Correction Officers Feder. Union v. Bristol

• Decision Date: 08 September 2005
• Docket Number: No. 03-P-1493.,03-P-1493.
• Citation: 833 N.E.2d 1182,64 Mass. App. Ct. 461
• Parties: MASSACHUSETTS CORRECTION OFFICERS FEDERATED UNION v. COUNTY OF BRISTOL & another.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 1182

833 N.E.2d 1182

64 Mass. App. Ct. 461

MASSACHUSETTS CORRECTION OFFICERS FEDERATED UNION v. COUNTY OF BRISTOL & another.¹

No. 03-P-1493.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Bristol.

Argued November 16, 2004.

Decided September 8, 2005.

Matthew E. Dwyer, Boson (Kathleen A. Pennini with him) for the plaintiff.

Robert M. Novack, Fall River, for the defendants.

Present: GREENBERG, COWIN, & DOERFER, JJ.

DOERFER, J.

Collective bargaining between the Massachusetts Correction Officers Federated Union (union) and the county of Bristol and its sheriff (employer) had proceeded to impasse after the expiration of a prior collective bargaining agreement. One issue which had been the subject of bargaining was the establishment of a vacation schedule. No agreement having been reached, the employer established the vacation schedule which it preferred. The union regarded this to be an unfair labor practice and brought a complaint before the Labor Relations Commission (commission). The union also brought a complaint in Superior Court seeking a preliminary injunction to keep the old vacation scheduling procedures in place. We affirm the order denying the application for a preliminary injunction, though not for the reasons given by the motion judge. We conclude that the administrative law framework constructed by the Legislature under G.L. c. 150E, which invests the commission with jurisdiction to deal with complaints of unfair labor practices and to issue orders for expeditious hearings in connection with such complaints, 456 Code Mass. Regs. § 15.10 (1993), requires the courts to refrain from entering such orders where, as here, such a complaint is pending before the commission.

Facts and prior proceedings. In 1997, the union, on behalf of its more than three hundred members, and the employer entered into a three-year collective bargaining agreement (CBA), which, by its terms, expired in June of 2000. Upon the expiration of that labor agreement, the union and employer engaged in bargaining, mediation, and fact-finding, all in an effort to reach a new agreement.² That effort was inconclusive.

Under the CBA (art. X, § 20), "an employee's vacation week shall commence on the first day after the employee's regularly scheduled days off." The CBA (art. X, § 8) did, however, reserve power to the appointing authority (the sheriff), who "shall establish the over-all vacation schedule and retain the right to make revisions therein and shall grant vacation leave in the vacation year in which it becomes available, unless in [the sheriff's] opinion it is impossible or impracticable to do so because of work schedules or emergencies."

The sheriff asserted that, over the course of the CBA, § 20 had led to a situation where the sheriff's office had been "forced" to spend a substantial amount of its budget for overtime pay, necessitated by having junior correction officers work extra hours to cover those senior officers who were able to "wrap around" vacation weeks by taking them beginning immediately after their regularly scheduled days off, so as to be out of the work cycle for periods of time longer than had been the custom before the CBA.

In bargaining for a new agreement, the sheriff proposed that the parties revert back to a vacation leave protocol (which had been in place before the CBA) calling for a Sunday through Saturday schedule. That particular issue, among others, remained unresolved, despite the parties' efforts to reach an accord through the mediation and fact-finding process.³

In March, 2003, the sheriff informed the union that overtime expenditures were straining the fisc of the sheriff's office and the health of junior officers who were being required to work extra hours as a result of the vacation policy under § 20. The sheriff solicited the union's ideas for possible solutions. This invitation was not productive of further negotiations and, on April 16, 2003, the sheriff announced the new policy respecting the scheduling of vacation leave which is the subject matter of this dispute.

The sheriff, in his capacity as appointing authority, contends he acted in good faith and within his permitted managerial power to change or alter the vacation leave schedule based on the needs of his office.⁴ The union, on the other hand, maintains the effect of the sheriff's policy is to implement a unilateral change to a mandatory subject of bargaining without reaching an impasse and thus constitutes an unfair labor practice.

Subsequently, on May 7, 2003, the union filed a complaint with the commission, alleging the sheriff had engaged in a prohibited practice. The union did not request an expedited hearing. See 456 Code Mass. Regs. § 15.10 (1993).

While the unfair labor practice complaint was pending before the commission, the union commenced this action in the Superior Court on June 30, 2003, and applied for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. At the hearing on that application the parties addressed the issue, among others, whether the Superior Court could issue such equitable relief given the pendency of the unfair labor practice charge at the administrative level. A Superior Court judge, after hearing and submissions by the parties, relied instead on the sheriff's additional argument that G.L. c. 214, § 6 (the Anti-Injunction Act), applied to the case at hand, so as to bar the court from issuing injunctive relief unless the applicable procedures were followed, including the requirement of a three-judge panel.⁵ In addition, the judge also agreed with the sheriff that the union had not, in any event, met its burden under the standard for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. See Packaging Indus. Group, Inc. v. Cheney, 380 Mass. 609, 616-617, 405 N.E.2d 106 (1980).

The union appealed pursuant to G.L. c. 231, § 118 (second par.), from the judge's ruling denying its application for a preliminary injunction. Contrary to the motion judge's ruling, we conclude that the Anti-Injunction Act, G.L. c. 214, § 6, was inapplicable and thus did not delineate the court's jurisdiction to hear the matter. We hold there was no error, however, in denying the injunction, because we believe the principle of exhaustion of remedies is controlling.⁶ In light of the union's pending complaint before the commission, the trial court (and this court) should not act on a request for a preliminary injunction at least until such time as an appeal for judicial review by either side from a final decision of the commission is ripe. The questions raised by the union's unfair labor practice charge before the commission encompass the same substantive issues arising from its application for a preliminary injunction. As such, the commission should decide the matter in the first instance.⁷

Anti-Injunction Act. General Laws c. 214, § 6, inserted by St.1973, c. 1114, § 62, limits the court's jurisdiction in granting injunctive relief in cases "involving or growing out of a labor dispute." "Labor dispute," as that term appears in § 6, is separately defined in a related statute, G.L. c. 149, § 20C, which provides in relevant part,

"(a) A case shall be held to involve or to grow out of a labor dispute when the case involves persons who are engaged in the same industry, trade, craft or occupation; or who are employees of the same employer; or who are members of the same or an affiliated organization of employers or employees;. . . or when the case involves any conflicting or competing interests in a `labor dispute' (as hereinafter defined) of `persons participating or interested' therein (as hereinafter defined).

"(b) A person or association shall be held to be a person participating or interested in a labor dispute if relief is sought against him or it, and if he or it is engaged in the same industry, trade, craft or occupation in which such dispute occurs, or has a direct or indirect interest therein, or is a member, officer or agent of any association composed in whole or in part of employers or employees engaged in such industry, trade, craft or occupation.

"(c) The term `labor dispute' . . . includes any controversy arising out of any demand of any character whatsoever concerning terms or conditions of employment . . . regardless of whether the disputants stand in proximate relation of employer and employee." (Emphases added.)

G.L. c. 149, § 20C, as amended by St.1950, c. 452, § 2.

We do not believe the conclusion that Bristol County and its sheriff were a "person" within the meaning of § 6 and § 20C is consistent with Hansen v. Commonwealth, 344 Mass. 214, 219, 181 N.E.2d 843 (1962), and related cases. Thus, we conclude that the Anti-Injunction Act (§ 6) does not apply and that the court's jurisdiction to enter the relief requested by the union did not depend on strict compliance with the specified procedures, including sworn testimony before, and findings under § 6(1) by, a three-judge panel of the Superior Court convened pursuant to G.L. c. 212, § 30 (see note 5, supra).⁸

As a general principle, the Supreme Judicial Court and this court have ruled that "`person' ordinarily does not describe the State or its subdivisions." Commonwealth v. Dowd, 37 Mass.App.Ct. 164, 166, 638 N.E.2d 923 (1994). See Hansen v. Commonwealth, 344 Mass. at 219, 181 N.E.2d 843; Kilbane v. Secretary of Human Servs., 14 Mass.App.Ct. 286, 287, 438 N.E.2d 89 (1982).

In Hansen, the court addressed the meaning of the term "labor dispute" under the Anti-Injunction Act in a case where a public employer (Metropolitan Transit Authority) sought to enjoin a threatened strike of its public employees. Hansen v. Commonwealth, 344 Mass. at 218, 181 N.E.2d 843. The court focused on the term "persons" in G.L. c. 149, § 20C, which refers to those "who are engaged in the same industry, trade, craft or occupation." Id. at 219, 181 N.E.2d 843. The court determined that "[s]uch language is not apt to describe public employers and public employees." Ibid. The court expressly stated, "it...