Corley v. Harris
| Decision Date | 03 July 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 68769,68769 |
| Citation | 171 Ga.App. 688,320 S.E.2d 833 |
| Parties | CORLEY v. HARRIS. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
James N. Finkelstein, Albany, for appellant.
Edmund A. Landau, III, Albany, for appellee.
The appellant, Marvin Corley, brought this action against the appellee, Sarah Harris, seeking damages for injuries he sustained when his motorcycle collided with the appellee's automobile. The collision occurred as the appellee attempted a left turn at an intersection, which was regulated by a traffic light, and as the appellant proceeded through the intersection. Whether the traffic light was green or red at the time was an issue in dispute. Following the trial, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant/appellee.
On appeal, Corley contends that the trial court erred in disallowing individual questioning of the prospective jurors on voir dire as to whether any of them were agents for the Horace Mann Insurance Company; that the trial court erred in disallowing his cross-examination of the appellee on whether she had filed any counterclaim against the appellant for the damage to her automobile resulting from the collision; and that the trial court erred in certain instructions to the jury.
Held:
1. OCGA § 15-12-133 extends to both parties in a civil action the right to question the individual jurors about "any matter or thing which would illustrate any interest of the juror in the case ...," but "[n]ot every matter and every thing is the subject of permissible inquiry under the Code section." Henderson v. State, 251 Ga. 398, 400, 306 S.E.2d 645 (1983). The examination is under the supervision and direction of the trial court, and its scope must be left to the discretion of the court. Whaley v. Sim Grady Machinery Co., 218 Ga. 838, 131 S.E.2d 181 (1963).
In qualifying the jury panel, the trial court in this case asked whether any of the prospective jurors were officers, directors, agents, employees, or stockholders of the insurance company in question. The trial court refused appellant's counsel's request to ask the same question of each individual prospective juror, because of the danger of prejudicially impressing upon the jurors the fact that the defendant had liability insurance. Such a restriction on the individual examination, where the trial court has previously qualified the panel with the inquiry, is proper. Widener v. Mitchell, 137 Ga.App. 730(5), 224 S.E.2d 868 (1976). See also, Weatherbee v. Hutcheson, 114 Ga.App. 761, 152 S.E.2d 715 (1966).
2. The gravamen of the appellant's action was that the appellee's negligent operation of her automobile caused the collision and his injuries. One defense proffered by the appellee was that actually the appellant's own negligence had been the cause. On cross-examination of the appellee, the trial court disallowed counsel for the appellant to inquire whether she had filed any claim against the appellant, seeking to recover damages to her vehicle sustained during the collision.
The right to a thorough and sifting cross-examination extends to all matters, relevant and material to the controversy, within the knowledge of the witness. OCGA § 24-9-64, generally; Luke v. McGuire Ins. Agency, 133 Ga.App. 948, 212 S.E.2d 889 (1975). "[W]here the purpose is to impeach or discredit the witness, great latitude should be allowed by the court in cross-examination ..." Western & Atlantic R. v. Burnett, 79 Ga.App. 530, 533, 54 S.E.2d 357 (1949), but the...
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