Correctional Sup'Rs v. Dept. of Corrections
Decision Date | 31 January 2002 |
Docket Number | No. C037493.,C037493. |
Citation | 96 Cal.App.4th 824,117 Cal.Rptr.2d 595 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONAL SUPERVISORS ORGANIZATION, INC., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
Steven B. Bassoff, Sacramento, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Howard L. Schwartz, Piedmont, Linda A. Mayhew and Roy J. Chastain, Sacramento, for Defendants and Respondents.
The California Correctional Supervisors Organization, Inc. (CCSO) sought a writ of mandate to compel the California Department of Corrections and its director (collectively, CDC) to discontinue certain staffing practices which assertedly violated CDC's duty to provide employees with safe working conditions. The trial court issued a judgment denying the writ after concluding CCSO had not met its burden to prove any abuse of discretion by CDC. CCSO timely filed a notice of appeal. We affirm.
As the trial court judge explained at the hearing on the writ, CCSO's complaints are not trivial, but they cannot be resolved by the judiciary. CDC has broad discretion to determine adequate staffing levels at prisons and CCSO has not shown CDC has acted outside the bounds of reason. Therefore, the trial court properly denied the mandamus petition.
(People ex rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado (1971) 5 Cal.3d 480, 490-491, 96 Cal.Rptr. 553, 487 P.2d 1193, fn. omitted.)
Where a statute leaves room for discretion, a challenger must show the official acted arbitrarily, beyond the bounds of reason or in derogation of the applicable legal standards. (See City of Sacramento v. Drew (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1287, 255 Cal.Rptr. 704.) Where only one choice can be a reasonable exercise of discretion, a court may compel an official to make that choice. (Bank of Italy v. Johnson (1926) 200 Cal. 1, 31, 251 P. 784; Ferrill v. Ellis (1942) 50 Cal.App.2d 743, 746, 123 P.2d 857.)
(Saathoff v. City of San Diego (1995) 35 Cal. App.4th 697, 700, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 352.)
The "Institutions" branch of CDC operates 33 prisons, among its other duties. These prisons vary widely in age, size, configuration, and type of inmate population. Each prison has its own warden who is responsible for operations, including employee safety. The prisons are organized into three regional districts and these in turn answer to CDC headquarters. Deputy Director David Tristan is in charge of institutions, and he answers to a directorate consisting of CDC Directors Clarence ("Cal") Terhune and Steve Lambra. Both Tristan and Terhune gave depositions in this case, described below.
Prison guards are organized in a paramilitary fashion. (See Gray v. County of Tulare (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1092, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 317.) The first rank consists of correctional officers, who are represented by the California Correctional Peace Officers Association (CCPOA), not a party to this case. Next comes Sergeants, and then Lieutenants, who supervise Correctional Officers. These are largely represented by CCSO. Because they are supervisors, their labor group is subject to different laws than CCPOA. (See Gov. Code, § 3525 et seq.) A division of CCPOA also represents supervisors, but this is not relevant here.
The number of correctional officers, sergeants and lieutenants needed at a given prison varies depending on the watch, day of the week, inmate population and other factors, and the warden must ensure adequate staffing by considering these factors. Employees are entitled to vacations, sick leave, family leave and other time off, but their shifts must always be covered. Sometimes, to cover a vacant shift or for other reasons (riots, sweep searches, etc.), a warden authorizes overtime. Unfortunately, the use of overtime eats up the available pool of funding authorized by the Legislature and the department of finance. In order to bring a prison back into budget limits, a warden has to take steps to reduce employee expenses.
There are two somewhat similar techniques for reducing employee expenses discussed in this case. "Redirection" is the assignment of a supervisor to another task. For example, a training supervisor might be told to take charge of a prison wing for a given shift. "Cross-covering" is the assignment of multiple watches to a single supervisor. For example, a supervisor of building A might be told to supervise buildings A and B for a given shift.
As more money is available to a given prison, its need to redirect or cross-cover declines. Some prisons have more generous budgets for employee hours than others, and the cross-coverage and redirection policies vary widely.
Until 1998 no written or statewide standard governed these policies. On December 17, 1998, Tristan issued a directive to all wardens to prepare supervisor vacancy plans which did The 4.9 percent was an average over a fiscal year and in effect meant that no less than 95 out of 100 theoretical supervisor slots would be filled or at least the dollar equivalent to those slots.
On February 29, 2000, Tristan issued another letter, directing wardens to consult with local CCSO chapters in drawing up redirection and cross-coverage plans. An amendment of March 10, 2000, directed wardens to consult with CCPOA, as well, apparently in response to a "rift" the first letter had caused between the two labor groups.
These letters were in response to a labor action, as reported in the Sacramento Bee. Terhune and Tristan were questioned about this article and did not dispute salient parts, although the interpretations to be drawn from it were disputed. Terhune is quoted as saying he dislikes the practice, but "`operationally, it's a fact of life and we have to do it.'" A state audit reportedly revealed CDC had spent "$255 million in overtime from July 1997 to March 1999." Because overtime was not budgeted, The article claimed Terhune acknowledges cross-coverage created a safety problem. The article also stated:
Apparently the labor action did not result in any changes, and on April 25, 2000, CCSO filed the present action, seeking a writ of mandate to compel CDC to abide by statutes regarding workplace safety "and refrain from the use of the practice of `redirection' or `cross-covering' in the assignment of lieutenants and sergeants employed in state prisons" and "to refrain from assigning lieutenants and sergeants to more than one duty post at the same time."
Terhune testified in deposition his February 29, 2000 memo was in response to CCSO safety concerns. Its purpose was to ensure "a minimum number of supervisors at each institution in order to run safely." Where further reductions would be dangerous, other steps, such as reducing inmate programs, would have to be taken.
Sergeant Donald Fredericks, a CDC employee since 1973 and a CCPOA-elected supervisorial representative, testified the policies were dangerous. In his view, "any officer or supervisor that has ever been assaulted that was in a unit that was providing cross-coverage or redirection one way or the other is a direct result of that misdirected staffing." These practices broke the "security chain" of the prison. He did not testify to any specific incident.
On this evidence, the trial court denied the petition, concluding CCSO had not shown CDC abused its discretion regarding these staffing practices.
CCSO reasons as follows: Employers, like CDC, have a duty to provide a safe workplace (Bendix Forest Products Corp. v. Division of Occupational Saf & Health (1979) 25 Cal.3d 465, 470-471, 158 Cal.Rptr. 882, 600 P.2d 1339; Bonner v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1023, 1034-1035, 275 Cal.Rptr. 337); cross-coverage and redirection impair employee safety; therefore, use of such practices is a breach of duty, or abuse of discretion, by CDC.
The trial court found CCSO had not met its burden to prove CDC breached its duty to its employees to provide a safe workplace. Viewing the evidence in favor of the judgment, cross-coverage and redirection are necessary functions of CDC, due to its budget constraints, and reasonable steps to...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Cal. Ass'n of Sanitation Agencies v. State Water Res. Control Bd.
...of discretion, a court may compel an official to make that choice.” ( California Correctional Supervisors Organization, Inc. v. Department of Corrections (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 824, 827, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 595.) But where the facts and the law in a case permit more than one choice, it is proper......
-
Stiefel v. Bechtel Corp., 06-CV-01414-H (WMC).
...requirements are sometimes referred to as the "general duties clauses." See California Correctional Supervisors Organization, Inc. v. Dept. of Corrections, 96 Cal.App.4th 824, 830-31, 117 Cal. Rptr.2d 595 (2002); see also Ming W. Chin et al., California Practice Guide: Employment Litigation......
-
Brown v. Superior Court of Alameda Cnty.
...Municipal Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 859, 863, 132 Cal.Rptr. 464, 553 P.2d 624;California Correctional Supervisors Organization, Inc. v. Department of Corrections (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 824, 827, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 595.) The burden of proving these requirements was on CCPOA. ( California Correction......
-
City of S.F. v. Bd. of Equal.
...the bounds of reason or in derogation of the applicable legal standards.” ( California Correctional Supervisors Organization, Inc. v. Department of Corrections (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 824, 827, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 595.) We therefore must consider whether City Petitioners demonstrated that SBE abu......