Coronel v. Chicago White Sox, Ltd.

• Decision Date: 19 May 1992
• Docket Number: No. 1-90-0091,1-90-0091
• Citation: 230 Ill.App.3d 734,595 N.E.2d 45,171 Ill.Dec. 917
• Parties: , 171 Ill.Dec. 917 Blanca CORONEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHICAGO WHITE SOX, LTD., a limited partnership, and Comiskey Park Corporation, an Illinois Corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 45

595 N.E.2d 45

230 Ill.App.3d 734, 171 Ill.Dec. 917

Blanca CORONEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHICAGO WHITE SOX, LTD., a limited partnership, and Comiskey

Park Corporation, an Illinois Corporation,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 1-90-0091.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

First District, Second Division.

May 19, 1992.

Michael J. Kane and Karen A. Kerbis, Kane, Obbish & Propes, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellant.

Baker & McKenzie, Chicago (Francis D. Morrissey, J. Kent Mathewson, Michael A. Pollard, and L. Michael Tarpey, of counsel), for defendants-appellees.

Justice SCARIANO delivered the opinion of the court:

On August 16, 1986, plaintiff, Blanca Coronel, attended her first Chicago White Sox baseball game at Comiskey Park, and sat in the first base "Golden Box Seats," specifically, Box Section 32, Row E, Seat 2, behind home plate, facing first base, approximately three seats away from the edge of a protective screen. During the sixth inning, when plaintiff looked down into her lap to pick up some popcorn, she was struck on the right side of her face by a line-drive, foul-tipped ball, and suffered a broken jaw.

She brought suit against defendants Chicago White Sox, Ltd., and Comiskey Park Corporation (collectively "the Sox"), alleging negligence:

"[ (1) for their] fail[ure] to provide adequate protection from batted balls for those spectators seated in the area of the stadium most vulnerable to stray foul balls; [ (2) for] fail[ure] to provide an adequate number of seats in areas screened off from the playing field; [and (3) for] fail[ure] to warn her of the likelihood that batted balls would be projected towards her and those spectators seated near her."

After the trial court granted the Sox's motion for summary judgment, plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider but that motion was denied. Plaintiff appeals.

Plaintiff claims that the Sox failed (1) to adequately protect her from, and (2) to warn her of, foul balls which they knew would be hit into the unprotected area in which she was seated. Plaintiff asserts that these are questions of fact, and thus are questions for the jury, and cannot be decided on a motion for summary judgment.

The existence of a duty is a question of law, to be determined by the court. (Ward v. K Mart Corp. (1990), 136 Ill.2d 132, 140, 143 Ill.Dec. 288, 554 N.E.2d 223; Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center (1987), 117 Ill.2d 507, 525, 111 Ill.Dec. 944, 513 N.E.2d 387; Wimmer v. Koenigseder (1985), 108 Ill.2d 435, 440, 92 Ill.Dec. 233, 484 N.E.2d 1088.) Whether or not there is a breach of a duty, however, is a question of fact, to be determined by the trier of fact. Curtis v. County of Cook (1983), 98 Ill.2d 158, 163, 74 Ill.Dec. 614, 456 N.E.2d 116.

A land owner or occupier of land owes a duty of reasonable care to business invitees located on his premises. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 80, par. 302; Ward, 136 Ill.2d 132, 143 Ill.Dec. 288, 554 N.E.2d 223.) We find no exception in favor of sports facilities from this requirement. Indeed, that the owner of a baseball park owes a duty to protect spectators from injury caused by foul balls was legally recognized a full quarter century ago by our court in the case of Maytnier v. Rush (1st Dist.1967), 80 Ill.App.2d 336, 342, 225 N.E.2d 83, where it was held that such duty does not require "a complete fencing of the spectators present at a baseball game to protect them from stray baseballs[;]" but rather, requires a "screen for the most dangerous part of the grandstand * * *." (Maytnier, 80 Ill.App.2d at 343, 225 N.E.2d 83, quoting Brisson v. Minneapolis Baseball & Athletic Ass'n (1932), 185 Minn. 507, 240 N.W. 903.) The most dangerous part of a ball park is universally recognized as the area behind home plate. Clapman v. City of New York (1984), 63 N.Y.2d 669, 479 N.Y.S.2d 515, 468 N.E.2d 697; City of Atlanta v. Merritt (1984), 172 Ga.App. 470, 323 S.E.2d 680; Akins v. Glens Falls City School District (1981), 53 N.Y.2d 325, 441 N.Y.S.2d 644, 424 N.E.2d 531; and whether the sports facility adequately screened the most dangerous area is a question of fact for the jury. Maytnier, 80 Ill.App.2d at 343, 225 N.E.2d 83.

In Riley v. Chicago Cougars Hockey Club Inc. (1st Dist.1981), 100 Ill.App.3d 664, 56 Ill.Dec. 210, 427 N.E.2d 290, the lease between the Cougars and the amphitheater where the team played its home games, required the Cougars to provide "plastic walls for crowd protection," but "did not specify how high the walls should be or what part of the stands should be protected. Around the edges of the rink at ice level, the Cougars erected herculite glass panels in order to protect spectators and to keep the puck in the rink. The herculite glass panels were higher behind the goals because most shots are aimed in that general direction. No protection was provided for balcony spectators." (Riley, 100 Ill.App.3d at 665, 56 Ill.Dec. 210, 427 N.E.2d 290.) While in play, "[t]he puck deflected off one of the Cougar players' sticks and soared on an angle to the first row of the balcony where it struck plaintiff on the left side of his head and knocked him unconscious." (Riley, 100 Ill.App.3d at 665, 56 Ill.Dec. 210, 427 N.E.2d 290.) The appellate court, in affirming a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, rejected the "Cougars' argument that the trial court should have found, as a matter of law, that the Cougars owed no legal duty to provide protection for spectators at hockey games," citing Maytnier. Riley, 100 Ill.App.3d at 666, 56 Ill.Dec. 210, 427 N.E.2d 290.

Especially on point are Wells v. Minneapolis Baseball & Athletic Ass'n (1913), 122 Minn. 327, 142 N.W. 706 and Akins, 53 N.Y.2d 325, 441 N.Y.S.2d 644, 424 N.E.2d 531. In Wells, a spectator, unfamiliar with the dangers inherent in attending a baseball game, was seated near the protective screen, and was struck by a foul-tipped ball. The screen covered "about 65 feet of the center of the grandstand" and "completely covered the opening from the roof down." (Wells, 142 N.W. at 707.) The plaintiff contended that the defendant "negligently constructed [the] screen * * * of insufficient size to furnish * * * protection." Wells, 142 N.W. at 707. The Supreme Court of Minnesota held that not only did the defendant owe a duty to protect its patrons by shielding certain seats, but also, "[w]hat precaution the ordinarily prudent person, furnishing a public amusement of this kind, should take to warn and protect the spectators from the attendant danger of which they may be ignorant, we think a question for the jury." Wells, 142 N.W. at 708.

Akins held that where an injured spectator presented no evidence that a backstop 24 feet high and 50 feet wide was inadequate, the owner was not liable for failing to provide additional screening along the baselines of its field. Citing Maytnier, the court stated that:

"we do not attempt to prescribe precisely what, as a matter of law, are the required dimensions of a baseball field backstop. Nor do we suggest that where the adequacy of the screening in terms of protecting the area behind home plate properly is put in issue, the case should not be submitted to the jury."

Akins, 53 N.Y.2d at 331, 441 N.Y.S.2d 644, 424 N.E.2d 531.

Also persuasive is Duffy v. Midlothian Country Club (1980), 92 Ill.App.3d 193, 47 Ill.Dec. 786, 415 N.E.2d 1099, where the plaintiff, a spectator attending a "Western Open" golf tournament, while standing near a concession stand located between two fairways, was struck by an errant golf ball and was injured. The concession stand was "placed in [an] area[ ] in which balls had regularly landed in the past, and * * * the * * * spectators located between the fairways [were] within range of balls likely to be hit by golfers." (Duffy, 92 Ill.App.3d at 196, 47 Ill.Dec. 786, 415 N.E.2d 1099.) The court held that the defendant owed a duty of "ordinary and reasonable care" to the plaintiff, and that "whether the standard of care required in a given case has been exercised is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury." Duffy, 92 Ill.App.3d at 198, 47 Ill.Dec. 786, 415 N.E.2d 1099, (citation omitted).

In light of the authorities cited above, we cannot accept the suggestion advanced by the Sox that it should be they and not the jury who should determine the adequacy of the protection afforded its fans at a baseball game. (Riley, 100 Ill.App.3d at 667, 56 Ill.Dec. 210, 427 N.E.2d 290, citing Maytnier.) Considering the location of plaintiff's seat and the comparatively small width of the screen, a question of fact exists as to whether there was violation of the duty owed by the Sox to spectators seated in the most dangerous part of the ballpark. We note that in Wells the adequacy of a screen 65 feet wide, and in Akins the adequacy of a backstop 54 feet wide, properly put in issue, were held to be determinations to be left to the jury. Here the Sox's director of purchasing, construction and maintenance testified in his deposition that the protective screen behind home plate was 21 feet high and 39.7 feet wide, one of the smallest in major league baseball. In discussing the significance of evidence used to compare the screening utilized in one park to that which is commonly employed in others, cases cited by the Sox themselves state that "while customary methods do not furnish a conclusive or controlling test of negligence or justify a practice obviously laden with danger, they are nevertheless to be considered as factors of measurement of due care." (Schentzel v. Philadelphia National League Club (1953), 173 Pa.Super. 179, 96 A.2d 181, 185; Jones v. Three Rivers Management Corp. (1978), 483 Pa. 75, 394 A.2d 546, 550.) Accordingly, we hold that plaintiff has met the requisite burden for her case to proceed to a jury.

The Sox also maintain that they did not owe plaintiff a duty to warn her of the risk of being injured by foul balls because as a matter of law a land owner owes no duty to warn of an "open and obvious" danger. Whi...