Corporate Group Service, Inc. v. Lymberis
| Decision Date | 16 July 1962 |
| Docket Number | No. 31662,31662 |
| Citation | 146 So.2d 745 |
| Parties | CORPORATE GROUP SERVICE, INC., and Allure Shoe Corporation, Petitioners, v. Achilles LYMBERIS, Employee, and the Florida Industrial Commission, an administrative agency, Respondents. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Warren C. Rose, Cosgrove, Rose & Budzinski, Miami, for petitioners.
Dan G. Wheeler, Jr., Miami, for Achilles Lymberis, employee.
Burnis T. Coleman and Patrick H. Mears, Tallahassee, for Florida Industrial Commission.
Certiorari denied.
ON REHEARING GRANTED
The hearing of the claim growing out of injuries received by the respondent Lymberis culminated in an order awarding compensation for temporary total and temporary partial disability for 18 months, permanent partial disability of the body as a whole for 70 weeks following, and commanding the payment to a hospital of the sum of $1800 and the reimbursement of the claimant for $68 expended by him for drugs and x-rays. The order further required the payment of $1900 for services of claimant's attorney, $123 for his expenses in procuring depositions, and the sums of $200 and $250 respectively to two named physicians. All other doctors who testified were allowed $50 each for their services.
When the matter reached the Full Commission on application for review, an order was entered simply affirming the deputy's conclusion because it was justified by the evidence under the rule adopted in United States Casualty Company v. Maryland Casualty Company, Fla., 55 So.2d 741.
Before the deputy there was testimony from the claimant, lay witnesses, two neuropsychiatrists, a neurologist, a psychologist, two psychiatrists, an ophthalmologist, and, during treatment administered the claimant he had an electroencephalogram and a lumbar puncture.
It appears that the claimant, in the course of his employment, fell a distance of 10 feet striking his head and sustaining an epidural hematoma which required brain surgery. The hematoma was evacuated by a neurosurgeon. The claimant remained in the hospital 16 days and upon failure to improve was returned to the hospital where an acrylic cranioplasty, or insertion of a plastic plate, was performed. After a stay of nine days he was discharged, remaining under the care of physicians, however, for the next 10 months. Although he complained of headaches and dizziness, he undertook to work for his employer but earned only $52.57 per week as compared with $126, the amount of his wages before the accident. He then ceased his work and has never resumed it.
When the case came to this court it was determined, 16 July 1962, by a denial of the petition for certiorari without comment. Then the petitioners filed a petition for rehearing which was granted. In it two points were presented: number two, corresponding with the second point in the original brief, raised the question whether or not a psychiatric condition is a disease within the purview of Sec. 440.02(19), The Workmen's Compensation Law, F.S.A., subject to the limitation of the act.
The claimant was apparently normal before his injury, but afterward, so it was testified by witnesses whom the deputy chose to believe, he became moody, thought everyone was against him, distrusted his attorneys and doctors, expressed a desire to jump into the river and was irrational, incoherent and despondent.
At the first hearing claimant's condition had so depreciated that he could not intelligently answer questions propounded to him so the deputy appointed a psychiatrist to examine him, who later reported that the claimant was devoid of personality disorder before his injury but that the hurt had triggered a recession and his then condition was the equivalent of a traumatic sequela.
There seems to have been sufficient testimony acceptable by the deputy to establish that the claimant's plight was traceable to trauma suffered in the accident and not to a pre-existing condition as was urged by the petitioners.
Inasmuch as we are convinced that there was ample testimony from which the deputy could deduce that claimant had had no 'pre-existing disease' that was 'accelerated or aggravated' by claimant's fall, there is no occasion for us now to decide whether or not only a part of the resulting damage was compensable by petitioners.
The other problem, corresponding with the third point in the original brief, deals with the propriety of the assessment against the petitioners of an unitemized...
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Graves v. Jones
...rev. denied, 690 So.2d 1299 (Fla. 1997). No new ground or position may be assumed in a petition for rehearing. Corporate Group Service, Inc. v. Lymberis, 146 So.2d 745 (Fla. 1962); see also Ayer v. Bush, 775 So.2d 368 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)(recognizing that it is a rather fundamental principal......
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Watson v. Freeman Decorating Co.
...cause, we think it first necessary to resolve that question. As was observed by the Florida Supreme Court in Corporate Group Service, Inc. v. Lymberis, 146 So.2d 745, 747 (Fla.1962), the statute itself "is silent about the manner in which and the person by whom the [good cause] showing shou......
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St. Francis Hospital, Inc. v. Feinberg
...Strickland v. Al Landers Dump Trucks, Inc., Fla., 170 So.2d 445. The claimant had the burden to show good cause. Corporate Group Service, Inc. v. Lymberis, Fla., 146 So.2d 745. The carrier had no burden to discover who was treating the claimant and then insure that the physician file his re......
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Cleveland v. State, 5D03-2067.
...rev. denied, 690 So.2d 1299 (Fla.1997). No new ground or position may be assumed in a petition for rehearing. Corporate Group Service, Inc. v. Lymberis, 146 So.2d 745 (Fla.1962); see also Ayer v. Bush, 775 So.2d 368 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (recognizing that it is a rather fundamental principal ......