Corley v. State
Decision Date | 21 February 1979 |
Docket Number | No. 58703,58703 |
Parties | Edward Eldon CORLEY, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Edward Eldon Corley appeals his conviction for capital murder. The jury returned affirmative findings to special issues concerning whether Corley acted deliberately and whether he would commit further acts of violence. The court assessed his punishment at death.
Vicki Lynn Morris was abducted from the Hebron Baptist Church in Tyler in the late afternoon as she played "The Old Rugged Cross" on the church organ. The following morning her body was found about four miles from the church. She had been shot with a 410 gauge shotgun and she had been raped. Three days after her abduction, appellant was arrested by the sheriff of Panola County. The murder weapon was found in appellant's pickup truck. After he was taken to Smith County he confessed to killing Vicki Lynn Morris. Later he confessed to raping her prior to the murder.
A hearing on appellant's competency to stand trial was held in Smith County. Then venue was changed to McLennan County.
Corley contends the trial court committed error at the pre-trial competency hearing by submitting to the jury a definition of competency to stand trial that was fundamentally erroneous and a denial of due process. Prior to trial appellant filed a motion for a hearing to determine his competency to stand trial. A jury was impaneled, heard the evidence and received a charge which contained the following standard for determining appellant's competence:
"To establish insanity at the present time it must be established by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is laboring under such mental disease or defect of the mind as to be rendered incompetent to make a rational defense to the charges against him."
Prior to the submission of the charge, appellant requested that the following language be substituted:
Corley argues that the standard submitted in the charge was constitutionally impermissible.
A review of the relevant United States Supreme Court cases is necessary. In Bishop v. United States, 350 U.S. 961, 76 S.Ct. 440, 100 L.Ed. 835 (1956), the Court held that conviction of a mentally incompetent individual violates the due process clause. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960), which dealt with a federal prosecution, held that the standard which required only that a defendant be "oriented to time and place and (have) some recollection of events" was inadequate. Dusky required that the standard, in federal prosecutions, be that the defendant have "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966), attempts to "resolve the difficult question of state-federal relations" posed by Bishop and Dusky. The Pate court first applied the Bishop rule to the states and further held that state procedures must be adequate to insure that an incompetent individual is not tried. Finally, in Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975), the Court held that because there was sufficient evidence raised at the state trial concerning the defendant's incompetence due process was denied by the state's failure to conduct a hearing into the defendant's competency. The Supreme Court has never held that the standard set forth in Dusky was constitutionally mandated as the only standard under which a state can determine an individual's competency.
The relationship between the federal and state courts concerning the standard for determining insanity at the time of the offense presents an interesting parallel. The federal courts have long expressed dissatisfaction with the M'Naghten Rule for determining insanity. While most American jurisdictions have rejected this outmoded test, the federal courts have not held that it is constitutionally forbidden. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952); Corley v. Cardwell, 544 F.2d 349 (9th Cir. 1976) cert. denied 429 U.S. 1048, 97 S.Ct. 757, 50 L.Ed.2d 763 (1977).
The Supreme Court has recognized the difficulty of constitutionally requiring a specific standard when dealing with psychiatric-legal principles. In Leland, Mr. Justice Clark wrote:
Similarly, Mr. Justice Marshall, writing for the plurality in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 88 S.Ct. 2145, 20 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1968), stated:
The Supreme Court has held that an incompetent individual cannot be tried and that a state's procedures must be adequate to ensure that this does not happen. The Court has also held constitutionally adequate a standard which tests (1) whether an individual understands the charge against him and (2) whether he can communicate with his attorney.
In the instant case the court submitted the issue of appellant's competency to the jury. He submitted a definition of present insanity under which appellant must be able "to make a rational defense to the charges against him." If appellant could not understand the charges against him, he would not be able "to make a rational defense to the charges against him." Similarly, if he could not communicate with his attorney, he would not be able "to make a rational defense to the charges against him." The charge given by the court was broad enough to comply with Dusky. The charge provided adequate procedural safeguards to ensure that an incompetent individual would not be convicted. We hold that the charge given in this case did not deny appellant due process.
In Ex parte Long, 564 S.W.2d 760 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), relied upon by the dissent, the main fault with the charge was that it gave the "right and wrong" test as a basis of his competency to stand trial. The court instructed the jury as follows:
". . . 'inability at the time of this trial of the defendant to understand the difference between right and wrong, or inability in mind to understand and appreciate the nature of the act charged against him in the indictment and the consequence thereof, or inability of the defendant in mind to make a rational defense concerning said act or offense.' "
The trial court required the jury in effect to find that the defendant did not understand the difference between right and wrong and as a result thereof he could not make a rational defense to the act or offense. The right and wrong test was not in the instruction to the jury in the present case.
Corley next contends that his confessions were inadmissible for numerous reasons. After his arrest at 7:30 a. m. on September 17, 1974, in Panola County, Corley was taken before a Panola County magistrate. Corley was subsequently informed that his mother had obtained an attorney to represent him. However, Corley stated he did not want to talk to his mother or the attorney. He also declined to use the telephone on several occasions when he was offered an opportunity to use it. Appellant was taken before a second magistrate and again warned. At 4:20 p. m. on the day of his arrest he signed a confession.
The attorney hired by appellant's mother testified that he was hired only to represent Corley at the time of the arrest. He also stated that he was never prevented from seeing Corley.
On November 1, 1974, the district attorney went to see Corley in response to a letter from Corley stating he had other things to tell him. At this time Corley added additional facts to his original confession.
Corley was indigent during the time he was held in jail. Counsel was appointed for him after he gave the second confession.
Appellant argues that the confessions were inadmissible because he did not have an attorney to explain his rights to him and he had a per se right to appointment of counsel within a reasonable time after his arrest. There is no per se right to counsel prior to taking a confession. Woodkins v. State, 542 S.W.2d 855 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). Appellant did not request an attorney when he was taken before the magistrates and informed of his right to an attorney. He made no request to anyone in the jail for an attorney. Under these circumstances there was no error in the State's failure to provide him with an attorney.
Appellant also contends that because h...
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