Cornett v. City of Chattanooga
| Decision Date | 11 February 1933 |
| Citation | 56 S.W.2d 742 |
| Parties | CORNETT v. CITY OF CHATTANOOGA. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Hamilton County; L. D. Miller, Judge.
Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Law by Leila Cornett, petitioner, for the death of her husband, alleged employee, opposed by the City of Chattanooga, alleged employer. From a judgment dismissing petitioner's claim, petitioner appeals in error.
Affirmed.
Estill & Morgan, of Chattanooga, for plaintiff in error.
J. W. Anderson, of Chattanooga, for defendant in error.
Petitioner's claim for an award of compensation for the accidental death of her husband was dismissed by the circuit court, on the city's demurrer, and she has appealed in error.
The petition, averring that the city had accepted the provisions of the Compensation Law, as authorized by Code, § 6856 (e), charges that the city employed petitioner's husband "as a police officer, under the direction and orders of the Commissioner of Fire and Police," and that he lost his life by accident arising out of and in the course of such employment, while undertaking to make an arrest.
One ground of the demurrer sustained by the circuit court is that petitioner's husband was an officer and not an employee of the city, and therefore was not subject to the provisions of the Compensation Law.
The Compensation Law, Pub. Acts 1919, c. 123, § 2, as amended (Code, § 6852), defines "employee," as used in the act, as embracing "every person, including a minor, in the service of an employer, as `employer' is defined in paragraph (a) above, under any contract of hire, apprenticeship, written or implied."
By the definition quoted, the benefits which accrue to employer and employee under the Compensation Law, and the obligations arising therefrom, are incidents of a contract of employment. The terms of the Compensation Act, upon its acceptance by the city, were written by law into its contracts of employment, express or implied, with its several employees. An action for an award of compensation is therefore "a suit upon contract." Tidwell v. Chattanooga Boiler & Tank Co., 163 Tenn. 420, 43 S.W.(2d) 221, 222; Vantrease v. Smith, 143 Tenn. 254, 227 S. W. 1023.
This being the nature of the obligation created by the Compensation Law, and of the action for its enforcement, it is obvious that no obligation can arise, and no action will lie, unless the parties are bound by contract, express or implied.
A member of the police, or "police officer," of a municipal corporation, is by the general law of the state charged with the duties of a "conservator of the peace," and as such he is "required to aid in the prevention and suppression of public offenses," acting with all the power of the sheriff. Code, § 11419. By the charter of Chattanooga, its policemen are vested with the powers possessed by constables. Acts 1901, c. 432, § 58.
Municipal policemen, charged with a duty to "preserve the public peace, prevent crime, detect and arrest offenders" are Porterfield v. State, 92 Tenn. 289, 21 S. W. 519.
It is contended for petitioner that the status of a policeman in Chattanooga is fixed as an employee by a charter amendment, Private Acts 1927, c. 692, wherein it is provided that the city "shall have full power and authority to employ policemen and firemen and other agents and servants, and to provide compensation therefor" (section 2), with a minimum salary stated for regular policemen and firemen.
The use of the word "employ" in this charter amendment cannot be given the effect of changing the status of a policeman from that of a governmental officer to that of a mere employee. That obviously was not the purpose of the amendment, the title of which indicated only that it would "provide salaries for policemen and...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Hord
...his status but the nature and extent of his duties and responsibilities with which he is charged under the law. Cornet v. City of Chattanooga, 165 Tenn. 563, 56 S.W.2d 742. To constitute an office, as distinguished from employment, it is essential that the position must have been created by......
-
Eidson v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co.
...defense on two grounds: (1) That the deceased employee being a policeman, was an 'officer' and not an 'employee.' Cornet v. City of Chattanooga, 165 Tenn. 563, 56 S.W.2d 742. (2) That the Company was liable, if at all, under the Employer's Liability provisions of the policy, to the employer......
-
State v. Thompson
...which we are dealing since the rights and obligations of a public office are created by law, not by contract. Cornett v. City of Chattanooga, 165 Tenn. 563, 567, 56 S.W.2d 742. Nor have we been able to find any decision of this court dealing with this question, but we are referred to or fin......
-
Wise v. City of Knoxville
...from salary of any amounts earned by him during suspension. 150 A.L.R. 115, 116, 120. The plaintiff relies on Cornett v. City of Chattanooga, 165 Tenn. 563, 56 S.W.2d 742. However, this case is to be distinguished from the present case because that decision was a construction and interpreta......