committees, conducted public hearings, and as a result thereof some changes and additions were made in the proposed constitutional amendments and the proposed statutes drafted by the Council. The interpretation to be given to some of the words added in one of the constitutional amendments which was proposed and adopted (Article VI, section 23) is the only real problem to be determined in this case. The language in question is contained in the 'exception' section, generally referred to as the 'Grandfather Clause', the pertinent parts of which are as follows:

'No person shall be eligible to the office of a Justice of the Supreme Court, or of a district court of appeal, or of a judge of a superior court, or of a municipal court, unless he shall have been admitted to practice before the Supreme Court of the State for a period of at least five years immediately preceding his election or appointment to such office; provided, however, that any elected judge or justice of an existing court who has served in that capacity by election or appointment for five consecutive years immediately preceding the effective date of this amendment shall be eligible to become the judge of a municipal court by which the existing court is superseded upon the establishment of said municipal court or at the first election of judges thereto and for any consecutive terms thereafter for which he may be reelected * * *.'

The legislature voted to submit the proposed constitutional amendment to the People at the General Election, November 7, 1950. The proposition was Number 3 on the ballot at that time, and was adopted by the People by a large majority. At the same election, section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution was amended to provide for only two types of courts inferior to the superior court, namely, justice courts and municipal courts, and further to validate the laws relating to judicial districts enacted in the legislative session of 1949, in anticipation of the adoption of the constitutional amendments. The amendments provided, among other things, in substance, that each county should be divided into judicial districts and that if the population of any district were over 40,000, the district should have a municipal court, or if under 40,000, a justice court. The legislature, by section 1 of Chapter 1511, Statutes 1949, Government Code, § 71040, directed the Board of Supervisors to district their counties. The new plan was to become effective January 1, 1952, except where two or more incumbent judges would be eligible to be judges of the new court, in which case section 2 of Chapter 1510, Statutes 1949, Government Code, §§ 71080, 71081, provided that they 'shall not automatically succeed to judicial positions in the municipal or justice court, and the existing courts shall continue to function within the district until the first judge or judges of said municipal or justice court shall be elected by the qualified electors of the district at the first general state election held following the expiration of 90 days and qualify.'

Article VI, section 11, as amended in 1950, also contained a provision that 'existing courts shall continue to function as presently organized until the first selection and qualification of the judge or judges of the municipal or justice court, at which time, unless otherwise provided by law, pending actions, trials and all pending business of existing courts shall be transferred to and become pending in the municipal or justice court established for the judicial district or city and county in which they are situated, and all records of such superseded courts shall be transferred to, and thereafter be and become records of said municipal or justice court.'

On July 6, 1944, Ventura township was one of nine townships into which Ventura county was divided. The court of Ventura township was a class B justice court. The justice of the peace who presided over the court died and appellant herein was appointed by the Board of Supervisors to fill the vacancy.

The City of San Buenaventura (hereinafter referred to as Ventura) is located in the territorial limits of Ventura township. The charter of Ventura provides for a police court and such court was presided over by Judge B. L. Gregg, a former member of the State Bar. Appellant's original term as justice of the peace expired January 6, 1947. He was elected to that position for the term from January 6, 1947, to January 2, 1951, and was re-elected to that position for the term from January 2, 1951, to January 3, 1955. On October 26, 1951, the population of the township having been found to be over 30,000 by the 1950 census, the court became a class A justice court. The boundaries of the Ventura judicial district were established as of September 4, 1951, by Ordinance No. 472 of the board of supervisors of Ventura county, in conformity with the Statutes of 1949. The area of the district included, but was larger than, Ventura township. The population of the district was less than 40,000.

On January 1, 1952, there were two judicial officers of courts within the area of Ventura judicial district, namely, appellant as justice of the peace of Ventura township, and B. L. Gregg as judge of the police court in the city of Ventura. Both were candidates for the office of judge of the justice court of Ventura judicial district at the election in 1952. Appellant was not and never has been an attorney, and had not passed any examination prescribed by the judicial council. Appellant, who was over 70 years of age at the time of the election, was elected and took office as judge of the justice court on January 5, 1953, for the term ending January 5, 1959.

The justice court of Ojai judicial district began functioning in January, 1952, because only one incumbent was eligible to the judgeship. The remaining four districts in Ventura county were inoperative as such, pending the election of judges. Judges were elected in 1952, and the four districts began functioning as such on January 5, 1953, or, in other words, on January 5, 1953, Ventura county have five judicial districts, each with a functioning justice court.

An action was filed in the superior court of Ventura county on July 5, 1956, for the purpose of having it declared that Ventura judicial district had a population of over forty thousand. On September 6, 1956, the trial judge of that court found that there were forty thousand or more persons in the district, and a municipal court is now in existence. Appellant contends that he is eligible to be, and that he is the judge of such municipal court now in existence. Appellant further asserts that he will continue to be a judge of the justice court if found to be ineligible to be the municipal court judge, until a municipal court judge is elected for the term beginning January 5, 1959. Respondent asserts that appellant is ineligible and he cannot pay appellant now that such municipal court is established; that appellant's term is now terminated as of September 6, 1956, the date upon which the municipal court was declared to be in existence, and appellant is compulsorily retired, and that a vancency existed which was to be filled by appointment by the Governor.

Appellant, in his briefs and in the oral argument, has made issue of the first contention heretofore mentioned, namely, that he is eligible to become judge of the municipal court of Ventura judicial district, and no argument or authorities were presented on the other matters, and we therefore assume that the disposition of the first question will dispose of this appeal.

Honorable Charles F. Blackstock, the learned trial judge, prepared findings of fact and conclusions of law and in his conclusions set forth the applicable law. We believe that the commentary of the trial judge concisely and correctly sets forth the law and we adopt his statements in reference thereto, as follows:

'Both parties concede that if Ventura Judicial District is found to have a population of 40,000 persons and if plaintiff is eligible to be a Municipal Court judge, the court will begin to function immediately with plaintiff as judge. Government Code, Section 71080. Not being an attorney, plaintiff is eligible, if at all, only under this proviso of Section 23 of Article VI of the Constitution:

"[A]ny elected judge or justice of an existing court who has served in that...

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