Cornman Tweedy 560 v. City of Casa Grande

• Decision Date: 15 March 2006
• Docket Number: No. 2 CA-CV 2005-0159.,2 CA-CV 2005-0159.
• Citation: 137 P.3d 309,213 Ariz. 1
• Parties: CORNMAN TWEEDY 560, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; Sun Lakes-Casa Grande Development, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. CITY OF CASA GRANDE, a municipal corporation and real party in interest, Defendant/Appellee. CITY OF CASA GRANDE, a municipal corporation, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. City of Eloy, a municipal corporation, Defendant/Appellant.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

Page 309

137 P.3d 309

213 Ariz. 1

CORNMAN TWEEDY 560, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; Sun Lakes-Casa Grande Development, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. CITY OF CASA GRANDE, a municipal corporation and real party in interest, Defendant/Appellee.

CITY OF CASA GRANDE, a municipal corporation, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. City of Eloy, a municipal corporation, Defendant/Appellant.

No. 2 CA-CV 2005-0159.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division Two, Department B.

March 15, 2006.

Fennemore Craig By Andrew M. Federhar, Timothy Berg, and Theresa Dwyer, Phoenix, Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants and Defendant/Appellant.

Moyes Storey, Ltd. By C. Brad Woodford and Andrew B. Ching, Phoenix, Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee.

Brett D. Wallace, Casa Grande City Attorney, Casa Grande, Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee.

OPINION

ECKERSTROM, Presiding Judge.

¶1 The parties in this case dispute whether the City of Casa Grande's petition to annex certain lands east of the city's boundary complies with the dimension and state approval requirements of Arizona's annexation statute, A.R.S. § 9-471. We also consider whether one of the City of Eloy's annexation petitions, which encompasses some of the same territory, was filed in accordance with that statute.

Facts and Procedural Background

¶ 2 Because this is an appeal from a declaratory judgment, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the judgment. See Associated Aviation Underwriters v. Wood, 209 Ariz. 137, ¶ 5, 98 P.3d 572, 578 (App.2004). Casa Grande filed a petition in June 2005 in the Pinal County Recorder's Office to annex nearly seventeen thousand acres of land bordering the city to the east.¹ Attached to the petition was the 1997 approval from the Arizona State Selection Board for annexation of some of the same state trust lands included in the annexation petition.

¶ 3 Plaintiffs/appellants Cornman Tweedy 560, LLC, and Sun Lakes-Casa Grande Development, LLC (collectively, Cornman), thereafter filed a special action complaint in superior court seeking declaratory relief. They charged that Casa Grande's petition is invalid because one of the dimensions of the proposed annexation territory does not comply with the "length" and width restrictions in § 9-471(H)(3). Cornman also alleged that Casa Grande has failed to secure current approval from the state for the annexation of the trust lands, rendering the petition void ab initio.

¶ 4 On the same day Cornman filed its complaint, Eloy filed in the recorder's office three petitions to annex territory. One of those petitions sought to annex some of the same territory included in the Casa Grande petition. Eloy maintains it filed that petition to deny Casa Grande an opportunity to cure any deficiencies in its annexation petition.

¶ 5 Casa Grande countered by filing its own special action complaint asking the trial court to invalidate Eloy's petition, characterizing it as "patently invalid." Casa Grande also alleged that the relevant portion of § 9-471(A)(6) had required Eloy to attach to its petition an affidavit stating that the proposed annexation territory is not "already subject to an earlier filing for annexation," but that the affidavit Eloy had filed, stating that the property is not subject to a "valid earlier filing for annexation," is insufficient.

¶ 6 The two actions were consolidated. The trial court conducted a hearing on the matters and considered three issues: (1) whether the Casa Grande annexation petition exceeds the size restrictions in § 9-471(H)(3); (2) whether Casa Grande has valid approval from the state to conduct the annexation; and (3) whether Eloy's annexation petition is illegal because it includes land in the territory described in Casa Grande's petition. The court resolved all issues in favor of Casa Grande, and Cornman and Eloy appealed.

Discussion

A. Does the shape of the annexation territory violate the contiguity requirement of § 9-471?

¶7 Cornman first argues the trial court misinterpreted § 9-471 and, as a result, confused the "length" and width calculations of the territory in Casa Grande's petition. It contends that the trial court's assignment of the shorter of the two dimensions as the length rather than the width is error and that the statute specifically contemplates that the length of a proposed annexation territory is necessarily the greater of the two dimensions. We disagree and, after considering both the language and purpose of § 9-471(H)(3), find that the trial court correctly determined that the dimensions of the territory comport with the statutory requirements.

¶ 8 We review issues of statutory construction de novo.² Zamora v. Reinstein, 185 Ariz. 272, 275, 915 P.2d 1227, 1230 (1996). The primary goal of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Id. The best and most reliable indicium of that intent is the plain language of the statute. Id. If the language is ambiguous, we then consider "factors such as the statute's context, subject matter, historical background, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose." Id.

¶ 9 Arizona law requires that the territory of a proposed annexation be contiguous to the annexing city or municipality. § 9-471(A)(1); see City of Safford v. Town of Thatcher, 17 Ariz.App. 25, 28, 495 P.2d 150, 153 (1972). Strict compliance with the contiguity provision of § 9-471 is required. Town of Miami v. City of Globe, 195 Ariz. 176, ¶¶ 9-14, 985 P.2d 1035, 1038-40 (App.1998).³

¶10 Territory is contiguous for purposes of the annexation statute if the following criteria are met:

1. It adjoins the exterior boundary of the annexing city or town for at least three hundred feet.

2. It is, at all points, at least two hundred feet in width, excluding rights-of-way and roadways.

3. The distance from the existing boundary of the annexing city or town where it adjoins the annexed territory to the furthest point of the annexed territory from such boundary is no more than twice the maximum width of the annexed territory.

§ 9-471(H). Cornman does not dispute that Casa Grande's proposed annexation territory satisfies the requirements of § 9-471(H)(1) and (H)(2). But it contends that the court misapplied (H)(3) and that the "length" of the territory is more than double its maximum width.

¶11 Section 9-471(H)(3) requires that the width of annexation territory be compared to the distance between the adjoining boundaries and "the furthest point of the annexed territory from such boundary." The trial court found that the farthest point of the territory from any of the shared boundary is the corner of Storey Road and Tweedy Road and that the distance from the shared boundary is 5.5 miles.⁴ The court then found the maximum width of the territory is 11.5 miles. Because the distance from the farthest point of the territory to the city boundary, 5.5 miles, is not more than double the width, 11.5 miles, the court concluded that the proposed annexation does not violate the contiguity requirements in subsection (H)(3).

¶12 Cornman maintains that the length of a territory must necessarily be the longer of the measurements and the width the shorter. It argues that, "[a]lthough A.R.S. § 9-471 does not explain the term `width,' it does define `length' as being `the distance from the existing boundary ... to the furthest point of the annexed territory from such boundary.'" But Cornman overlooks that the statute does not contain the word "length" at all and requires that the width be measured only after the farthest boundary of the territory is determined.

¶13 Cornman also maintains that, even if the length need not be longer than the width, the trial court erroneously determined the farthest point of the annexation territory from the shared boundary because it chose an incorrect shared boundary point from which to measure. The trial court determined the farthest point of the territory by identifying the boundary point of the territory that is the greatest distance from the nearest shared boundary point. Cornman contends the court should have determined the farthest point by identifying a point along the boundary of the territory that is the greatest distance from the farthest shared boundary point.

¶14 Subsection (H)(3) does not specifically articulate which point along the shared boundary must be used for measuring. Thus, Cornman's interpretation of the statute arises from one plausible facial reading of its language. But that interpretation would require courts to ignore closer points along a shared boundary when determining the farthest point of an annexation territory from that boundary. The boundary of the annexation territory Cornman has selected as farthest from Casa Grande (a point along the northernmost border of the annexation territory on Millrise Road) is obviously closer than 5.5 miles to the shared boundary of Casa Grande to the southwest. Thus, although the Millrise point may indeed be 11.9 miles to the north of the southernmost part of Casa Grande's shared boundary with the annexation territory, the Millrise point is clearly not "the furthest point of the annexed territory" from the "existing boundary" of Casa Grande. § 9-471(H)(3). In short, Cornman's interpretation of the statute, when applied to the annexation here, does not ultimately comport with the language of § 9-471(H)(3).

¶15 Moreover, Cornman's interpretation of subsection (H)(3) would impede those annexation plans involving none of the abuses the legislature sought to remedy in adopting the statute. Section 9-471(H) was designed to prevent "gerrymandered" annexation plans that result in "islands" of unincorporated territory isolated from competing annexation by intervening thin strips of incorporated areas. Roberts v. City of Mesa, 158 Ariz. 42, 46, 760 P.2d 1091, 1095 (App.1988); see 56 Am.Jur.2d Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions § 53 (2000); In re Annexation...