Cornellier v. Haverhill Shoe Mfrs.' Ass'n
| Decision Date | 16 September 1915 |
| Citation | 221 Mass. 554,109 N.E. 643 |
| Parties | CORNELLIER v. HAVERHILL SHOE MFRS.' ASS'N et al. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Report from Supreme Judicial Court, Suffolk County.
Bill in equity by John Cornellier against the Haverhill Shoe Manufacturers' Association and others. Cause reported to the Supreme Judicial Court by a single justice, who confirmed the master's report and dismissed the bill, which was brought by plaintiff to restrain defendants from conspiring to prevent him from earning a livelihood by means of a black list. Decree overruling exceptions, and confirming the master's report, and dismissing the bill of complaint ordered.
Frederick W. Mansfield and Edmund R. Mansfield, both of Boston, for plaintiff.
Jos. J. Feely and Roger Clapp, both of Boston, for defendants.
1. The defendants filed 85 exceptions to the original report of the master. The sustaining of the forty-fourth and eighty-fifth rendered necessary a recommittal,
for the purpose of hearing further evidence. The supplemental report is a redraft of the original one, with certain parts eliminated in consequence of the rulings of the single justice sustaining some of the exceptions, and with the additional findings made on the new evidence. To the supplemental report the defendants filed 40 exceptions, and these have come before us without any action thereon by the single justice. We have considered the large number of objections made and the arguments thereon, and have come to the conclusion that all of the exceptions to the original report, except those sustained by the single justice, and all of those taken to the supplemental report, must be overruled. It would serve no useful purpose to discuss them in detail. Those that deal with the admission and rejection of evidence disclose no reversible error. The findings of fact cannot be reviewed because the evidence has not been reported; and the facts found are relevant to the issues in the case, as clearly stated by the master when dealing with the several objections to his draft reports. The exceptions that relate to rulings of law cannot be sustained, because it was the master's duty to find the facts only, and not to rule upon their legal effect.
2. The basis of the plaintiff's complaint is that the defendants conspired against him, and by means of a black list procured his discharge from employment. On December 12, 1912, the plaintiff, with 39 other employés of the Witherell & Dobbins Company, went out on strike. He secured employment at the factory of Charles E. Fox, Incorporated, on December 14th, began work on December 16th, at 7:10 a. m., and was discharged in a summary and unusual manner about two hours later. The master finds that the cause of his discharge was the fact that he was one of the striking employés of the Witherell & Dobbins Company, and that there existed a tacit understanding, to which the Fox Company was a party, that those striking employés should not be employed. It appears that on the day of the strike, or the day after, and at the request of the defendant Child (who was the manager of the Shoe Manufacturers' Association), Mr. Dobbins brought to a meeting of the manufacturers several lists containing the names of the employés who had gone on strike. Copies of the list were prepared and circulated by the defendants for the
purpose of preventing the strikers from getting work in Haverhill and vicinity, and of forcing them to abandon the strike and return to work at the Witherell & Dobbins Company's factory against their will. The acts of the several defendants in furtherance of this combination need not be recited. The master specifically has found that Cornellier was discharged at Fox's because of this 'black list.' It may be said in passing that of the 20 respondents named in the bill the master finds that only the following (herein referred to as the defendants) were responsible for the acts complained of, namely: The Haverhill Shoe Manufacturers' Association, the Witherell & Dobbins Company, Gale Shoe Manufacturing Company, Charles E. Fox, Incorporated, Austin H. Perry, Ira J. Webster, Alwyn W. Greeley, Albert M. Child, George W. Dobbins and H. L. Webber.
Did this combination of the defendants to blacklist the striking employés of the Witherell & Dobbins Company, resulting in the discharge of and damage to the plaintiff, give him a legal cause of action? The statement of the general right of the Fox Company to terminate a workman's employment when and for what cause it chooses, where no right of contract is involved, does not carry us far. See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 35 Sup.Ct. 240, 59 L.Ed. 441, L.R.A. 1915C, 960. The same is true of the recognized equal rights of employers and employés to combine in associations or unions, so long as they employ lawful methods for the attainment of lawful purposes. See Hoban v. Dempsey, 217 Mass. 166, 104 N.E. 717, L.R.A. 1915A, 1217. But it is settled that the intentional interference by even an individual, without lawful justification, with the plaintiff's right to have the benefit of his contract with his employer would be an actionable wrong. Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353, 74 N.E. 603, 5 L.R.A.(N.S.) 899, 108 Am.St.Rep. 499, 3 Ann.Cas. 738; Hanson v. Innis, 211 Mass. 301, 97 N.E. 756. A combination to blacklist is the counter weapon to a combination to boycott, and is open to similar legal objections, when directed against persons with whom those combining have no trade dispute, or when the concerted action coerces the individual members, by implied threats or otherwise, to withhold employment from those whom ordinarily they would employ. See New Eng. Cement Gun Co. v. McGivern, 218 Mass. 198, 105 N.E. 885, and cases cited. It is true that in Worthington v. Waring, 157 Mass. 421, 32 N.E. 744, 20 L.R.A. 342, 34 Am.St.Rep. 294, this court refused to enjoin the defendants from making use of a black list, stating that the rights alleged to be violated were personal Burnham v. Dowd, 217 Mass. 351, 359, 104 N.E. 841, 51 L.R.A.(N.S.) 778, the case of Worthington v. Waring cannot well be reconciled with our later decisions. It must be considered as no longer binding as an authority for the doctrine that equity will afford no injunctive relief against an unlawful combination to blacklist.
It should be added that St. 1914, c. 778, was enacted after the events in controversy and has not been considered. Nor, on the facts, have we had occasion to determine how far the 'peaceful persuasion' statute (St. 1913, c. 690) permits one employer to advise another not to employ his striking employés. In several states legislation has been enacted to prevent blacklisting; and most of the decisions deal with the validity or construction of the different statutes. See Labor Laws of the United States, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin No. 148; Labor Decisions, 1912, Bulletin No. 112; Id. 1913 Bulletin No. 152.
3. The single justice ruled that:
'The combination of the defendant employers to aid Witherell & Dobbins in resisting the strike of their employés by refusing to employ the striking employés of the Witherell & Dobbins Company was a legal combination, and not a boycott by way of a black list.'
Without now considering the correctness, as abstract legal propositions, of the rulings as to the legality of a general strike to secure recognition of the union in a particular shop, and of a combination of employers as a retaliatory measure, we are of opinion that the master's report does not sustain the conclusion of fact on which apparently the rulings were based, namely, that the black list was instituted after and to resist the general strike. On this point the chronology of the events in the case seems decisive. The strike at Witherell & Dobbins Company's factory took place December 12, 1912. On the following day, December 13th, a meeting of the shoe manufacturers was called by the association. Mr. Dobbins
told them about the strike at his factory, and some of the lists of striking employés were distributed to those...
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