Johnson v. Riverdale Anesthesia Associates
| Decision Date | 13 May 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. S01G1138.,S01G1138. |
| Citation | 275 Ga. 240,563 S.E.2d 431 |
| Parties | JOHNSON, et al. v. RIVERDALE ANESTHESIA ASSOCIATES, P.C. et al. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Hill & Bleiberg, Gary Hill, Atlanta, for appellants. Owen Gleaton Egan Jones & Sweeney, H. Andrew Owen, Jr., Amy Jo Kolczak, Atlanta, Evans & Evans, Larry K. Evans, Griffin, for appellees.
Love Willingham Peters Gilleland Monyak, Robert P. Monyak, Lucas W. Andrews, Doffermyre Shields Canfield Knowles, Kenneth S. Canfield, Atlanta, Cook, Noell, Tolley, Bates & Michael, J. Vincent Cook, Athens, Henry, Spiegel, Fried & Milling, Philip C. Henry, Atlanta, Middleton, Mathis, Adams & Tate, Charles A. Mathis, Jr., Atlanta, Butler Wooten Overby Fryhofer Daugherty, Joel O. Wooten, Jr., Columbus, amici curiae.
Certiorari was granted in this medical malpractice action in order to consider the Court of Appeals' ruling forbidding the plaintiff from cross-examining the defendants' expert witness as to how he personally would have treated the plaintiffs' decedent. We conclude that because the standard of care in medical malpractice cases is that which is employed by the medical profession generally, and not what one individual physician would do under the same or similar circumstances, how a testifying medical expert personally would have treated a plaintiff or a plaintiff's decedent is not relevant to the issue of whether a defendant physician committed malpractice. Moreover, we conclude that how a testifying medical expert personally would have treated a plaintiff or a plaintiff's decedent cannot be used to impeach the expert's credibility. Therefore, we affirm.
The decedent, Clair Johnson, suffered a severe adverse reaction to anesthesia she received during surgery. The reaction caused Mrs. Johnson's oxygen supply to be interrupted, resulting in massive brain trauma and death. Her husband, Donald Johnson, along with the administratrix of her estate (collectively "Johnson"), sued the anesthesiologist, Dr. Lawhead, and his employer, Riverdale Anesthesia Associates, Inc. (collectively "Anesthesia Associates"), alleging malpractice.
At trial, Johnson alleged that Anesthesia Associates had committed malpractice by failing to "pre-oxygenate" Mrs. Johnson. Pre-oxygenation is a procedure where, before surgery, a patient is given a measure of pure oxygen, providing her with a reserve to draw from, should her oxygen supply be interrupted during surgery. The trial court granted Anesthesia Associates' motion in limine to prevent Johnson from cross-examining the defendants' medical expert, Dr. Caplan, about whether he, personally, would have pre-oxygenated Mrs. Johnson.
After the jury found in favor of Anesthesia Associates, Johnson appealed, claiming the trial court erred by preventing Johnson from cross-examining Dr. Caplan as to whether he would have elected to pre-oxygenate Mrs. Johnson. The Court of Appeals affirmed,1 and this Court granted certiorari.
1. The crux of Johnson's complaint against Anesthesia Associates was the contention that the latter violated the applicable standard of care by failing to pre-oxygenate Mrs. Johnson.2 Johnson attempted to establish this breach of care through the testimony of an expert witness.3 Johnson claimed that if pre-oxygenation had been administered, Mrs. Johnson would have been protected against the low oxygen levels that occurred during surgery and that led to her death. For its part, Anesthesia Associates claimed that because its decision not to pre-oxygenate Mrs. Johnson was consistent with the applicable standard of care, no malpractice occurred. In support of this argument, Anesthesia Associates presented the testimony of its own medical expert, Dr. Caplan.
It is axiomatic that in order to establish medical malpractice, 4 Thus, in medical malpractice actions, "[t]he applicable standard of care is that employed by the medical profession generally and not what one individual doctor thought was advisable and would have done under the circumstances."5
Accordingly, in cases where expert medical testimony has been presented either to support or to rebut a claim that the applicable standard of care was breached, Georgia case law holds that questions aimed at determining how the expert would have personally elected to treat the patient are irrelevant. The questioning of a medical expert witness should be disallowed as irrelevant when it "pertains to [the expert's] personal views and personal opinions as to the care and treatment he himself would have rendered."6 Contrary to Johnson's argument, this is true regardless of whether the expert's personal views are sought through direct testimony or cross-examination; as held by the trial court in this case, a defendant's expert witness is not required to answer questions on cross-examination "as to what course of treatment he personally would have followed."7
It follows that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Anesthesia Associates' motion in limine to prohibit Johnson from cross-examining the defendant's expert witness as to whether he personally would have pre-oxygenated the decedent, because such questioning was irrelevant to the issue of whether Anesthesia Associates breached the applicable standard of care.8
2. Questions aimed at determining how a defendant's medical expert personally would have treated a plaintiff or a plaintiff's decedent also are irrelevant for purposes of impeaching the expert. As explained above, a medical expert's personal practices are irrelevant to the issues in controversy in a malpractice case. It is axiomatic that a witness may not be impeached with irrelevant facts or evidence,9 and cross-examination should be confined to matters that are relevant to the case.10
Moreover, when confronted with the same or similar situation, different physicians will, quite naturally, often elect to administer differing treatments, and will exercise their judgments regarding a patient's care differently.11 However, merely because these procedures and treatments differ, it does not automatically follow that one of them fails to comply with the applicable standard of care.
Georgia precedent holds that "`testimony showing a mere difference in views between surgeons as to operating techniques, or as to medical judgment exercised,'" is irrelevant in a medical malpractice action when the differing views or techniques are both acceptable and customary within the applicable standard of care.12 Accordingly, questions asked on cross-examination as to how a defendant's medical expert "personally would have treated [a patient are] ... not proper for impeachment."13
Therefore, the trial court did not improperly curtail Johnson's ability to impeach the testimony of Anesthesia Associates' medical expert, Dr. Caplan, by granting the defendants' motion in limine.14
3. As with all determinations of the relevancy of evidence, the determination in a medical malpractice case of whether evidence should be admitted as relevant to the standard of care or should be excluded as irrelevant to that standard rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.15 For the reasons explained above, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this case by prohibiting the cross-examination of the defendants' medical expert as to his personal medical practices, because such information was irrelevant to any issue of fact in controversy.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except BENHAM, HUNSTEIN and CARLEY, JJ., who dissent.
In a one-sentence footnote, the majority overrules Prevost v. Taylor, 196 Ga.App. 368, 369(4), 396 S.E.2d 17 (1990), which was not even cited by the Court of Appeals. In my opinion, Prevost was simply overlooked by the Court of Appeals and should not be overruled by this Court because the rationale of that decision is so persuasive:
It is true, as defendant argues, that the issue in a medical professional negligence action is whether the treatment met the standard of care of the profession generally and not what any one individual doctor believes is advisable. However, those cases cited by defendant involved instances where the only testimony presented to support plaintiff's claim is the individual view of one doctor and no testimony was presented as to the standard of care generally practiced by the profession. [Cits.] Here, plaintiff did not present the individual opinion of defendant's expert for the purpose of establishing the acceptable standard of care but offered it to impeach the expert's opinion that the surgery performed by defendant met the standard of care of the profession generally. "Evidence tendered for impeachment purposes need not be of the kind or quality required for proving the facts." [Cits.]
Prevost v. Taylor, supra at 369-370(4), 396 S.E.2d 17.
"The right of a thorough and sifting cross-examination shall belong to every party as to the witnesses called against him." OCGA § 24-9-64.
Over one hundred years ago, this Court held that it is the [trial] court's duty to allow a searching and skillful test of the witness' "intelligence, memory, accuracy and veracity(,)" [cit.], and that it is better for cross-examination to be "too free than too much restricted.... [Cit.] Eason v. State, 260 Ga. 445, 446, 396 S.E.2d 492 (1990), overruled on other grounds, State v. Lucious, 271 Ga. 361, 365(4)(b), 518 S.E.2d 677 (1999). ...
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